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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Over the past two decades, major changes have taken place in 
governmental paradigms and national self-representations across South 
Asia. A broad range of events, from Maoist insurgency and Hindu 
nationalism to constitution-writing and neoliberal economic policies 
are pushing the subcontinent through processes of internal and global 
refashioning. Incredible India! has ostensibly stepped out of the 
“imaginary waiting room of history” and joined the ranks of modern, 
developed and branded nations.1 And Naya Nepal is no longer the 
world’s last Hindu kingdom, although the country’s transition towards 
a “federal, democratic, and republican” future is still rife with 
uncertainty.2 Concomitantly with changes in governmental paradigms, 
a range of claims to local autonomy brings together local movements 
and global processes in novel ways. Place-making itself has been 
globalised. Local movements face global images of ‘their’ locality. 
State-encouraged commercial dynamics of tourism, heritage and 
geographical branding furthers a global sense of place that emphasises 
harmony over conflict. And groups claiming local roots themselves 
draw on international academic literature and globalised notions of 
indigeneity. 
In this study, I ask what happens when the increasingly 
globalised production of places collide with a resilient national order of 
                                                
1 The imaginary waiting room of history refers to Dipesh Chakrabarty’s famous 
phrase in Provincializing Europe (2000). For a recent analysis of the shifting logic 
of the India nation-state under the Incredible India! brand see (Kaur, 2012). 
2 The imagination of Nepal as a “Federal Democratic Republic” is taken directly 
out of the current interim constitution. For descriptions of recent developments in 
relation to Nepal’s refashioning in this direction see e.g. (International Crisis 
Group, 2008, 2011; B. G. Shrestha, 2012) 
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things in the Himalayan hills.3 Combining global connections with 
claims directed at the nation-state, contemporary movements for local 
autonomy provide an important site for such collisions. Here, I 
investigate movements for the establishment of a Limbuwan and 
Gorkhaland state on either side of the border between eastern Nepal 
and north-eastern India. My study is motivated by the aspirations for a 
larger say in local decisions that these movements fundamentally 
express – although, as I illustrate, these aspirations are often obscured 
and overrun by other interests. In this study, I thus ask about the 
contemporary conditions for government and local autonomy in the 
Himalayan hills. To unpack these conditions, I ask how government 
was first extended over these hills by imperial regimes. I then ask how 
this government changed with the national territorialisation of the 
subcontinent. And finally, I ask how these governmental legacies are 
played out in the contemporary politics of local autonomy. Through my 
analysis, I show how contemporary political dynamics reactualise 
resilient imperial differences and tensions within the nation that a 
national territorial perspective obscures. And I argue that the 
contemporary refashioning of these differences can shift decision-
making both closer to and further away from the people inhabiting the 
borderland. 
The hills, that form the centre of attention in the present study, 
are what most people from my flat part of the world would call 
mountains. A translation of the Nepali pahad, these hills are dwarfed 
only by the show clad himal, the massive peaks of the Himalayan 
range. Albeit, domesticated as “hills” by the British colonists and their 
hill stations, they in fact presents a rugged terrain that largely opposes 
                                                
3 I take the notions of a ’national order of things’ from (Malkki, 1992) 
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centralised government. I pose my questions from these hills neither to 
exoticise nor generalise the area they inhabit. What the hills provide 
my study, is rather a productive location from which to rethink notions 
of landscape, territory and government in the contemporary 
conjuncture. The ‘friction’ of the terrain and history of un-
governability in these hills bring the spatial extension of government in 
to sharp relief. The situation of my area of study across the border 
between two contemporary nation states provides a good position to 
approach the production of national territory. And the contemporary 
movements for local autonomy combined with the global connections 
of indigeneity, heritage, tea and tourism make it a good location to 
observe shifts in the scalar hierarchies along which we often imagine 
the world. 
Through my engagement with this area, I argue that we need to 
rethink notions of government and its spatiality in order to understand 
the contemporary conditions for government and local autonomy. 
Aspirations for local autonomy tend to be regarded in light of 
traditional hierarchies of scale. Here, the local is seen in relation to the 
national, and autonomy in relation to national territorial government. 
Movements for local autonomy are seen as national problems because 
localities are seen as encompassed by national scales.4 However, the 
last couple of decades has seen increasing shifts in the connections 
between governmental authority and national territories. The 
Himalayan hills also reflect these shifts, and my study suggests that it is 
no longer sufficient simply to re-evaluate the authority attached to 
traditional scales. We need, I argue, to fundamentally rethink the 
                                                
4 For a good discussion of the imagination of nation-states as ‘vertically 
encompassing’ see (Ferguson & Gupta, 2002) 
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connection between government and spatiality. Rather than asking 
whether national government is being undermined by various forces of 
globalisation, we need to ask how government, in a wider sense, 
continuously brings about spatial scales and hierarchies. And we need 
to ask what kind of shifts the spatiality of government is going through 
in the contemporary conjuncture. 
The increasingly global production of place that feeds into and 
affects local movements today is part, I argue, to these shifts in the 
spatiality of government. Hence, while we need to look at 
‘government’ in the present conjuncture to see how it frames claims to 
local autonomy, the investigation of such claims in turn tells us about 
the contemporary conditions of government. Local movements bring 
out a range of tensions within nation-states – tensions that were 
probably there all along, but which attain an increased urgency in the 
contemporary conjuncture. They bring out differences and spatial 
inequalities that national government often seeks to obscure in their 
self-fashioning for international competition. The global connectivity 
of local movement thus illustrate that it is no longer sufficient to see 
movements for autonomy through simple dichotomies of national 
government and local resistance. As I illustrate in this study, 
contemporary government evolves across a much more dispersed field. 
This, however, does not mean that there is no domination or resistance. 
If we see the aspiration for a larger say in local matters as the ultimate 
reference point, global connections can bring decisions both closer to 
and further away from this situation.  
Furthermore, I argue that we need to historicise the contemporary 
moment and the spatiality of its government in order to understand the 
contemporary conditions for government and local autonomy. This, in 
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turn, brings into sharper relief the tensions that exist within the national 
territorial order. In this study, I engage such a project by investigating 
the tension between three historic assemblages of government and 
politics in the Himalayan hills: The imperial landscapes that emerged 
in the collision between the rugged nature of the hills and the interests 
and affect of British colonisers and Gorkha emperors in the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries; the national territories that the new 
Indian and Nepali governmental regimes sought to produce out of the 
imperial landscapes in the mid- and late twentieth century, and the 
glocal place-making that is currently taking place around labels such as 
Darjeeling, Gorkhaland and Limbuwan. I use the word assemblage to 
indicate a combination of material practices and governmental vision 
that is not necessarily confined to a specific geographical scale.5 It 
points to various constellations of ways of knowing, seeing and acting 
that concomitantly enable government and constitute what government 
entails. In the study, I show how these assemblages rely on various 
ecological, territorial and anthropological differentiations and how each 
assemblage reworks differences inherited from earlier ones.  
Although the three assemblages that I analyse in the present 
study emerge at different points in history, I argue that they are all 
three present, in various guises, in the contemporary politics of the 
Himalayan hills. Today they are situated in various positions of tension 
with each other in a repeated play of difference and uniformity. I argue 
                                                
5 In this sense, my use of the term assemblage resembles the one proposed by 
Deleuze and Guattari. They suggest that an assemblage “is simultaneously and 
inseparably a machinic assemblage and an assemblage of enunciation”, that it “is 
basically territorial”, and that this territoriality “originates in a certain decoding of 
milieus” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, pp. 503-505). In my use, assemblage similarly 
denotes a combination of representation and practice that refers to a certain space 
or locality (I use territory in a more specific sense than Deleuze and Guattari) 
which is, however, not restricted to a specific scale. 
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that the national projects of territorialisation have only superficially 
erased a range of differences that relate to the imperial landscapes. 
Hence today, elements of empire within and across national boundaries 
are being reactualised in demands for recognition, statehood and local 
autonomy. These demands uncover imperial inequalities that the 
national territorial perspective obscures, while connecting them to 
global notions of branding, heritage, indigeneity and tourism. In the 
study, I document novel collisions between, on the one hand, 
refashioned imperial differences in the production of place and, on the 
other hand, resilient territorial monopolies on political authority at the 
national scale. I argue that these collisions bring out old problems as 
well as new opportunities in relation to the aspiration for a larger say in 
local decision-making: While global connections can provide 
normative leverage to demands for increased local autonomy, the 
consequence of global connectivity might also be new imperial 
arrangements of government at a distance.  
The Path Towards the Present Study 
As many research projects do, this study started out in a very different 
place from where it arrived in the present dissertation. I began my 
research process with the aim of conducting a comparative study of the 
management of cultural pluralism and democratic experiences between 
six country cases: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal and 
Bhutan. As a cross-country comparison, this envisaged study was 
situated well within the nationalised confines of traditional political 
science. It was natural to me that cases would equal nation-states, and 
thus to expect that the interesting points of comparison would be 
situated between (rather than within or across) these entities. Hence, 
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my initial project was very loyal to the national scale. It gradually fell 
apart. 
First of all, I quickly realised that I would not be able to conduct 
a six-country comparison at the level of detail I was after within the 
scope of my PhD. This was a simple realisation, and the consequences 
were as simple – cut down the cases. Six quickly turned to three (India, 
Pakistan, Nepal) and later to two (India and Nepal). The more 
substantial re-structuring, however, only arrived later. When I began to 
take a more careful look at Indian and Nepali history and present 
politics, a cluster of (amazingly simple) realisations pushed me further 
away from the initial plans: the ‘management of pluralism’ I was 
looking for differed substantially within the two countries; the 
representations of identity that I saw as the building blocks of 
‘pluralism’ included a host of mobile, cross-border histories and 
references; and the spatial scales of the ‘national’ and ‘local’ entities I 
was working with seemed somehow themselves to be at stake in the 
on-going politics. Over time, these complications themselves began to 
seem more interesting than the envisioned country comparison that 
they were obviously undermining. The complications became my 
object of study. 
My changing interest gradually brought me into the 
methodological borderland of the political science discipline. The 
critical discussions of the field and place in the anthropological 
literature I engaged influenced and complicated my conceptualisation 
of cases.6 In order to get a grasp of the political dynamics between 
                                                
6 There is, by now, a host of literature on the how contemporary globalised 
conditions affect the possibilities of ethnographic fieldwork and anthropological 
inquiry. Good discussions can e.g. be found in (Arjun Appadurai, 1996; Ferguson 
& Gupta, 2002; Gupta & Ferguson, 1997b, 1997c; Marcus, 1995). 
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national and local scales, I conducted ethnographic fieldwork in two 
town schools and their surrounding semi-urban environments on either 
side of the India-Nepal border. My recognition of the ‘methodological 
territorialism’ characteristic of much research within my own discipline 
was further pushed by this fieldwork.7 Doing research on the 
Limbuwan movement in Eastern Nepal – one of the most vocal ‘ethnic’ 
movements for more local autonomy at the time – it was hard not to 
look the additional thirty kilometres across the border to where the 
Gorkhaland movement had taken place in the late 80’s and was again 
beginning to stir. This cross-border perspective and readings on the 
borderland provided additional blows to my initial research design and 
its disciplinary conventions.8 
Finally, moving between different geographical and textual sites 
of investigation, I realised that landscapes, place and scale itself 
seemed to be at stake in much of what I was working with.  
Representatives of the Limbuwan movement sought to make sense of 
and legitimise their claims on the basis of a representation of 
Limbuwan as a proper, historically rooted, indigenous place. The 
Gorkhaland movement, on the other hand, seemed to operate in a 
curiously unsettled space – somehow sliding between the spatial 
categorisations within which the governmental gaze of the Indian state 
organised its territory. Although both movements fundamentally 
revolve around aspirations for local autonomy, the politics that they are 
part of is concomitantly local, national, and global. In fact the 
                                                
7 At least since John Agnew’s article on the ‘territorial trap’, a range of 
publications within human geography have provided incisive critiques of 
methodological territorialism. See e.g. (Agnew, 1994; Brenner, 1999, p. 46) 
8 Some South Asian borderlands are analysed in (Middleton & Shneiderman, 2008; 
Schendel, 2005). See also (Schendel & Abraham, 2005). 
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constitution of these scales can be seen as part of this politics. With this 
in mind, it became untenable to approach the Limbuwan and 
Gorkhaland movements simply as local struggles within national 
politics. It also became harder and harder to make sense of these 
contemporary movements without looking towards the historical 
constitution of the political landscape in which they were taking place.  
It was on the basis of these shifting reflections that the 
perspectives and scaffolding of this present study emerged. Crossing 
both territorial and disciplinary borders, I regard it somewhat as an 
experiment. Conceptually, it is an experiment in how to approach 
contemporary government and politics outside a strictly national 
territorial framework. Methodologically, it is an experiment in how to 
combine a limited range of minute, ethnographic observations and in-
depth textual analyses with a broad historical and geographical scope. 
And analytically it is an experimental investigation into what we can 
make of contemporary politics of local autonomy and place-making if 
we also look at the sides that national territorialisation tends to obscure. 
Towards a Non-Territorial Approach to Government and Politics  
Over the last couple of decades, a lot has been said and written about 
globalisation and the fate of the nation-state. Today, very few would 
dismiss the notion of increased global connectivity. Our imagination of 
politics (and related thoughts on democracy) however remains 
substantially tied to the national territorialisation of the globe. Within 
social scientific discourse, political science seems be to the discipline 
that upholds this segmentation most rigorously in spite of multiple, 
innovative attempts at spatial re-imagination. We insistently continue 
to evaluate contemporary politics – not least in the “third world” – in 
relation to national territorial units. We discuss whether India is really 
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the world’s largest democracy, whether Nepal is a fragile state, and we 
compare them with other nation-states in international rankings of 
economic performance, governmental transparency, electoral processes 
etc. Of cause there continue to be good reasons for an empirical focus 
on the national scale. Great powers continue to be invested at the 
nation-state both materially and symbolically. Nonetheless, in the 
present study I show that we also miss a great deal of powerful political 
dynamics if we continue to approach contemporary politics through 
what John Agnew and others have called ‘methodological 
territorialism’.  
I would like, already here, to highlight three characteristics where 
my approach provides novel perspectives. Firstly, my study spans a 
relatively long stretch of history on the South Asian subcontinent. I 
connect a synthetic presentation of studies on the imperial (non-
)government of the hills with a spatial history of the national territories 
of Nepal in general and India with a specific focus on North Bengal. 
By cutting across this historical stretch rather than beginning in the 
mid-twentieth, as many political studies of India do, my study enables 
us to see how the Limbuwan and Gorkhaland movements in their 
global connectivity reactualise and refashion various forms of imperial 
difference that the national histories of India and Nepal obscure. This 
historical perspective enables me e.g. to show how much the 
contemporary globalised representation of Darjeeling replays the 
colonial aesthetic of the hill station and how the contemporary 
governmental arrangements similarly resemble an imperial government 
at a distance. Hence, the methodological sacrifices that my substantial 
reliance on secondary sources naturally entails are, I would argue, 
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outweighed by the critical appreciation of the present moment that the 
long historical perspective enables.  
Secondly, my study crosses contemporary territorial borders 
rather than relying on them for the production of analytical units for 
research and comparison. As I argue in chapter three, one of the ways 
‘methodological territorialism’ enters studies of politics is exactly 
through a widespread spatial delineation of units of analysis in 
accordance with the contemporary territorial ordering of the globe. 
When applying a longer historical perspective or looking carefully at 
contemporary global connectivity these territorial delineations however 
appear less natural than we often assume. My study builds on this 
recognition by focusing on what is, today, a national borderland as the 
overall object of analysis. Although the national border analytically 
constricts most existing histories and political analyses of this area, I 
try to cut across it.9 What this perspective enables is an appreciation of 
how the border – and hence the national territorialisation of the 
landscape – works. It enables me e.g. to show how some things 
(Nepali-looking people, various licit and illicit goods, and socio-
cultural connections) are allowed to cross the border, while other things 
(most importantly “politics”) is not. Such insights, in turn allow for an 
empirically founded, rather than a pre-supposed, appreciation of the 
contemporary power of the nation-state. 
Finally, my study also cuts across the disciplinary landscapes of 
academia. While my focus on government and politics positions my 
study to feed into discussions within political science, my approach to 
concepts such as space, landscape, territory, scale, place-making and 
                                                
9 A few articles are the exception to the rule here. See (Hutt, 1997; Shneiderman, 
2010) 
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global connectivity owes a lot to theoretical reflections that have 
evolved within human geography, anthropology and cultural studies. 
You could say that I have followed James Scott’s methodological 
advice to allow at least half of what you read to be outside your home 
discipline.10 I see this cross-disciplinarity as one of the main strengths 
of the present study. Thinking along with reflections in human 
geography has allowed me to see space as a social product and examine 
the historical production of spatial categories such as plains, hills, and 
territories. Thinking along with reflections in anthropology has allowed 
me to consider the political role of non-discursive practices (as the 
contemporary public spectacle of Darjeeling) and provided inspiration 
on how to engage a multi-sited study outside the comparative 
framework that inspires much of my home discipline. Finally, 
especially Appadurai’s writing on public culture and global 
connectivity has allowed me a more complex appreciation of the ways 
in which my locality of study connects to dynamics of tourism, 
branding, heritage, and indigeneity across the globe. 
Producing a Place of One’s Own 
As stated above, this study begins with a concern for contemporary 
claims to local autonomy. Such claims are no novelty to the South 
Asian subcontinent. Since the reorganisation of the India states in 1956, 
no less than fifteen new states and eleven “Autonomous Councils” 
have been formed. Much of this territorial and governmental 
rearrangement took place across the 70s and 80s, but the dynamics 
continue. In 2000, the three new states, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and 
Uttarakhand, were formed, in 2003 a Bodoland and a second Ladakh 
                                                
10 See the interview with Scott at Theory Talks: http://www.theory-
talks.org/2010/05/theory-talk-38.html (accessed December 2012) 
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Autonomous Council were established, and in 2011 the Darjeeling 
Gorkha Hill Council was transformed into the new Gorkhaland 
Territorial Administration. In Nepal, movements for local autonomy 
have been less pronounced until the fall of autocratic government in 
1990. However, after a federal future has been placed on the national 
horizon during the negotiations of a new constitution for Nepal a long 
list of statehood movements have emerged. There is, in other words, 
both a long legacy and continued dynamics related to the local 
autonomy across the two nation-states. But how do contemporary 
conditions for local autonomy differ from earlier times? And how are 
we to approach such movements today? Before engaging these 
questions, I’ll present a small anecdote.11 
From May to September 2007 Indian TV broadcasted the talent 
show Indian Idol 3. Over the weeks of competition, as more and more 
contestants were eliminated, the viewership and popularity of the show 
soared, crossing the border into Nepal. Here, Nepali media had 
gradually begun to take note of one remaining contestant. Employed as 
a police officer in Darjeeling, Prashant Tamang was part of the large 
‘Indian Nepali’ or ‘Gorkha’ population in the area. Performing several 
songs in Nepali and, occasionally even wearing the Nepali dhaka topi, 
Tamang’s participation in the competition quickly attained a wider 
symbolical significance for the Indian Nepalis of Darjeeling as well as 
the ‘Nepali Nepalis’ across the border. Eventually, he won the 
competition. Part of the reason for Tamang’s victory and some of its 
major consequences are to be found in the borderland area of northern 
                                                
11 This anecdote was first presented to me by Christopher Townsend in Darjeeling. 
Later, Harsha Man Maharjan for Martin Chautari in Kathmandu generously shared 
the insights from a paper he is writing on the story – hopefully it will be published 
for wider readership soon. 
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West Bengal. Here, the Gorkha National Liberation Front ‘strongman’ 
Bimal Gurung had taken up the leadership of a Prashant Tamang Fan 
Club. During the competition, the fan club organised Indian Idol 
polling booths at the Kakarbhitta and Pashupatinagar border-crossings. 
Here, Nepali residents could and did cross the border to cast their SMS 
votes from Indian mobile phones. Paralleling the illicit granting of dual 
citizenship to Nepalis to form ‘vote banks’ in times of ‘real’ elections, 
this arrangement seemed to work. Prashant Tamang’s victory also 
became Bimal Gurung’s, who utilised his new popularity to take over 
the leadership of the Gorkhaland movement.  
This little anecdote from the hills between India and Nepal 
illustrates the complex position in which the contemporary production 
of place and claims to local autonomy operate. As the national 
appropriation of a globalised talent show template, Indian Idol 3 
suddenly had an impact on the local politics in Darjeeling. Obviously 
cutting across spatial scales, the show illuminates existing 
complications of difference and belonging. Albeit the Nepali viewers 
seemed to love Tamang’s representation of a unified national identity 
symbolised by dress and language, the same symbols were under sharp 
attack in Nepali politics. Here, the enforced national unity of the 70s 
and 80s is currently countered by an emphasis on ethnic difference and 
historical marginalisation. On the other side of the border in Darjeeling, 
many of the same ethnic groups are, on the other hand, presently under 
pressure to conform to a common Gorkhaland front. Like many of the 
observations in my study, the story of Prashant Tamang thus illustrates 
how contemporary movements for autonomy operated in a complex 
contemporary situation where globalised phenomena connect deeply 
with local realities. 
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Much of existing literature on movements for local autonomy in 
India seems, I would argue, somewhat out of tune with such a 
contemporary condition. Often, these works employ a language of 
economic development or conflict and national security.12 These 
languages are, however, typically attuned to a distinctly national 
territorial framework. As I describe in the present analysis, the notion 
of development e.g. brings along its own particular spatial 
arrangements. This renders economic development problematic as an 
analytical perspective on movements that, in some sense, might evade 
or disturb this spatiality. Notions of security provide other problems. 
Apart from a strong association with the nation-state, assessments of 
security often bring in differentiations of ‘peaceful’ and ‘unruly’ 
places. As my analysis brings out, such notions can, however, be seen 
as internal elements in the government of space.  
What is needed instead, I argue, is an approach which – instead 
of pitting the local against the national – acknowledges that neither 
claims to local autonomy nor government are can be purely assigned to 
local and national scales today. Here, I attempt to do so by approaching 
the production of place as a globalised phenomenon and by critically 
investigating the spatiality of contemporary government across scales. 
A Tour of the Study 
In his classic book The Practice of Everyday Life Michel de Certeau 
refers to a study in which New York residents describe their 
apartments. He points out how there seems to be two ways to go about 
this (Certeau, 1984, pp. 118-122; see also Linde & Labov, 1975). The 
                                                
12 See e.g. (Sarkar, 2010) for a long list of analyses that approach the Gorkhaland 
movement in terms of economic development. See e.g. (Baruah, 1999, 2005) for a 
pointed critique of the security focus in analyses of movements in northeast India. 
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first might be called the ‘map’ type. Here, the residents describe the 
relative position of the rooms and features as a tableau, as something 
seen. The second type might be called the ‘tour’. Here, movement is 
the central characteristic of the description. Rooms and features are 
described as you encounter them while moving about the space of the 
apartment. Among the New York residents interviewed, only about 
three per cent described their home along the lines of a ‘map’ narrative 
structure, the rest chose to take the interviewer on a narrated ‘tour’ of 
the place. As de Certeau notes, the opposite seems to be the case in 
scientific discourse. Here, the map and its centralised legibility prevails 
over the tour (Certeau, 1984, p. 119). Nonetheless, in line with 
theoretical and methodological reflections outlined in the following 
two chapters, I would describe the rest of this study more along the 
lines of a ‘tour’ than a ‘map’.  
Before beginning our tour across the Himalayan hills, the 
following chapter sets out a range of conceptual reflections. Springing 
out of my engagement with the governmental and politics of the hills, 
these reflections provide tentative steps towards a non-territorial 
conceptualisation of government and politics. The steps I suggest 
involve an analytical starting point in landscapes rather than territories 
and a focus on the government of ecological, territorial and 
anthropological differences across the three assemblages outlined 
above. Chapter three sets out the path that I have chosen to follow in 
my analytical journey across the hills. I present and discuss the textual 
and ethnographic sites around which the arguments of study have been 
built. And I argue for a conceptualisation of my units of investigation 
in terms of political locations rather than in the more traditional terms 
of cases. Finally, I discuss the various levels in which history has been 
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brought into the analysis, and I reflect upon the kinds of knowledge 
that my interpretive approach produces. 
Then, in chapter four, I begin the journey along the line that 
distinguishes the hills from plains traversing several millennia of the 
history of the northern subcontinent. I follow the Gorkha and British 
expansions into and across the hills and take note of the gazes and 
differentiations that enabled the rule of the imperial landscape. In 
chapter five, I turn to the nationalised schooling of Nepal and present 
how the expansion of education and circulation of school textbooks 
have facilitated a shift from a Gorkha imperial landscape to a Nepali 
national territory. I, however also not how this territory only 
superficially concealed the differences that were an essential part of the 
imperial landscape. In chapter six, I return to these differences and 
analyse how they are played out in the contemporary politics of 
federalism in general and of the Limbuwan movement in particular. In 
this analysis, I show how the refashioning of imperial differences as 
indigenous belong through local as well as international academic texts 
give leverage to the demand of a Limbuwan state in a federal Nepal. I, 
however, also note how this very politics can also have excluding 
consequences, as ‘ethnic fluency’ becomes a criterion for entering the 
on-going politics – a criterion that replays differences between 
‘developed’ and ‘backward’ people. 
In chapter seven, we cross the border and investigate the various 
national territorial perspectives that came to circumscribe Darjeeling 
across the midnight of 1947. I show how Darjeeling repeatedly falls 
through the cracks of continued ecological differentiations of civilised 
plains and savage hills. And I argue that what emerges instead is a 
representation of Darjeeling as the ‘ruly’ hills of the colonial hills 
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station. In this image, the governmental gaze connects with that of the 
tourist. In this connection repeated parallels between colonial 
government and contemporary branding and heritage endeavours 
wholly obscure the national historical watershed of 1947. Then, in 
chapter eight, I turn to the meeting between this image and the 
Gorkhaland movement in the late 80s as well as today. I find that the 
Gorkhaland movement, counter-intuitively, does not seem to represent 
a different assignment of meaning to Darjeeling as a place. Often, the 
movement rather seems to rely on the unsettled character of the area 
and feed on anxieties of being ‘out of place’. An investigation that 
began I began with question of what Gorkhaland is, thus tuned out to 
illuminate instead a struggle of who controls Gorkhaland. As I suggests 
towards the end of the chapter, it seems that the Gorkha Janmukti 
Morcha and the new government of West Bengal are moving towards a 
renewed arrangement of somewhat imperial government at distance – 
symbolically organised around a refashioned image of the familiar hill 
station. Finally, in chapter nine I summarize and reflect upon the 
insights and conclusions from the study. 
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Chapter 2: Ecology, Territory, People 
Curiously, space is a stranger to customary political reflection. 
Political thought and the representations which it elaborates remain 
“up in the air,” with only an abstract relation with the soil [terroirs] 
and even the national territory… Space belongs to the geographers 
in the academic division of labor. But then it reintroduces itself 
subversively through the effects of peripheries, the margins, the 
regions, the villages and local communities long abandoned, 
neglected, even abased through centralising state power. (…) this 
requires a spatialization of political theory. (Henri Lefebvre cited in 
Brenner & Elden, 2009, p. 360) 
Representations of space in the social sciences are remarkably 
dependent on images of break, rupture and disjunction. The 
distinctiveness of societies, nations, and cultures is based upon a 
seemingly unproblematic division of space, on the fact that they 
occupy “naturally” discontinuous spaces. The premise of 
discontinuity forms the starting point from which to theorize contact, 
conflict and contradiction between cultures and societies. (Gupta & 
Ferguson, 1992, p. 6) 
In the introduction above, I sketched out the historical production of 
three governmental assemblages: imperial landscapes, national 
territories and the glocal production of place. I argued that, although 
these perspectives emerged on the South Asian subcontinent at 
different points in time, they are all, in various ways, present in the 
political dynamics of place-making and claims to local autonomy in the 
contemporary global conjuncture. In this chapter, I translate this 
historical sketch into the more analytical language of a government and 
politics of difference. I highlight three languages of difference that 
combine, in different ways, to facilitate the historical governmental 
assemblages outlined in the introduction: a language of ecological 
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difference, a language of territorial difference, and a language of 
difference between people. Combining this perspective on government 
with an approach that begins with landscape rather than territory, I 
seek, in this chapter, to suggest one way in which we may move 
towards a non-territorialised theory of government and politics. 
Maps in the Mind 
Image yourself sitting in front of two maps. One is a “political” 
map, the other “topographical”. Place them side-by-side and consider 
the differences. One map presents landmasses, elevation, contours, 
vegetation, rivers, lakes and valleys – the ecological textures of the 
physical landscape. The other map presents a jigsaw puzzle of 
truncated spaces, neatly coloured and sharply bordered pieces, flat 
areas with no bleeding boundaries, shared borders with no in-betweens. 
Why is one of these maps “political” while the other map isn’t? What 
qualities constitute the specifically political spatiality that one map 
displays and the other one doesn’t? 
The answers to these questions, I would argue, have a lot to say 
about our spatial imagination of politics. As Akhil Gupta and James 
Ferguson suggest in the quote above, we live in a world where politics 
is imagined in the language of spatially organised disjuncture. The 
‘maps in our minds’ largely reflect the image of the school atlas 
described above, dividing the globe into bordered world regions, 
national territories, and local administrative entities (Ludden, 2003b; 
Malkki, 1992). At the same time, counter-images of global connectivity 
– ‘scapes’ and ‘flows’ – proliferate (see e.g. Arjun Appadurai, 1996). 
Notions of globalisation have led us to question whether the territorial 
sovereignty that we presume exists at the national scale will continue in 
the future or whether new “scalar fixes” of political authority will 
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emerge. Nonetheless, the political consequences of global re-scaling 
are routinely brought back to the well-known governmental scales of 
the school atlas – most often the national (see e.g. Agnew, 1994; 
Brenner, 1997, 1999).  
As we, thus, find ourselves wedged in between national orders 
and global flows we tend to forget that other “topographical” kind of 
map. We tend to forget that government is extended over landscape as 
much as it is extended over people, and that even contemporary politics 
is played out in specific ‘political landscapes’.13 In academic and 
political discourse today, we largely imagine states to be sovereign 
within their respective territories. If they turn out not to be, we tend to 
provide them with limiting adjectives: then they are not full, proper 
states, but “fragile” or even “failed” ones. As I argue in the present 
study, this territorialized view of the world is not only a consequence of 
the development of more and more elaborate ‘distance demolishing’ 
technologies of rule, but also a consequence of certain contemporary 
fantasies about the spatial uniformity of territorial government. 
In this study I extended an invitation to de-territorialise our 
imagination of government by rethinking connections between 
government and the landscape across which it is extended. My study 
lends itself to such rethinking by investigating multiple forms of 
government from various historical and contemporary vantage points 
in/on the unusually rugged landscape of the India-Nepal borderland. I 
argue that the ecological characteristics of the land and the imperial 
government of the landscape provide a political framework, a distinct 
governmental gaze that continues to inform the contemporary 
                                                
13 In a forthcoming article, Stuart Elden suggests that Foucault’s writing might 
have pointed us in this, misleading, direction (Elden, 2013). 
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government and politics of the area in multiple ways. Although, over 
the last sixty years, national discourses, maps and images have sought 
to flatten the landscape of the borderland into the un-textured, uniform 
and strictly bordered spaces of the school atlas, an ‘imperial landscape’ 
of differences continues to influence government and politics within 
and across national territories. By focusing on the extension of 
government and the interplay of governmental categories of differences 
across distance and difficult terrain, my study thus provides input 
towards a theory of government and politics that allow notions of place 
and landscape to re-enter our political imagination. 
It should be noted straight away that I do not mean to say that 
physical landscapes are strictly determining for contemporary 
government and politics, nor that no change has occurred since the time 
of British and Gorkha imperialism. Far from it. But I do highlight how 
imperial categories of governmental difference continue to influence 
present politics, albeit in novel and increasingly globalised ways. I e.g. 
bring out how the colonial representation of Darjeeling in the 
harmonious image of the picturesque hill station is repeated in a 
contemporary merger of the governmental gaze with that of the 
globalised tourist-consumer. And I analyse how representatives of a 
present-day movement in eastern Nepal, in their aspirations for a future 
federal state of Limbuwan, connect imperial categories of difference 
and national territorial borders with international academic scholarship 
and globalised notions of indigeneity. Through such investigations my 
study points to the variously mediated connections that exist between 
the landscape, on the one hand, and contemporary government and 
politics on the other. These connections include the physical barriers to 
government that rugged landscapes provide, but also the ways in which 
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governmental intervention in turn shapes the landscape, and the ways 
in which representations of the landscape are brought into politics to 
support or oppose the existing governmental order. 
Why would one want to move towards a non-territorialised 
theory of government and politics? It is one of my central claims with 
this study that, if one were to approach the dynamics of contemporary 
movements for increased local autonomy in the Himalayan hills from a 
perspective shaped by the school atlas segmentation of the world, then 
one would miss a lot of the politics involved. As I describe below, 
regimes do not govern territories, they produce them through the 
extension of governmental gazes across the landscape – a process 
which in turn borders politics. If we begin our investigation from these 
borders then we miss out on the politics involved in their instantiation 
on the landscape as well as the politics of territorially internal 
differences and global connectivity that the territorialisation of the 
globe obscures.  
The observations that led me to this claim can be summarised 
quite well in an interesting quote from the Argentinian scholar Walter 
Magnolo. He states that: 
coloniality is, on the one hand, what the project of modernity needs 
to rule out and roll over in order to implant itself as modernity and, 
on the other hand, the site of enunciation where the blindness of the 
modern project is revealed, and concomitantly also the site where 
new projects begin to unfold (cited in Escobar, 2008, p. 168). 
We might see Magnolo’s “coloniality” as the imperial landscape 
described in my introduction. The basic tension that I describe between 
this landscape and the modern national territory is exactly one where, 
as Magnolo describes, the territory “needs to rule out and roll over” the 
imperial landscape in order to qualify as a modern and national 
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territory. As we see in the contemporary dynamics of the glocal place-
making, the languages of difference facilitating the imperial landscape 
however continue below the superficial uniformity on the national 
territory and provide a different “site of enunciation” in the politics of 
local autonomy. In the following conceptual delineations I move 
towards an approach that respects this contemporary site of enunciation 
by beginning not from the modern territory, but from the imperial 
landscape. As Magnolo suggest, the added value of this perspective is 
firstly, that it reveals the “blindness” of modern territorial imagination 
along with the differences that this imagination seeks to obscure, and 
secondly, that it enables an appreciation of the continued and politically 
salient play of these differences – in creative as well as repressive ways 
(see Kaur & Wahlberg, 2012). 
In the remainder of this chapter, I delineate the ways in which my 
engagement with the India-Nepal borderland has spurred reflections on 
imperial landscapes, national territories, and the government of 
difference. In the following section, I present how I have come to see 
‘landscape’ as an alternative starting point for the present study’s 
engagement with government and politics. I then delineate what I mean 
by the government and politics of difference and highlight three 
categories of difference - three governmental gazes - that have 
historically influenced the extension of government across the 
borderland: differences of ecology, differences of territory, and 
differences of people. The subsequent sections consider these three 
categories in turn highlighting their local and historical significance as 
well as their political salience in the present global conjuncture. 
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An Alternative Beginning: Landscape and its Government 
In this study I evade a pre-given focus on national territory by taking 
landscape and the imperial government of it as a starting point. In the 
borderland where I have conducted fieldwork for the present study this 
landscape includes lush forested hills, deep river valleys, tea gardens 
with their rows of dark green bushes marking out the elevation, and - 
occasionally visible – the snow-clad peaks of the Kanchenjunga 
massive. In this landscape, it is hard to find any significant level areas, 
and both the towns that housed my fieldwork are perched, precariously 
on cloud-swept ridges. The physical landscape of this borderland, in 
other words, provides a marked contrast to the flat territories of the 
school atlas. Hence, it works as a constant visual reminder of the 
abstract flatness of national territories, of the multiple levels of 
difference within territories that this abstraction conceals, and of the 
similarities that territorial borders tend to obscure. In this sense, the 
geological and ecological character of the landscape provides both an 
empirical starting point and a critical methodological intervention for 
the study. 
In everyday usage the notion of landscape usually brings up 
aesthetic qualities. As the Oxford English dictionary defines the word, 
it thus comprises “all the visible features of an area of land, often 
considered in terms of their aesthetic appeal”14. The problem with this, 
however, is that notions of aesthetic appeal, harmony, and order tend to 
repeal notions of political dominance, conflict, and unruliness (A. T. 
Smith, 2003, p. 9). In the representation of Darjeeling in the image of 
the picturesque hill station this tendency is clear. The aesthetically 
harmonious landscape of the hill station and its surrounding tea 
                                                
14 http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/landscape?q=landscape 
(accessed October 2012) 
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plantations lends itself to notions of order, which in turn leads to the 
representation of the violent Gorkhaland uprising as intermittent 
unruliness, foreign to the picturesque landscape. What begins as a 
supposedly non-political aesthetic thus turns out to have major political 
consequences for a centralised view of the area and, in turn, for its 
government. 
In line with scholarly reflections on landscape across multiple 
academic disciplines, I therefore suggest that we regard landscape in a 
sense that connects to, rather than repeals, government, politics and 
conflict (Kenny, 1995; W. J. T. Mitchell, 1994; K. Olwig, 2002; K. 
Olwig & Mitchell, 2009; K. R. Olwig & Mitchell, 2007; A. T. Smith, 
2003). Emphasising the existence of a ‘darker side’ to our visualisation 
of the notion of landscape in the picturesque aesthetic of the landscape 
painting, W.J.T. Mitchell e.g. foregrounds the notion of an ‘imperial 
landscape’. While he, on the one hand, emphasises that landscape “is a 
particular historical formation associated with European imperialism” 
(as in the hill station imagination of Darjeeling), he, on the other hand, 
also states that “landscape is a medium found in all cultures” (W. J. T. 
Mitchell, 1994, p. 5). Hence, albeit recognising that there is a strong 
connection between our conception of landscape and a specific 
European history of colonial domination, we might apply a broader 
view of the connection between landscape and power. From the private 
garden in contemporary Australia, to the hill station landscape in 
colonial India, various authors have already shown such connections 
(Cerwonka, 2004; Kenny, 1995). In this study, I take these insights 
further by exploring the tension between the ‘imperial landscapes’ 
articulated in the government of the north Indian subcontinent and the 
national territories that “role over” these landscapes later on. 
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In order to get a grasp of the political entanglement of the 
landscape that I analyse in the present study, I propose that we begin 
from the simple recognition of landscape as the combination of “a 
focus on the material topography of a portion of land (that which can 
be seen) with the notion of vision (the way it is seen)” (see also 
Cosgrove, 1985; Cresswell, 2004, p. 10). As the dictionary definition of 
landscape refers to the “visible features of an area”, these features are 
obviously visible to someone. The materiality of the landscape is 
mediated through vision as well as through human intervention (K. 
Olwig, 2002). As Appadurai’s more fluid ‘scapes’, the land-scape as I 
employ the term, is thus a “deeply perspectival construct” (Arjun 
Appadurai, 1996, p. 33). And like Appadurai’s scapes, the perspectival 
construction of the landscape might evolve across a much more 
dispersed geography than the locality that provides its material point of 
reference. The landscapes I engage in the present study typically 
involve large-scale material interventions or more-or-less widely 
circulated representations in text or image. And, as described below, 
they involve perspectives that have distinct links to the governmental 
gaze of imperial rule. 
In a more substantive sense, I see landscapes as “broad 
canvas[es] of space and place constituted within histories of social and 
cultural life” (A. T. Smith, 2003, p. 11). Here, place refers not only to 
simple location (as in position on the Earth’s surface), or locale (as in 
built and natural environment), but also to a certain, shared form of 
meaning attached to that location/locale – what John Agnew refers to 
as a ‘sense of place’ (Cresswell, 2004, pp. 7-8). Place, in other words, 
“refers to how specific locales become incorporated into larger worlds 
of human action and meaning” (A. T. Smith, 2003, p. 11) – in the sense 
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I employ it in this study, meaning shared among wider groups of 
people. Space, on the other hand, “refers to the general concepts of 
extension and dimension that constitute form” (A. T. Smith, 2003, p. 
11), space is ‘in-between’ places (cf. Certeau, 1984, p. 127). Hence, the 
notion of landscape, as I use it here, “assemble places to present more 
broadly coherent visions of the world” (A. T. Smith, 2003, p. 32). 
Government, Politics, and Difference 
In this study, I suggest that we might see government as an 
organisation of various forms of difference. I deliberately employ the 
word “government”, a word usually monopolised by the national scale, 
to emphasise that I am not talking about a different, alternative or 
residual form of rule to the territorial default. I am not trying to 
delineate a globalised governance (or whatever one might call it) that 
takes places in parallel or in competition with traditional, territorially 
based government. As I see it, such an endeavour would only go part of 
the way in rethinking the contemporary spatiality of government and 
politics as it would continue to rely on a territorial approach, albeit with 
certain additions. What I suggest is that all government operates, in one 
way or the other, through the organisation of difference and that these 
differences, in turn, provide grounds that both enable and restrict 
politics.15  
The three governmental assemblages that I refer to in the 
introduction (imperial landscapes, national territories and glocal place-
making) can thus be seen as different ways of organising difference. As 
I argue in the present section, we might analyse the organisation of 
                                                
15 This line of thinking obviously ows a great deal to writings by William Connolly 
and Gilles Deleuze, the latter of which I have mainly encountered in other scholars’ 
interpretations so far (Connolly, 1991, 1995; Kaur & Wahlberg, 2012; May, 2005). 
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difference that each assemblage employs through certain governmental 
gazes that relate to three ‘languages of difference’: ecology, territory, 
and people.16 In very general terms, the imperial landscape of the 
British colonisers thus regarded people through a language of racial 
difference that coincided with an ecological differentiation between 
hills and plains and a territorial perspective that allowed for uneven 
forms of government, especially at the territorial frontiers. The imperial 
landscape of the Gorkha rulers was organised along other lines of 
difference, as was the later national territory of India. 
In slightly different terms, one might say that the relationship 
between landscape and its government that I seek to illuminate in the 
present study is fundamentally about the production of legibility and 
governability through various ‘governmental gazes’.17 I see the 
governmental gaze as an assemblage of knowledge and power in a 
specific, focused vision. Such an assemblage involves a range of 
different actors with a range of different motivations assembled around 
a shared gaze.18 Coming together, these actors not only build a certain 
vision of the world, but, through this vision, they also powerfully affect 
the world. The colonial hill station of Darjeeling provides a good 
example of this. Here, in the second half of the nineteenth century, 
                                                
16 I borrow the term ‘languages of difference’ from a recent article by Ravinder 
Kaur and Ayo Wahlberg but employ it, in this study, at a lower level of abstraction 
that they do. The languages of difference that Kaur and Wahlberg present relate to 
processes of standardisation, commodification and alterity (see Kaur & Wahlberg, 
2012) 
17 Obviously, this notion owes a lot to Foucault’s and probably even more to James 
Scott’s work (Foucault, 2007; Scott, 1998, 2009). In its connection to territory, it 
also owes a great deal to recent theoretical developments within human geography 
(Brenner & Elden, 2009; Elden, 2007, 2010). 
18 As Scott argues, the state is often a central actor and centralised legibility is often 
a crucial motivation, but, as I see it, the governmental gaze is often shared more 
widely (Scott, 1998). 
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tourists, scientific explorers, government officials, and tea-planters 
with their separate motivations assembled around a specific (though 
multi-facetted) vision of the hill station. In turn, this vision led to a 
rapid and fundamental transformation of the area in involving e.g. 
massive immigration and ordering of the landscape. 
The governmental gaze is, in other words, a way of handling a 
complex reality in a way that makes it legible and governable from a 
centralised position. This obviously resonates well with Scott’s incisive 
description of the production of legibility through focused vision. This 
is worth quoting of at length: 
Certain forms of knowledge and control require a narrowing of 
vision. The great advantage of such tunnel vision is that it brings into 
sharp focus certain limited aspects of an otherwise far more complex 
and unwieldy reality. This very simplification, in turn, makes the 
phenomenon at the centre of the field of vision more legible and 
hence more susceptible to careful measurement and calculation. 
Combined with similar observations, an overall, aggregate, synoptic 
view of a selective reality is achieved, making possible a high degree 
of schematic knowledge, control and manipulation (Scott, 1998, p. 
11) 
The Himalayan hills provide a good example of what Scott refers to as 
a “complex and unwieldy reality” – a complex geography that with 
rows, upon rows of deep valleys and soaring hills provides a massive 
challenge for centralised government. As Scott suggests elsewhere, 
such hills provide ecological zones that have historically been 
extremely hard to penetrate by the governmental gaze of the settled 
valley states (Scott, 2009). Hence, the government of the Himalayan 
hills that I engage in the present study relies fundamentally on a 
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narrowing of vision in specific governmental gazes that organises the 
world around specific categories of difference. 
Such government, I argue, sets out specific categories of 
difference that shape the possibilities and barriers for politics. Inherent 
in this argument, is a relatively broad approach to politics as relating to 
every situation that combines conflict with power (see Warren, 1999, 
pp. 217-218).19 Within this broad approach to politics, government as I 
have outlined it above, nonetheless renders specific categories of 
difference and hence specific conflicts more politically salient than 
others. In other words, if we, following Deleuze, see the world as 
“composed not of identities that form and reform themselves, but of 
swarms of difference that actualize themselves into specific forms of 
identity” (May, 2005, p. 114) then government can be seen as a major 
force in organising differences into political identities no matter 
whether the governors intend to do so or not. As Bernard Cohn e.g. 
describes, the difference of caste as it was emphasised by British 
census operations – a technique of colonial government – enabled the 
emergence of caste as a political identity among a swarm of difference. 
In my study, I provide a range of other examples that fundamentally 
support the same point: that government to a very large degree shapes 
politics. 
In summary, the present study analyses how the governmental 
gazes that have been brought to bear on the landscape of the Nepal-
India borderland work through the constitution of multiple categories 
of difference approached through various vantage points. I argue that 
one can understand the historical dynamics involved in the extension of 
                                                
19 Here, conflict should be seen as relating not only to material interests, but also to 
“contests over the symbolic world, over the management and appropriation of 
meaning” (Wedeen, 1999, p. 30). 
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government over the landscape by focusing on three such languages of 
difference: differences of ecology, territory and people – discussed in 
turn below. In the study, I trace how these differences have been 
“constructed, manifested, governed, mobilised and obscured” (Kaur & 
Wahlberg, 2012, p. 576) across long stretches of governmental history. 
And I analyse how they are played out, refashioned and rearranged, 
today, in new claims to difference that partake in the contemporary 
politics of local autonomy. 
Ecology: Government and Governability of Hills and Plains 
Anyone who has travelled or worked in the Himalayan foothills will 
recognise the obvious challenges posed by the geography of the area to 
centralised forms of organisation. Even today, in spite of a broad range 
of ‘distance demolishing’ technologies (Scott, 2009), centralised 
government continues to be a challenge. When a powerful international 
organisation as the World Food Program provides supplementary food 
to some of the food-insecure areas in northern Nepal, negotiating 
passage through the politically contentious “Tibetan Autonomous 
Region” of China is preferred to transporting the food through Nepal.20 
And during preparations for the CA elections, a team of election 
observers were hit by severe altitude sickness and snowstorms in north-
eastern Nepal reducing the able observes from eleven to four.21 If 
difficulties such as these occur to internationally supported, centrally 
administered government today, we can only imagine that the 
challenges of government were even more severe when centralised 
imperial rule was first extended across the area. 
                                                
20 WFP officer, personal communication, Kathmandu 2007 
21 Reported in local media. See e.g. http://hamropalo.com/altitude-sickness-
snowfall-affect-poll-officials-in-taplejung/ (accessed December 2012) 
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The difficulties of governing the Himalayan hills are reflected in 
the first language of difference that I bring out in the present study: 
ecology. For several millennia, the ecological distinction between 
plains and hills guided the governmental gaze of the valley empires 
across the northern part of the Indian subcontinent (see e.g. S. Guha, 
1999; Ludden, 2002). For the valley empires, the plains and their 
agricultural settlement were synonymous with civilisation, while the 
hills with their more sparse population of slash-and-burn cultivators, 
hunters, gatherers and traders were seen as un-civilised. As presented 
e.g. by the British colonial officer Edward Gait in chapter four, this 
distinction of culture and civilisation was also one of government and 
governability. Seen as essentially different from the plains, the hills 
were regarded as in need of government “in a simpler and more 
personal manner” (Gait, 1906, p. 330), that is, a less standardised and 
less elaborate form of government – a government at a distance. The 
ecological line of distinction running across the length of the northern 
subcontinent thus also provided a governmental border, a spatial line of 
demarcation dividing settlement and civilisation from migration and 
wilderness.  
This ‘imperial landscape’ – the combination of an ecological 
materiality with the governmental gaze of various imperial formations 
– continues to play an important role for political organisation and 
notions of belonging inside and across national territories even today. 
As illustrated by the anecdote on the Nepali president introducing this 
study, the ecological distinction between plains and hills continues to 
have a political life today, played out through notions of identity and 
belonging that, sometimes, cut across national territorial boundaries. 
Furthermore, as several scholars have illustrated, this distinction also 
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stretches far into the spatial imagination – the ‘maps in the mind’ – of 
area studies as an academic field. This situation is reflected e.g. in the 
differential treatment of the Nepali and Indian nation-states within the 
imagination of South Asia (Chene, 2007; Ludden, 2003b; Schendel, 
2002). 
In the area-studies mapping of the world into cultural regions 
both the Nepali and Indian nation-state formations are clearly placed in 
‘South Asia’. Within this category, they however take up very different 
positions. While India clearly dominates the imagination of South Asia 
in South Asian studies – almost to the point of defining the field – 
Nepal, on the other hand, holds a more dubious position. In a thought-
provoking article, Mary Des Chene provides an apt illustration from the 
job interview of a Nepal-oriented scholar who, when asked, “But how 
can you teach South Asia when you work in Nepal” answered “what 
makes a village in Tamil Nadu more representative of South Asia than 
some place in Nepal?” (Chene, 2007, p. 210). The answer, as Des 
Chene suggests, is telling for the combined national and regional order 
of things that provides the ‘maps in the mind’ for our imagination of 
the world. In this imagination, the (fantasy of) Hindu, caste-organised 
Indian plains (think of Dumont, 1970) are ostensibly more defining of a 
South Asian cultural region than Nepali hills. 
What is interesting about this academic imagination of the region 
is that it replays the imperial division of the area into hills and plains 
(see Schendel, 2002, p. 648). Although often self-consciously post-
colonial, the implicit designation of the border of South Asia at the hills 
of northern India seems strikingly similar to the British governmental 
gaze of the area. H. H. Risley (1851-1911), the Director of the 
Ethnographic Survey of India, e.g. described Nepal as a “sort of 
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debatable land between Aryan and Mongolian territory” (Risley in 
Chene, 2007). This imagination of space is clearly repeated in the 
aesthetic of (earlier) colonial maps of the subcontinent where the 
northern hills typically appear as a relatively fluid area of rows upon 
rows of carefully shaded but unnamed hills. Implicitly, post-colonial 
area studies scholarship thus repeat an imperial mapping of the world 
in which the ecological difference between plains and hills, and the 
identification of the South Asian cultural region with the former are 
defining features. While this area studies division is not necessarily 
problematic, it can be if the division is divorced from its history and 
posed as an essential division of cultural identities, or if it ends up 
overshadowing the salience of the territorial borders between present-
day nation states (see Shneiderman, 2010). 
I engage the ecological distinction between hills and plains 
exactly from its historical constitution as a governmental category of 
difference (distinguishing governable from un-governable spaces). In 
doing so, I follow in the footsteps of recent scholarship that has turned 
this ecological distinction on its head through the imaginative 
introduction of the world region Zomia (Schendel, 2002; Scott, 2009). 
For Willem van Schendel and James Scott, Zomia is a concerted name 
for an Asian highland massive that our national and regional 
imagination of the world usually cuts into a multitude of ‘territorial’ 
and ‘cultural’ pieces. As Scott describes it: 
Zomia is a new name for virtually all the lands at altitudes above 
roughly three hundred meters all the way from the Central Highlands 
of Vietnam to northeast India and traversing five Southeast Asian 
nations (Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Burma) and four 
provinces of China (Yunnan, Guizhou, Guangxi, and part of 
Sichuan). (Scott, 2009, p. ix).  
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Van Schendel’s Zomia stretches even further, including the Tibetan 
highland as well as the Himalayas and their foothills across India, 
Bhutan and Nepal (Schendel, 2002, pp. 653-654).22 In van Schendel’s 
delineation, Zomia thus encompasses my area of study (see also 
Shneiderman, 2010). 
As Scott elaborates in The Art of Not Being Governed, Zomia is 
historically to be considered a non-state space – an zone of refuge for 
people evading the repressive hand of valley states. In the highlands of 
Zomia, the ‘friction of the terrain’ has, according to Scott, repelled 
states from any form of substantial government – at least until the 
development of increasingly powerful ‘distance demolishing’ 
technologies over the past sixty years. In line with this, Scott argues 
that the hill people of Zomia are: ”best understood as runaway, 
fugitive, maroon communities who have, over the course of two 
millennia, been fleeing the oppressions of state-making projects in the 
valleys – slavery, conscription, taxes, corvée labor, epidemics, and 
warfare” (Scott, 2009, p. ix). Scott thus, on the one hand, confirms the 
governmental salience of the ecological distinction between the hills 
and the plains, emphasising how the hills have historically proven 
relatively impenetrable for the governmental gaze of the valley 
empires. However, Scott, on the other hand, provides a novel 
perspective from which to see the relationship across this divide. This 
relationship is no longer seen as a matter of steps on a civilizational 
ladder (the “backward” hills), nor a simple dichotomous question of 
(state) dominance and (hill peoples’) resistance (see Shneiderman, 
                                                
22 According to a the editorial of a special issue on “Zomia and beyond”, van 
Schendel has later extended his notion of Zomia further west across northern 
Pakistan, large parts of Afghanistan and north into southern Kazakhstan (Michaud, 
2010) 
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2010, p. 303). Rather, in the Zomia-perspective, state and non-state 
spaces can be regarded as historically tied together in dynamics that 
bring into sharp relief the political significance of the physical 
landscape as well as the history of national territories. 
The idea of Zomia resonates well with this study in the way that 
it foregrounds a relational perspective situating the hilly peripheries of 
national territories and world regions in an explicit relationship to 
nation-state formations in the valleys. In its focus on imperial 
landscapes and national territories, my study deals with much the same 
tension. In my view, the development of ‘distance demolishing’ 
technologies that Scott claims have eliminated all the world’s Zomias 
since the Second World War (infrastructural developments, 
communication technologies etc.) is part and parcel of the translation of 
hilly imperial landscapes into flat national territories. Much seems to 
indicate that the area I engage has, at some point, functioned as a zone 
of refuge, a Zomia, for people fleeing imperial expansions in the 
Tibetan plateau and Indian plains (English, 1985; Shneiderman, 2010). 
Later, empire was superimposed upon the area, and today we regard it 
as part of the ubiquitous national segmentation of the globe. However, 
remnants of these various governmental stages exist within 
contemporary national government and with them the relevance of the 
ecological language of difference. 
Territory: Borders and Belonging 
The early British maps of India usually display a host of the textures in 
the landscape. Especially the northern hills and mountains of Nepal and 
Bhutan are often depicted as numerous, carefully shaded hills fading 
into the horizon. Gradually, and especially after 1947, this depiction 
changes. The textures of the landscape are increasingly obscured and 
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the fluid northern frontiers transform into firmer borders. Through 
these maps, we can follow the visual ascendancy of the second 
language of difference that I highlight in the present study: territory. As 
for the ecological distinction between plains and hills, I argue that 
territory can be regarded as a specific category of governmental 
distinction; a governmental gaze that enables a highly focused and 
simplified view of an otherwise “complex and unwieldy” landscape. As 
a governmental gaze, territory focuses on the spatial disjuncture of 
borders, on internal homogeneity inside those borders, and on 
difference across them. With this focus, the territorial gaze divides the 
landscape into the distinct but uniform spaces that we know from the 
school atlas – different in colour, but isoform, unambiguously bordered 
and contiguous. 
As I argue in chapters four and five, the shift towards a 
governmental gaze organised around the distinction of national 
territories rather than ecologically delimited spaces involves a number 
of processes. It, first and foremost, involves a management of 
territorially internal differences that, at least superficially, differs from 
the imperial past. In the mid-twentieth century, both the Indian and 
Nepali nation-states are cast explicitly in opposition to the oppressive 
rule of the former imperial states. Built upon the opposition to the 
British Raj by the anti-colonial movement in India and the overthrow 
of the Rana regime by the 1950 revolution in Nepal, the Indian and 
Nepali nation-states are posed as negations of earlier inequality and 
oppression. Both states are presented through the endlessly repeated 
notion of ‘unity-in-diversity’ – a notion of equality as national citizens 
across ‘sub-national’ differences (see e.g. S. Roy, 2007). I argue, 
however, that the new national territories at best ‘roll over’, rather than 
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‘rule out’, the differentiation of people and places that provided the 
basis for imperial rule. Within, as well as across, the new, flat national 
territories imperial differences continue beneath a surface of superficial 
equality. In fact, the ostensibly more uniform and egalitarian 
government of the new national orders are littered with ‘imperial 
debris’ – old categories of difference that join “imperial pasts and 
national presence” (Stoler, 2008, p. 192) – and many decisions are still 
guided by imperial lines of differentiation. 
Notwithstanding territory’s obvious centrality to the global form 
of the nation-state, the concept has until recently been surprisingly 
overlooked across the social sciences (Brenner & Elden, 2009; Elden, 
2007, 2010). Not least in political science a widespread loyalty to the 
naturalised territories of the nation-state – a methodological and 
epistemological territorialism – has impeded critical investigations of 
the notion of territory (Agnew, 1994; Schendel, 2005). Recent 
theoretical developments in human geography are, however, pushing 
for more critical reflection on the historical significance of territory 
(see Brenner & Elden, 2009; Elden, 2007, 2010). Stuart Elden, e.g. 
suggests that territory might be regarded as a political technology 
emerging historically along with the various population-oriented 
governmental technologies that Foucault describes (Elden, 2007, 
2010). Just as population was constituted as a “known” object of 
governmental intervention through e.g. census operations and 
aggregate statistics, territory might be seen as a similar sort of object 
constituted through e.g. cadastral surveys and cartography (Scott, 1998; 
Strandsbjerg, 2008). Territory thus indicates a political space that is 
“owned, distributed, mapped, calculated, bordered and controlled” 
(Elden, 2010, pp. 804-808, 810) and is, in fact, “nothing else but the 
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effect, the profile, the mobile shape of a perpetual territorialisation” 
(Elden, 2013, p. 14) 
While these theoretical developments are conducive for a 
rethinking of the productive translation of variegated landscapes into 
territories, detached theoretical reflection only take us so far. Different 
territories have arisen at different global historical conjunctures and on 
different imperial backgrounds affecting the ways in which territory 
has been produced. While Elden seems, like Foucault, to be working 
out from an implicit European backdrop, the situation in South Asia 
was very different. Here, state territories emerged later than in Europe, 
they emerged within a growing international development regime, and 
they emerged out of explicit confrontation between imperial regimes 
and national movements (Chatterjee, 1986; Goswami, 2002, 2004; 
Ludden, 1992, 2005a; S. Roy, 2007, pp. 13-14). In explicit 
acknowledgement of this, my study supplements the Foucaultian 
approach to territory by pointing out how the more humanistic 
technology of centralised schooling supports the production of a 
modern national territory by extending literacy within a nationally 
shared language of difference and equality (cf. Anderson, [1991] 
2006). In Nepal, where I mainly focus on this, centralised schooling 
was most likely extended further across the landscape at an earlier 
point in time than e.g. the cadastral survey. 
Looking into the Nepali textbooks, it becomes apparent how the 
nation is cast in explicit opposition to the hierarchical differentiation of 
people and places in the imperial past, how the present-day territory is 
inscribed in history, and how unity-in-diversity is rallied under notions 
of aesthetic order and future development. It also emerges, however, 
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that the national territorialisation ‘rolls over’ more than it ‘rules out’ 
imperial categories of difference. 
Seen together, the emergence of national territories as the ruling 
governmental gaze across India and Nepal illustrates how territory 
works as a category of difference – that is, how it involves a need not 
only for territorially internal homogeneity, but also for territorially 
external difference.23 The national discourses that enable the 
production of a superficially uniform territory within both nations are 
obviously affected by the global conjuncture in which they emerge. 
One can especially see the reflections of the global post-war 
development regime in both nations’ immense discursive focus on 
dichotomies of backwardness and development (Ludden, 1992, 2005a; 
S. Roy, 2007). With a strong focus on national development, Nepali 
school textbooks e.g. largely follow in the footsteps of their Indian 
counterparts. Their national project is, however, cast on a background 
of particularism. Here, the brave past of Nepali warriors are brought 
out as a distinctive background for development, and the distinction 
from the large southern neighbour is further accentuated through the 
fashioning of Nepal as the world’s last Hindu kingdom. Hence, the play 
of difference illustrates the role of the nation as “both one of the most 
universally legitimate articulations of group identity and one of the 
most enduring and pervasive forms of modern particularism” 
(Goswami, 2002, p. 775). 
Furthermore, territorial delineations not only divide landscapes 
into distinct albeit isoform spaces, they obviously provide strong 
normative spaces of belonging, too. As Liisa Malkki, among others, 
                                                
23 This involves an interesting play of difference and similarity that illustrate what 
Manu Goswami has called the ‘doubled nature’ of the nation (Goswami, 2002). 
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has pointed out we largely live under a ‘national order of things’ in the 
contemporary world. Reproduced “in ordinary language, in nationalist 
discourses, and in scholarly studies of nations, nationalism and 
refugees” this order provides a ‘sedentary’ perspective to our thinking 
and an ‘arborescent’ imagination of belonging (Malkki, 1992, pp. 
25,27-28,31). People and nations are essentially imagined as trees 
rooted in the soil of national territories. This rooting provides a 
‘normative landscape’; a landscape that delineates norms of belonging, 
of who are ‘in place’ and who are ‘out of place’ and thus ties people to 
places (see also Cresswell, 1996). As a consequence of this normative 
landscape, the people that are not staying put – the refugee, the 
migrant, the displaced – are inherently suspect, ‘uprooted’, ‘out of 
place’. In my analysis of the Gorkhaland movement (chapter eight) the 
consequences of this order come out clearly in the anxiety of being ‘out 
of place’ that fuels the Gorkhaland movement. 
People: Caste, Race, Nationality, and Indigenous Rooting 
As I have already touched upon at various points above, the 
government of landscapes and territories is fundamentally intertwined 
with the government of people. During British rule, the imperial 
distinction between the civilised and governable plains and the 
backward and un-governable hills was overlaid with a racial distinction 
between plains and hill people. In the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, the overlapping differences of ecology and race thus 
reinforced each other emphasising the notion that the hills and their 
people provided a fundamentally different governmental landscape 
than the plains. Around the same time, the hierarchical organisation of 
people according to a hierarchy of caste-groups enabled the gradual 
territorial integration of the Gorkha Empire. Also here, the 
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governmental differentiation of people was intertwined with the 
territorial organisation of the landscape. Furthermore, especially over 
the last decades, claims to ethnic difference have been widespread 
across the subcontinent. As in the case of the Limbus, these claims 
often refashion earlier governmental categories of caste and racial 
difference in the context of indigenous place-making and territorial 
demands. These situations all, in various ways, highlight the third 
language of difference that I engage in the present study: people.24 
Multiple studies of colonial India have already highlighted some 
of the technologies involved in a governmental gaze organised around 
the difference between people as well as some of the effects of this 
kind of organisation (Cohn, 1987b; Dirks, 2001; Kaviraj, 1997, 2010). 
Bernard Cohn’s classic study of the Indian Census e.g. traces how 
census-categories developed from being essentially governmental 
distinctions of caste and religion applied to get a grasp of the vast 
subcontinent, to being categories of popular identification and 
mobilisation at a much wider scale than ever before (Cohn, 1987b). 
This overall development includes a shift, as Sudipta Kaviraj has 
highlighted, from a “fuzzy”, fluid sense of community towards a more 
rigid, “enumerated” sense (Kaviraj, 2000, pp. 187-201). It also, 
involves a shift from a local sense of community towards a sense of 
community that spans the emerging territory of the British Raj. Hence, 
while providing a measure of governmental legibility, the 
differentiation of people also has the unintended consequence of 
opening up for collective action at the hitherto unimaginable scale of 
the imperial territory. In this sense, governmental operations such as 
                                                
24 I have chosen the word “people” over alternatives such as nation or ethnicity to 
indicate a broader overarching commonality (see R. M. Smith, 2003, pp. 12-13) 
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enumeration, on the one hand, opens a new space for political action 
while, on the other hand, territorialising that space within the national 
boundaries delimit the enumerative operations. 
I do not have much to add to this already well-established 
literature in the present study. What I do contribute, however, is an 
investigation of various relationships between these well-developed, 
Foucaultian ideas about the government of population and the less-
developed notions of government of landscape and territory (Elden, 
2007, 2010). As stated above, I find these relationships both in historic 
government and in present-day refashioning of the categories of 
difference around which this historic government evolved. An 
important example of the latter is the notion of indigenous rooting. As 
the notion of national belonging, indigeneity combines distinctions of 
people with distinctions of territory (see Malkki, 1992). As I argue in 
chapter six, this notion cuts across academia and politics in a sense that 
activates historical and anthropological perspectives in present-day 
territorial politics. The, often academic, establishment of indigeneity 
provides substantial political leverage in South Asia today due to its 
regional and global status as a normative framework of belonging and 
rights. The politics of indigeneity thus not only connects distinctions of 
people and territory, but also re-shuffles our habitual spheres and scales 
of political authority. 
When the Limbus engage in the highly localised politics of 
where the border of a future Limbuwan federal state should be drawn, 
they do so largely through the association of their claims with 
globalised notions of indigenous rooting in ancestral landscapes. The 
establishment of indigeneity provides a globalised form of meaning and 
authority to Limbuwan as a place in the political landscape, because it 
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makes that place resonate with broader normative frames about the 
rooting of people that are present in the national discourse of Nepal 
(and South Asia) as well as more globally. Hence, the local landscape 
is made political through global references including a number of 
international declarations and conventions not least the ILO 
Convention 169.25 Since the 1991 Mandal Commission Report in India, 
and the contemporary political revolution in Nepal, this notion is 
increasingly viewed as a legitimate source of political claims across 
South Asia. As Amita Baviskar suggests with reference to India, the 
“social fact” of indigeneity has begun to raise “a legitimacy that is hard 
to ignore” across South Asia (Baviskar, 2006, p. 36). Similarly, Marie 
Lecomte-Tilouine recently suggested that a normative framework 
regarding indigenous rootedness in a specific territory is very much 
alive within public discourse in Nepal (Lecomte-Tilouine, 2010; see 
also Middleton & Shneiderman, 2008).26 
To complicate matters, today other globalised processes parallel 
national and indigenous rooting in relation to the production of place. 
As my analysis of Darjeeling illustrates, globally sanctioned processes 
of heritage conservation and “Geographical Indications” branding 
similarly reflect back on local place-making. The generalised 
production of meaning that I see as crucial to political place-making, 
thus, not only relates to the rooting of people in a specific soil, but also 
                                                
25 Usually referred to simply as “ILO 169” the ILO Convention Concerning 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries is a very popular 
reference point among ‘indigenous’ representatives in Nepal. In the convention it is 
clearly stated that, “governments shall respect the special importance for the 
cultures and spiritual values of the peoples concerned of their relationship with the 
lands or territories” (Article 13§1). 
26 In her interpretation, the Nepali ‘indigenous’ groups, “associate identity with 
territory, and establish a genealogical link with their environment, which they 
conceive as an organic being with which they share common substance” (Lecomte-
Tilouine, 2010, p. 123). 
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to the ‘rooting of things’ considered to have a certain value. As I argue, 
the geographical certification of Darjeeling Tea not only brands the 
product, but also the landscape from which it arrives. If seen from the 
outside, one could, in a sense, argue that tea is more solidly rooted in 
Darjeeling than a population repeatedly referred to through their 
migration history. And the heritage status of the Darjeeling Himalayan 
Railroad ties it to a notion of global, rather than national, history. 
Selected, certified and fashioned in front of a tourist gaze, this heritage 
site thus provides a globalised perspective to a highly localised setting 
– a perspective that does not distinguish between colonial and post-
colonial rule in the same way as national discourse does. 
Conclusion 
In summary, I seek to move towards a non-territorialised theory of 
government and politics. I do so, by beginning from a notion of 
landscape rather than territory. As I, subsequently, consider the 
relationship between government and this landscape, I emphasise three 
languages of difference around which the governmental gazes of the 
assemblages presented in the introduction are built: a language of 
ecology, a language of territory, and a language of difference. At this 
abstract, analytical level I thus suggest we might regard the three 
governmental assemblages: imperial landscapes, the national territories 
and glocal place-making as different forms of governing difference 
across these three languages. As my analysis presents over the next 
four chapters, this perspective illuminates a range of fundamental 
tensions that evolve across the governmental history of the Himalayan 
hills: a tension between the interests and desires of the imperial regimes 
as they collide with the rugged landscape of the Himalayan hills; a 
tension between the hierarchically organised diversity that the imperial 
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landscape employs as a central governmental gaze and the ideal of 
territorial uniformity that applies to the national regimes that follow; a 
tension between the supposed unity-in-diversity of the national 
territories and indigenous claims to difference within them; and finally 
a tension between global connectivity and local meaning involved in 
glocal place-making. 
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Chapter 3: Paths Through the Landscape 
(…) we need to do more than what social scientists like to call 
comparison, putting one country next to another, another culture 
next to another, as if they were as independent in life as in thought. 
(A. Appadurai, 1993, p. 419) 
In the last chapter, I set out some preliminary steps towards a non-
territorial conceptualisation of government and politics. In this chapter 
I discuss what this entails for the way we practice research. I argue that 
we need to relax the policing of disciplinary borders and re-consider 
methodological conventions, in order to re-imagine a study of politics 
that can simultaneously engage global flows and the continued 
importance of place. 
In its cross-disciplinary approach to politics, the present chapter 
is situated on the background of critical discussions on the relationship 
between place and culture in anthropology and the relationship 
between politics and scale within geography (Agnew, 1994; Arjun 
Appadurai, 1996, 2002; Brenner, 1997, 1999; Escobar, 2001; Ferguson 
& Gupta, 2002; Gupta & Ferguson, 1992, 1997a, 1997b; Malkki, 1992; 
Schendel, 2002).27 If culture can no longer be expected to be naturally 
linked to place (if it ever could) then the study of cultural politics 
cannot rely on merely importing ‘culture’ as a static, place-bound 
object into discussion of political dynamics. Instead, the production of 
cultural roots in specific places should be seen as potentially political in 
itself, and its political consequences and entanglements should be 
investigated. Similarly, if the ‘scalar fix’ that tied power and politics 
                                                
27 Lisa Wedeen, in a recent article, takes up the related challenge of thinking 
through what the critical anthropology of the late 80s and 90s – most importantly 
Clifford & Marcus’ Writing Culture (1986) – means for the use of ethnography in 
political science (see Wedeen, 2010) 
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tightly to the national scale in the second half of the twentieth century 
is unravelling, then the ‘methodological territorialism’ of much 
political science research needs to be revised (Brenner, 1998). Hence, 
to grasp contemporary political dynamics in the face of both de-
territorialisation and place-making we need to revise our understanding 
of what constitutes relevant objects of study, how these are delineated, 
and how we might study them. To do so, I argue that bringing relevant 
insights from imagined disciplinary outsides into the study of 
contemporary politics makes a lot of sense. 
Places, Cases and Political Locations 
Through well thought-out cross-case comparisons, political science has 
over the last half century managed to produce a wide range of 
interesting middle-range propositions about political phenomena 
(George & Bennett, 2004). In these comparisons, ‘cases’ are often 
envisioned in spatial terms and positioned in a bureaucratic hierarchy 
evolving around the nation-state formation (Gerring, 2004). This is one 
of the places where a ‘methodological territorialism’ tends to seep into 
the analytical framework (Agnew, 1994; Brenner, 1999). That is, in the 
comparative case study, national territory is often taken not simply as a 
temporally finite empirical phenomenon, but as a pre-given analytical 
category. In parallel, scale is often imagined in terms of concentric 
circles: ’the local’, encompassed by ’the national’, encompassed 
by ’the global’. And, when introduced into analytical frameworks, 
these circles are often further imagined to be situated in a hierarchy 
indicating directions of effect: global flows undermine the power of the 
nation-state, national legislation has local effects etc. As noted in the 
introduction, I initially conceptualised the present study largely along 
these lines. 
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However, if we regard space, place, and territory as socially and 
historically constituted phenomena then the typical, spatial approach to 
cases and comparison becomes problematic. If national territory is the 
product of a contingent, albeit highly globalised, governmental gaze 
then its production emerges as a central concern for analysis rather than 
a pre-given starting point. Scales, in other words, cannot be taken as 
neutral categories of analysis as scale itself is produced along with 
spaces, places and territories (Brenner, 1997, p. 159; 1998). Neither can 
we regard scale as necessarily organised in hierarchies. As my analysis 
illustrates, the production of a uniform national space in Nepal in the 
mid-twentieth century is e.g. to a large extent contextualised by the 
local practice of a handful of academics working towards community 
improvement among the Nepalis in Darjeeling in the beginning of the 
century. Here, very local events produce an important context for the 
production of space at an explicitly national scale.28 Hence, when 
approaching space, place and territory as human products, a 
comparison-in-isolation of cases conceived in simple spatial and 
hierarchical terms is unviable and – given the spatial dynamics I 
investigate – highly problematic. 
This study, therefore, is not a comparative case study in the 
classic sense. I do not see the spatial scales I engage (e.g. India, West 
Bengal, Darjeeling) as constituting cases, and I do not regard a 
comparison between these as the primary objective of research. Rather, 
what is interesting from the perspective of this study are the multiple 
ways in which landscape and politics are connected across what we 
                                                
28 Appadurai calls this non-hierarchical co-constitution “intercontextuality” (Arjun 
Appadurai, 1996, p. 187). Lefebvre seems to indicate the same through his 
“principle of  interpenetration and superimposition of social spaces” (Brenner, 
1997, pp. 14-145; Goswami, 2004, pp. 27-30; Lefebvre, [1974] 1991, p. 88) 
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might call ‘political locations’ (Gupta & Ferguson, 1997c, p. 35).29 By 
political location I mean a connection between, on the one hand, a 
specific location and on the other hand, political contestation of e.g. 
that location’s meaning as a place. While the ‘location’ part naturally 
ties a ‘political location’ to a specific point on Earth, the ‘political’ part 
isn’t necessarily tied to location in the same way. Hence, the 
conceptualisation suggests that we might use the coalescence of an 
often widespread range of political actions and representations around a 
specific location as an analytical starting point.  
My study deals with four such ‘political locations’ across the 
India-Nepal borderland and across substantial historical stretches. 
Firstly, I engage Darjeeling as it is constituted in relation to the 
distinction between hills and plains across the northern subcontinent, in 
relation to British imperial connections and imagination of the hill 
station, and in relation to globalised notions of heritage and tea 
branding. Secondly, I engage Nepal as it is produced as a uniform 
national space across the last half century, how this production takes up 
the imperial history of the Gorkha kingdom, and how governmental 
differences are overwritten in this production albeit re-emerging in the 
contemporary imagination of a new Nepal. Thirdly, I engage 
Gorkhaland as it meets the image of the peaceful hill state, as it feeds 
upon and feeds into anxieties of being ‘out of place’ among the 
‘Indian-Nepalis’, and as it organises spectacles of heavy-handed 
control in Darjeeling. Finally, I engage Limbuwan as it is positioned as 
a proper place across academic and political discourse, as it is 
                                                
29 Gupta and Ferguson bring up this notion in their reflections on how to rethink 
fieldwork in a way more attuned to a world where culture not necessarily sits 
naturally in place (see also Escobar, 2001). I, however, think we might usefully 
bring this notion out of the disciplinary self-reflection of anthropology and into a 
wider discussion. 
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connected to globalised notions of ‘indigeneity’, and as it is enacted as 
a state-to-be in a new, federal Nepal. 
The refusal to rely on conventional territorial scales in the 
construction of units of analysis does not, however, indicate that these 
scales are not empirically important. In fact, I would argue that the 
present study is in a better position to gauge the power of national 
territorialisation and local place-making because it avoids uncritical 
methodological allegiance with either scale to begin with. Additionally, 
the historical horizon within which this study operates – stretching 
from British and Gorkha imperial government, over Nepali and Indian 
national territorialisation, to contemporary global entanglements – 
helps place the ‘scalar fix’ of the national order of things in a broader 
perspective. Hence, in this study, the national scale continues to play a 
crucial role – not as a natural entity – but as the powerful product of 
global history related to colonial imperialism and the global spread of 
capitalism (Goswami, 2002, 2004; Lefebvre, [1974] 1991; Lefebvre, 
Brenner, & Elden, 2009).30 Through my engagement with spatial 
history (see below) the national scale, in other words, emerges as a 
historically conditioned globalised form (Balibar, 1991; Brenner, 1997, 
1999). In my view, such a perspective not only resonates with recent 
history scholarship (Goswami, 2002, 2004; Ludden, 2003b, 2012), but 
also helps lift political science research out of the global order in which 
it was born, without losing sight of that order.31 
                                                
30 I do not, by saying this, want to suggest that the nation-state formation was a 
direct product of capitalist expansion - as Lefebvre might be interpreted to suggest 
(Balibar, 1991; Deshpande, 1998). Rather, the globalisation of capitalism – in the 
historical interaction with a range of other factors - brought about some of the 
grounds on which nation-state formation was enabled. See (Goswami, 2004) for a 
detailed analysis of such dynamics in the case of the Indian nation-state formation. 
31 A globalised spatial history of nation-state formation furthermore pushes for a 
critical interrogation of the supposed uniformity of colonial imperialism and the 
Paths Through the Landscape 
 54 
Geographical Sites, Textual Sites, and the Object of Study  
Albeit dealing with ‘political locations’ as units of analysis, the 
research for this study has, naturally, taken place in more concrete 
sites. I spent a total of four months in Kathmandu, Delhi, Ilam and 
Darjeeling over three visits from the autumn of 2010 to the autumn of 
2011.32 I interviewed people and gathered textual material in 
Kathmandu and Delhi, and I travelled across and conducted fieldwork 
in the borderland between Eastern Nepal and North Bengal – mainly 
concentrated on the towns of Ilam and Darjeeling. My time in the field 
was shared between various forms of participant observation, chatting, 
informal interviewing and collection of textual material. I undertook a 
range of interviews with representatives of various ‘ethnic’ and 
‘political’ organisations across Kathmandu, Ilam and Darjeeling and 
participated in an array of public events and speeches. As my focus at 
the time was more explicitly on national schooling than is expressed in 
the present study, part of my time was furthermore spent with 
                                                                                                                                  
subsequent ‘post-colonial condition’ of former colonies (see e.g. S. Roy, 2007, p. 
23). As I argue in the dissertation, colonial rule actually produced a variety of 
different spaces in the landscape on which the Indian national territory was later 
instantiated. As a result, the notion of a uniform ‘post-colonial condition’ – evident 
e.g. in Indian national discourse – overwrites a variety spatially differentiated 
legacies. The uniformity of colonial imperialism, in other words, seems more like a 
product of post-colonial nationalist discourse than of colonial administration itself. 
As I analyse the production of space across a formally ‘post-colonial’ and a 
formally ‘non-colonised’ nation-state formation as well as local place-making in 
the Darjeeling area – a somewhat special (post-colonial?) space – the dissertation at 
least scratches the surface of a critique of uniform post-coloniality illustrating some 
of the spatial diversity of colonial conditions. 
32 Before initiating the project, I lived and worked in Kathmandu during nine 
important months of Nepal’s recent political history – from autumn 2007 to 
summer 2008 when the Constituent Assembly was elected and the country 
subsequently declared a republic. While this stay predates the conceptualisation of 
the present project – and thus cannot be really be relied upon for fieldwork material 
– it did allow me to gain an important familiarity with the region, a basic 
understanding of the Nepali language, and a good insight into the fundamental 
political questions that are currently being posed. 
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participant observations in schools. While not all of the resulting 
material turned out to be of interest for the subsequently reframed 
study, the textbooks remain an important site (especially in chapter 
five).  
To these geographical sites of fieldwork, one could add a range 
of textual sites. One of my early selections was the textual site of 
school textbooks. This has proved a rich site for investigating the 
territorialisation of the political landscape and the production of 
national space. In both countries schools are one of the most 
widespread institutions of the nation state and have been seen a prime 
site for the production and negotiation of nationalism (Advani, 1996, 
2009; B. K. Banerjee, 2007; Caddell, 2005, 2006, 2007; Guichard, 
2009, 2010; Kumar, 1988, 2005; Skinner & Holland, 2009 [1996]).33 
Both countries also have centralised systems determining what students 
are supposed to read in public schools across the nation.34 Hence, the 
textual site of textbooks combines an explicit state focus with a 
substantial spatial dispersion and a relatively uniformity in content. 
This site, thus, provides both an insight into the governmental gaze as 
expressed by the state and a grounded check on scholarly analyses of 
national discourse and representation. To this, I have added a range of 
other representational and reflective material: government documents, 
                                                
33 A range of scholars furthermore emphasise the school as an important institution 
for the production of the nation, its people and territory in general (see e,g, Balibar, 
1991; Foucault, 1995; Goswami, 2002; Weber, 1976). 
34 The Nepali system is, nonetheless substantially more centralised than the Indian. 
In Nepal, public school textbooks are written, edited, and even printed centrally 
before being distributed throughout the country. In India, the states are allowed a 
certain, limited, freedom in selecting and/or producing textbooks following the 
centrally prescribed curriculum. West Bengal, however, does not seem to comply 
with the centrally prescribed standards and the textbooks used in public schools in 
the state differ substantially from those produced by the National Council of 
Educational Research and Training (NCERT).  
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political pamphlets, maps and academic texts providing a multitude of 
textual encounters.  
In sum, my research practice has spanned multiple, diverse sites. 
What does this multiplicity and diversity mean for the study? I see my 
research practice somewhat along the lines of George Marcus’ classic 
discussion of a multi-sited ethnography in which: 
 (…) comparison emerges from putting questions to an emergent 
object of study whose contours, sites, and relationships are not 
known beforehand, but are themselves a contribution of making an 
account that has different, complexly connected sites of investigation 
(Marcus, 1995, p. 102). 
What my engagement with the multiple sites has allowed me to do is to 
see the political landscape of the Indian-Nepal borderland as an 
‘emergent object of study’.35 As such, it ties together the four political 
locations described above in a complex web of relations. And it 
straddles an international border that typically bounds research while 
concomitantly pointing the ‘paths out’ of the area, its global 
connections (see Cresswell, 2004, pp. 40-43; Cronon, 1992). While I, 
naturally, selected the geographical field sites at a relatively early 
stage, this object of study has emerged through a gradual reflective 
process. It is only through a repeated ‘tacking’ (Cerwonka & Malkki, 
2007; Clifford & Marcus, 1986) between my theoretical propositions 
and various geographical and textual sites that I have been able to make 
sense of the area in these terms. Hence, as Marcus suggests, the object 
                                                
35 A few articles have already studied dynamics across the border between Eastern 
Nepal and Darjeeling (Hutt, 1997; Shneiderman, 2010), but the concerted 
perspective I propose here has not been attempted before. 
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of such a multi-sited study should itself be seen as a product, as a 
contribution, of the study.36 
Why then, is the political landscape of the India-Nepal 
borderland an interesting object of study? What does the India-Nepal 
borderland help us see about the connection between landscape and 
politics? If you look at a ‘political’ map of the area you will clearly see 
the north-south border that ostensibly separates India and Nepal. One, 
however, needs not spend much time in the area to realise that this 
border, as many others, “not only join[s] what is different but also 
divide[s] what is similar” (Schendel, 2005, p. 9). If you then turn your 
attention to a topographical map of the area, a very different border 
emerges. This border follows the ecological line of distinction between 
the hills and the plains running east-west, perpendicular to the 
international border. As my study suggests, this border is pretty much 
invisible for most common approaches to politics (developments in 
political ecology exempted), yet it plays into politics in various ways 
across the borderland. In contrast to a classic comparison of territorially 
conceived units, a focus on the borderland enables an appreciation of 
                                                
36 This grounded, improvising (Cerwonka & Malkki, 2007) research process 
directed at an emergent object of study does not follow the principles for case 
selection within a causal comparative framework. Here, my ‘selection of case’ 
would surely be cast as a biased selection on the “dependent variable” – a comment 
I have indeed received a number of times. This critique however follows a different 
epistemological logic than the one guiding my study in this dissertation. Where 
classic comparative studies obviously rely on a high degree of abstraction from 
context through the magic of large numbers (large-N) or more-or-less well founded 
prior assumptions about the cases (small-N), the study proposed here relies, 
instead, on a detailed ‘thick’ explication of the context in which the political 
dynamics unfolds (see e.g. Cerwonka & Malkki, 2007, pp. 73-74; Geertz, 1973, pp. 
3-30). The value of my study relies on its ability to provide connection between the 
cases I bring forth, the context in which they are situated (and interact with), and 
the theoretical propositions that have been produced in the course of the research 
process. In turn it produces contextually situated rather than abstract knowledge 
(Haraway, 1988). 
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these dynamics, along with the powerful effects of the territorial 
border. 
Borderland Fieldwork and Situational Analysis 
The borderland provides a rich field site for the investigation of 
national territorialisation as well as local place making. Placing the 
periphery of national territory at the centre of attention, the borderland 
illustrates the everyday operations of territory. At the border, it 
becomes very tangible what can travel across – openly or illicitly – and 
what cannot.  
When school buses every day bring children from the Nepali 
border town of Pashupatinagar to attend the supposedly superior 
schools of the Indian border town Mirik, their everyday route fuses two 
small localities with the international scale of cross-border travel while 
supplanting one nationally scaled curriculum for another. And when 
these children’s fathers walk the small smuggler’s path across the 
border with Chinese jeans coming from Kathmandu, they are able to do 
so because eager Indian consumers cannot get these directly from 
China due to the high politics of international relations between the two 
massive super-powers. In these, and many other ways, the borderland 
perspective is necessarily multi-scalar and destabilises the clear-cut 
borders of the national order of things with the naturalness of everyday 
life. Hence, as a field site, the borderland provides a novel perspective 
on scale (Schendel, 2005; Schendel & Abraham, 2005). 
Supposedly part of an ancient Kirat civilisation, the two 
borderland sites where I did my fieldwork share history. The area was 
at various times divided between Sikkim, Bhutan, the Gorkha Empire, 
the British Raj, Nepal and India. Present histories of the borderland, 
thus, provide both resources and constraints for the rooting of people in 
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the area. In a period when notions of indigeneity are attaining global 
legitimacy, the minute details of borderland history have become the 
playing field for contemporary politics of place. Questions about who 
are ‘in place’ and who are ‘out of place’ in the political landscape 
introduce elements of a history of and before the border into claims 
directed towards the power-centres of the two nation-states that bisect 
the borderland. Paradoxically, such claims both destabilise and confirm 
the territoriality of the two nation-states – asking the national centres 
for recognition based on histories that are overwritten in national 
representations. Hence, as the geographical anchoring of political 
locations, the borderland sites illuminate complex connections between 
national territorialisation and local place-making. 
In my fieldwork in the borderland, I chose to focus on the semi-
urban environments of Ilam and Darjeeling. These towns combine the 
everyday life of the borderland (the border is less than 20 km from 
either) with the material practices and representations of place and 
territory that come out of official signposting, political parades, ethnic 
organisation offices and national schools. Potentially the capitals of 
future Limbuwan and Gorkhaland states, the towns provide both a 
concrete geographical anchoring of these territorial claims and a stage 
on which place-making can be performed. They provide a meeting-
point in which the politics of place are staged in front of and within the 
borderland with its inherently multi-scalar characteristics. Hence, in 
these borderland towns, politics is rarely just local. 
In the present study, I make sense of my fieldwork in two ways. 
Firstly, I bring in a range of my interviews at a discursive level, 
considering the ways in which they represent place and landscape. 
Secondly, I bring in various observations constructed as ‘cases’ as 
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understood within the Manchester school of social anthropology (M. 
Burawoy, 1998; see Michael Burawoy, 2009; J. C. Mitchell, 1983). In 
contrast to the classic comparative case study of political science, 
‘cases’ are here characterised more in terms of time and social 
complexity than in terms of space and bureaucratic hierarchy. 
Consisting of “a detailed examination of an event (or a series of 
events)” (J. C. Mitchell, 1983, p. 192) cases can extend anywhere from 
an ‘apt illustration’ over a ‘situational analyses’ to a longer-term 
‘extended case’. Due to the relatively short time-span of my fieldwork, 
I do not provide any extended observation-based analyses, but I do 
construct what might be termed both apt illustrations (e.g. the anecdote 
introducing the study) and situational analysis (e.g. of the public events 
during the state elections in Darjeeling). The use of these enables me to 
address more directly the material and practical side of the politics of 
place and landscape than any purely discourse-based study could 
(Cerwonka, 2004). 
Engagements with History 
Places rarely change from one day to another. Neither do landscapes. 
Hence, looking at history makes sense when seeking to understand the 
production and change of political landscape. In the present study I 
deal extensively with history. The political landscape itself is 
historically founded bringing together ecological conditions, historical 
alterations and sedimented representations of the landscape. Similarly, 
attempts to alter the landscape – to produce and situate places such as 
Limbuwan and Gorkhaland within it – routinely brings history into the 
on-going politics of place. Furthermore, historical interpretation also 
runs through the territorialisation of the landscape in the hands of the 
Indian and Nepali nation-states. Therefore, as it shows up in such 
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various guises, history provides as a vibrant field for the production of 
the political landscape. This field, however, is also a methodologically 
challenging one. Across the three guises described above, history is 
obviously brought into this study at multiple levels of ontology and 
interpretation. In the following paragraphs, I outline these levels and 
the choices involved in my interpretation – in choice of material as well 
as epistemological approach. 
National and indigenous histories obviously have a tendency to 
project its people and place far back in time (see e.g. Hobsbawm & 
Ranger, 1983). As such histories are often politically effective they, 
nonetheless, need to be taken seriously. Although some ‘inventions of 
tradition’ seem more dubious than others, all histories are, after all, 
interpretations based on varying degrees of engagement with varying 
amounts and qualities of sources. In the Himalayan hills, sources can 
sometimes be very meagre. As one Limbu representative told me, the 
Nepali paper on which much Limbu historical documents have been 
written is, unfortunately, excellent for lighting fires and rolling 
cigarettes. Hence, few historical documents have survived decades of 
cold winters. This, however, does not mean that the histories that are 
written are necessarily less important in the contemporary politics of 
place. As Lisa Wedeen’s study of the Asad cult in Syria reminds us, 
sometimes even “manifestly incredible” claims can effectively be 
incorporated into the symbolic universe of national discourse (Wedeen, 
1999, p. 12). Repeated and rehearsed, such claims might be 
incorporated into the repertoire of banal forms of nationalism or 
indigeneity supporting the rooting of people in specific, bordered and 
territorialized, landscapes (Billig, 1995; Malkki, 1992). 
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In this study, I nonetheless try to situate both national and 
indigenous historical claims against a background of what might be 
called ‘spatial history’. Where national and indigenous histories 
typically read history backwards from the positions of a present place, 
the ‘spatial history’ instead seeks to clarify the ways in which this place 
has emerged along with the political landscape into which it is fitted. 
As Paul Carter suggests in the introduction to his spatial history of 
Australia, such an approach is “concerned with the haze which 
preceded clear outlines” and ”recognizes that the spatiality of historical 
experience evaporates before the imperial gaze” – that is, the gaze of 
established, cause-and-effect histories supporting certain regimes 
(Carter, 1987, p. xxii). Hence, more than a history of origins, it is a 
history of beginnings and transformations – a history of the cultural 
production of landscapes, or broad canvases of space and place. It is, in 
other words, a history of the delineation, naming, bordering, 
organization and representation of space into the form of places, 
landscapes and territories.  
In the present study, I seek to bring out ‘spatial histories’ of 
Nepal as a national territory and of the Darjeeling hills as a place. To 
do so, I apply two connected interpretive tactics. Both of these can be 
seen as minor alternatives to the strategy of writing a full-blown spatial 
history (e.g. along the lines of (Carter, 1987)) – a project fully outside 
the scope of the present dissertation as well as my field of expertise.  
In the first tactic, I apply a critical reading of existing, ‘national’ 
or ‘indigenous’, historical narratives in terms of their effects on 
territorialisation, place-making and the production of the political 
landscape. This reading involves not so much a critique of the veracity 
of the truth claims in these historical narratives as an explication of 
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their contingency and the powerful effects they have notwithstanding 
their truthfulness. In this reading I, in other words, foreground what the 
historical narratives do, rather than what the veracity of their claims 
might be – emphasising how the narratives make places and territories 
more real and inevitable in the political landscape. While relying on 
existing historical scholarship for the histories I analyse within this 
tactic, my engagement with school textbooks furthermore allows me to 
interpret the historical articulations and gauge the spread of these 
histories – providing a check on the scholarly literature. Chapter five, 
on the spatial history of Nepal, illustrates the most consistent use of this 
tactic. 
In the second tactic, I try to provide an ‘outside’ to the dominant 
historical narratives. I do so mainly through a synthetic reading of 
existing historical scholarship, at crucial points supplemented with a 
limited engagement with primary sources. Chapter seven, on hills, hill 
stations and Darjeeling in the history of India mainly illustrates the use 
of this tactic. In this history, I foreground the physical landscape and its 
representations and insist on pointing out how specific parts of this 
landscape –in this case the hills – have been placed outside the main 
narratives of national history. Here, I approach a critique of national 
history more from the outside then from the inside, through a decentred 
view that places the national periphery at the centre of attention. This 
again enables the explication of contingency and a focus on how some 
places – such as Darjeeling – might fall between lines of national 
spatial classification. Like the first tactic, it thus allows for an 
appreciation of the involved in the production and territorialisation of 
the political landscape. 
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In summary, one might distinguish three ontological or 
interpretive levels at which history enters the present study. As a basis 
for the analysis, I bring in a range of historical conditions and events 
that are taken as positive facts. These are conditions that seem to be 
surrounded by widespread agreement in the literature and which are 
outside the scope of the present project to critically engage. The 
Gorkha-British war in 1814-15 and the ensuing Treaty of Sugauli are 
an example of this level. At a second level, I bring in various histories 
that I refer to as ‘national’, ‘colonial’ or ‘indigenous’. Some of these 
contain ‘facts’ that can obviously be questioned, but I only do so to a 
limited degree. For these histories, their articulation and dissemination 
are of more interest to this study than their veracity. I approach them at 
a level of representation where their discursive and visual constellation 
and its effects on the production of place and landscape are more 
relevant than their truth claims. At a third level, I bring in what we 
might call ‘outside’ histories or counter-histories. The merit of these for 
the dissertation lies in a combination of their truthfulness and their 
critical or decentering potential. Obviously, some histories appear at 
several of these levels at different points in the study. 
A Note on Limitations 
With the focus on space, place and social landscape, there are a number 
of perspectives that I do not address in the present study. With my 
focus on the political landscape of the India-Nepal borderland I do not 
address a number of the ‘social wholes’ that many studies often take as 
their object (see e.g. Binsbergen, 1981; Gellner, 2012). Albeit my study 
deals extensively with claims raised in terms of ‘ethnicity’, I do not 
take any specific ethnic group as a unit of study. As described above, 
my interest in the indigenous rooting of people in specific physical 
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landscapes relates mainly to the places that are produced as meaningful 
and important in the process, not the people. My main focus is thus e.g. 
on Limbuwan and not on the Limbus – although such categories of 
identity and place are obviously intertwined in the social processes of 
rooting. Similarly, I do not deal with questions of religion or caste in 
any concerted way. In addition, although I acknowledge the high 
political salience of questions of gender in the area as well as in parts 
of the literature of nationalism (Yuval-Davis, 1997), I do not address 
these questions explicitly in the study. While gender relations 
obviously plays an important role in the organisation of many societies 
into e.g. ‘public’ and ‘private’ spaces, questions of gender seem less 
relevant in relation to the scales at which I approach place and territory 
(however see Massey, 1994).37 
Furthermore, with a focus on large-scale practices and 
widespread representations, I do not extensively deal with personal 
imaginations of place and political landscape. While such a study 
would obviously be interesting, it would involve a very different kind 
of material (e.g. gained through much longer term fieldwork) and 
interpretive framework (more attuned to how people produce meaning 
at a personal level). While I do provide some minor observations in this 
direction in order to ground the study in the lived realities of the areas I 
investigate, my main level of investigation nonetheless remains that of 
more-or-less organised representation. Though necessary in terms of 
focusing the study, this of cause limits my ability to provide knowledge 
claims related to the relationship between organisational 
                                                
37 Similarly, while claims to indigeneity in the area are obviously and interestingly 
represented as inscribed particularly on the female body (widespread Limbu 
beauty-contests are a case in point of this), I do not take up such connections as 
they do not seem to be implicated in the production of political landscapes in the 
sense I am after. 
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representations (e.g. of Gorkhaland) and personal imagination (e.g. that 
of people living in ‘Gorkhaland’). 
Finally, a note on language: English and Nepali are the official 
and prevalent languages across my sites of investigation. Many of the 
‘ethnic’ and ‘political’ elites I interviewed gladly spoke to me in 
English and some even preferred to do so, the centralised school 
textbooks and government documents that I analyse are for the most 
part published in English38, and much formal political discussions are 
partly conducted in English-language media. During my fieldwork in 
Kathmandu, Ilam and Darjeeling, a Nepali friend assisted me with 
language. He translated during interviews with non-English speakers, 
helped out with subsequent transcriptions and answered a barrage of 
questions about signs, pamphlets, informal comments, public speeches 
etc. that were linguistically inaccessible to me. My rudimentary 
knowledge of Nepali helped me ask questions in a variety of situations 
of uncertainty, but it was not sufficient to allow me to do independent 
interviews of translations. In sum, while the present study might not 
give an adequate picture of Nepali-language discourse, it should 
nonetheless give a substantial account of vernacular politics. 
Interpretation and Situated Knowledge 
As I have argued throughout this chapter, taking place as a socially 
constituted phenomenon rather than a pre-given analytical category has 
major implications for our knowledge production. It firstly involves 
working with and towards an emergent object of study. In this study I 
have come to conceptualise this object as the political landscape of the 
India-Nepal borderland and I have approached it analytically through 
                                                
38 Of the textbooks I analyse, only the Nepali textbooks from the late 80’s are in 
Nepali. Parts of these were translated for me. 
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four ‘political locations’. Secondly, it will often involve a multi-sited 
research practice. In this study, I have analysed material from various 
geographical and textual sites in order to enable the construction of a 
research object that was not pre-given. Thirdly, this study has involved 
both ethnographically and historically oriented research practices. As 
places and landscapes are constructed over substantial stretches of time 
and their construction involves not only discursive and visual 
representation, but also material practices these practices have been 
essential for uncovering historical and material connections between 
landscape and politics.  
Finally, taking place seriously involves interpretation throughout 
the research process. As the production and politics of place and 
landscape rely on local and trans-local, historical and contemporary 
networks of meaning, the knowledge claims that I produce through the 
interpretation of representations and practices are necessarily 
contextually situated (Cerwonka & Malkki, 2007; Haraway, 1988). In 
order to produce such knowledge, procedures are necessarily flexible 
and improvisational and thus do not lend themselves to standardization 
(Malkki, 2007). Hence, the ‘embedded objectivity’ of situated 
knowledge cannot be evaluated solely in procedural terms (M. 
Burawoy, 1998), but has rather to be judged on the basis of contextual 
resonance. In the present study, I seek to make my contextual 
interpretations open to the reader not only through a general explication 
of what I see as the relevant context, but also through the design itself. 
As the production of the places I investigate provides important and 
interpenetrating contexts for each other, what is explicated in one 
analytical chapter is often part of the interpretive context for another. 
Hence, by the final chapter, the interpretive context will hopefully be 
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clear enough for the reader to relate to the interpretive claims I put 
forward throughout the study. 
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Chapter 4: Imperial Landscapes 
A great amount of warring, betraying, bartering had occurred; 
between Nepal, England, Tibet, India, Sikkim, Bhutan; Darjeeling 
stolen from here, Kalimpong plucked from there – despite, ah, 
despite the mist charging down like a dragon, dissolving, undoing, 
making ridiculous the drawing of borders. (Desai, 2006, p. 9) 
The effect of these notifications has been to place the plains of Assam 
in much the same legal position as other parts of India. The 
inhabitants of the hilly tracts, however, were not yet suited for the 
elaborate legal rules (…) and they had to be governed in a simpler 
and more personal manner than those of the more civilized and 
longer-settled districts. (Gait, 1906, p. 330) 
“What democracy you have in Nepal, you made an Indian president!” 
the keeper of the bookstore told Narayan. This was not the first time he 
had gotten this sort of half joking, half baffled comment while assisting 
me during my fieldwork in Darjeeling. As a ‘Nepalese Nepali’ among 
the ‘Indian Nepalis’ of Darjeeling, my friend easily attracted such off-
the-cuff evaluations of the political changes taking place across the 
border. The “Indian president” in question was Ram Baran Yadav, the 
president of Nepal since its official declaration as Republic in 2008. 
For Darjeeling residents, such as the keeper of the bookstore, Yadav’s 
supposed Indianness obviously stems from his origin in Nepal’s 
southern plains. To them, Yadav’s Nepali citizenship, his mainstream 
political career in the Nepali Congress Party or his earlier ministerial 
positions did not matter, it seemed. The president’s loyalties were seen 
as determined by his originating landscape. And notwithstanding the 
eager commentators’ own Indian citizenships, and everyday life in a 
North Indian town, the “Indian” loyalties of the Nepali president 
seemed to offend their political sensibilities. What was this plains-
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dweller doing now heading the former “Himalayan kingdom” across 
the border? 
Narayan’s repeated encounters with such comments illustrate a 
tension between the bordered national territories of India and Nepal 
and a cross-border normative landscape. In these encounters, the 
national order of things unravels for a moment providing a glimpse of 
an underlying landscape. This landscape, I argue, draws lines back into 
the imperial history of the area, lines that are increasingly resurfacing 
in the contemporary politics of local autonomy. 
In 1991, Etienne Balibar stated that all nations are born out of 
empire (Balibar, 1991). This is definitely true for India and Nepal. 
Initially there were the empires of the Indian plains and the Tibetan 
plateau. In between these, the Himalayas and their foothills constituted 
an area that was relatively impenetrable by the governmental gaze of 
imperial formations. For some, this space represented the uncivilised 
and savage. For others it provided a zone of refuge from the imperial 
exploitation on either side. Over time, however, empire was 
superimposed even upon the challenging terrain of the Himalayan hills. 
In the mid-eighteenth century, Prithvi Narayan Shah expanded the 
Gorkha empire eastwards across the hills subduing dozens of small 
polities. Around the turn of the century, this empire stretched all the 
way across the central Himalayas from the river Sutlej in present-day 
Himalchal Pradesh, to the Teesta river separating the Darjeeling and 
Kalimpong districts of present-day West Bengal. Only a decade later 
the Anglo-Gorkha war stopped the Gorkha expansion and the British 
extended their colonial government into the Himalayan hills first 
around Darjeeling and later further east. What used to be a zone of 
refuge from imperial expansion had thus, by the mid-nineteenth 
Imperial Landscapes 
 71 
century, been superimposed by empire. Migrants escaping the feudal 
exploitation of the Gorkha Empire ended up in relations of capitalist 
exploitation within the British. These migrants might be distant 
relatives of the Darjeeling residents that presented Narayan with their 
comments on the “Indian” president of Nepal. 
In this chapter I lay out a broad, sweeping history of the imperial 
government of the Himalayan hills. I describe how, within both the 
British and the Gorkha imperial formations, essential and hierarchical 
differentiations of people emerged as a way to govern the difficult 
terrain at a distance. Under the British, the racial differentiation 
between the plains- and hill-dwellers provided a governmental gaze in 
which, as Edward Gait (a British administrator stationed in Assam) 
suggests above, the ‘normal’ rule of the plains was distinguished from 
a “simpler” government at a distance supposedly more suited for the 
hills. In parallel, the Gorkha Empire’s extension of government across 
the hills was facilitated by an equally essentialised differentiation of 
castes following a Hindu hierarchy of purity and pollution. In turn, 
these lines of difference provided the imperial landscapes upon which a 
gradual territorial integration was brought about. In independent India, 
the “backward village” of the plains provided a model for uniform 
territorial representation as India was incorporated into the globalized 
project of post-war development – excluding the north-eastern hills. 
And in Nepal, the hierarchical division of people continued below the 
superficial unity of the world’s last Hindu kingdom.  
Civilised Plains and Savage Hills 
In a detailed historical study of environment and ethnicity in India, 
Sumit Guha argues that, already when “agrarian settlement in the great 
river valleys began to elaborate the outlines of a sub-continental 
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political and cultural system during the first millennium CE” 
differentiation along ecological lines occurred. This differentiation was 
(…) socio-cultural as well as technological, and the communities of 
the riverine plains, the forest, the savannah, the desert and the high 
mountains co-evolved in continuous interaction involving both 
conflict and cooperation over the next two millennia. (S. Guha, 1999, 
p. 26) 
As ecological niches such as the hills and forests functioned as “both a 
base and refuge” they enabled the distinct developments of their 
inhabitants providing the grounds for a crucial contrasts “between the 
civilised and their domesticated landscape, and the savages in their 
wild woods” (S. Guha, 1999, pp. 26, 199; see also Scott, 2009). In 
other words, practices of sedentary settlement, on the one hand, and 
shifting cultivation, slash-and-burn, hunting and gathering, on the 
other, gradually became contrasting markers for the identification of 
people and places.  
At first, this ecologically based line of distinction was, 
nonetheless, relatively permeable. The relations between the 
inhabitants were, according to Guha, “characterised by a mixture of 
continually varying proportions between predation and production, 
tribute and trade, and changes in this mix affected, and were affected 
by, the advances and retreats of the forest and the sown” (S. Guha, 
1999, p. 200). More of a frontier than a border, the ecological line of 
distinction engendered exchange and interaction. In the north eastern 
subcontinent, Sanjib Baruah further argues that, under the pre-colonial 
Ahom government, “most peasants did some amount of shifting 
cultivation”. Hence, the  
common perception that only ‘tribal’ peasants were shifting 
cultivators while what we would now call the ethnic Assamese – 
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both Hindu and Muslim – peasants were settled cultivators (…) had 
little foundation in the reality of agricultural practices (Baruah, 2005, 
p. 89).  
In other words, while the ecological lines of distinction were there in 
relation to place, they did not necessarily translate into solid 
distinctions between people. 
This pattern, however, began to shift dramatically over the last 
century of colonial rule. After the rebellion in 1857, the British 
economic philosophy changed bringing about a new conception of 
colonial space in relation to economic development. This change was 
to have important consequences both for the physical landscape of the 
subcontinent and its political representation. In her recent book 
Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space (2004), 
Manu Goswami describes this change as a shift from ‘mercantile’ to 
‘territorial’ colonialism. Formerly regarded as an external territory for 
extraction, “the new imperial episteme (…) placed colonial spaces 
within rather than outside the larger British-imperial whole” (Goswami, 
2004, p. 44). Providing a “spatial fix” to British economic 
development, this change made India a landscape for rapidly increasing 
investment, a space that could be developed through public and private 
intervention. In the new governmental gaze of the colonisers, the 
subcontinent became an area that held the promise of major economic 
development if provided with due investment in agriculture, 
infrastructure etc. (Goswami, 2004). A South Asian development 
regime, that was to stretch across colonial and post-colonial 
government, emerged (Ludden, 1992, 2005a).  
With the change towards ‘territorial’ colonialism, major 
investments followed substantially altering the Indian landscape: 
Railroads were laid down at a rapid pace, large-scale irrigation works 
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undertaken, and tea plantation picking up speed (Bhattacharya, 2012; 
Gadgil & Guha, 1993; Goswami, 2002, pp. 46-52, 103-131). Seen as 
having a ‘magical’ ability to annihilate distance, provide material 
welfare, discipline, modernise and “tame entrenched prejudices”, 
railways were “the most privileged of all ‘state works’” and from 1860 
to 1920 the pace of railway construction in British India “far exceeded 
that of Britain and France” (Goswami, 2004, pp. 47, 51, 105). In 
parallel with the railway constructions, “colonial officials were driven 
by a desire to improve landscapes and modernise agrarian spaces, even 
as they sought to maximise revenue returns” (Bhattacharya, 2012, p. 1). 
In the pastoral highlands of Punjab major irrigation canals and model 
villages for agrarian settlement were thought out and constructed in the 
same period. And in the Darjeeling area, the number of tea gardens 
rose from 39 in 1866 to 113 in 1874 while the outturn of tea exploded 
from 433,000 lb. to 3,928,000 lb. in the same period (Griffiths, 1967, p. 
85).39 
Under the new colonial developmentalism, the political economy 
of the hills and plains was “profoundly modified” (S. Guha, 1999, p. 
200). Firstly, the link between the environment of the forests and hills, 
on the one hand, and ‘tribal’ ethnicity or race, on the other, was 
solidified in the colonial era. While the line of ecological distinction 
between the hills and the plains had earlier had the character of a soft 
frontier of exchange and migration, colonial anthropological surveying 
and census operation gradually turned this frontier into a hard border 
between essentially different people or races (Baruah, 1999, pp. 28-38; 
                                                
39 Over the next three decades, the development continued leaving 148 gardens 
with a production of 12,447,000 lb. of tea in 1905 (O'Malley, 1907, p. 94). 
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Cohn, 1987b, 1996).40 Increasing interest in geology, social Darwinism 
and anthropometry and the ways these new forms of knowledge were 
tested and developed in the context of the British Raj combined “to 
create a stereotype of the forest folk that was to have a powerful effect 
on society and politics in India down to the present” (see also Dirks, 
2001; S. Guha, 1999, p. 19). Seen either as economically and 
civilisationally backward or intimately connected to pristine nature, the 
hills and their inhabitants were cast as essentially different from the 
civilised and settled plains and its peasants. 
Secondly, the colonial visions of agrarian development resonated 
with a fundamental idea that settled cultivation was more civilised than 
other forms of subsistence. Across a range of legal land settlements, the 
British administration encouraged long-term tenure seen as a tool to 
promote more ‘civilised’ forms of agricultural development (Baruah, 
2005, pp. 83-97; Ranajit Guha, 1963). Longer tenures were regarded as 
a prerequisite for a better use of the land (Moore, 1966). While not 
always well received, this push towards increased sedentary settlement 
of people also transformed the landscape (Baruah, 2005, pp. 83-97; 
Bhattacharya, 2012). As Guha argues:  
The model of village-centred peasant agriculture – long more ideal 
than real – was finally realised under colonial auspices in the 
backwash of the Industrial Revolution. Except on the north-eastern 
and north-western boundaries of the empire, forest lords had to fit 
into this pattern or be hunted down; the woodlands, meanwhile 
retreated inexorably before ace and plough (S. Guha, 1999, p. 200). 
                                                
40 See (Masani, 1940, pp. 9-10) for an example of the continuation of the intimate 
connection between people and places in a textbook used extensively after 
independence. 
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As I argue in chapter seven, this process fed into the production 
of a distinct normative landscape across late colonial and post-colonial 
India – a framework of belonging, identity, and difference that posed a 
distinct landscape and a distinct form of settlement in this landscape as 
the norm. Across ‘territorial colonialism’ and post-colonial 
developmentalism, this normative landscape was largely shaped in the 
image of the settled agrarian village of the plains and thus excluded the 
‘wild’ hills of the north east as well as the more ‘ruly’ hills of 
Darjeeling. (cf. Inden, 2000, pp. 131-157; Ludden, 1993). 
Governing the Himalayan Hills: The Gorkha Empire 
While the plains of the Indian subcontinent have thus provided the 
physical landscape for various empires for several millennia, imperial 
formation came much later to the hills and mountains of the Himalayas. 
Larger-scale settlement came to the valleys of the western Himalayas 
with the migration of Aryan ‘Khas’ nomads into the area around 1500 
B.C. The Khas later continued their eastward migration, and the 
Gorkhas – who eventually brought about the first larger imperial 
formation across the central Himalayas – are believed to be of Khas 
origin. In the eastern Himalayas, the little archaeological and linguistic 
evidence that exist suggests that migrants of Tibeto-Burman origin 
settled there around 1000 B.C. These people might have been evading 
the consolidation of the Han Empire in southwest China (English, 
1985, p. 65). Referred to as ‘Kirata’ by ancient Sanskrit sources, the 
opaque story of these people provides a reference point for present-day 
claims to a common civilizational history among various ‘Kirant’ 
groups (Limbus, Rais, Sunuwars, Yakkhas) across the eastern 
Himalayas (Schlemmer, 2003/2004, 2010). However, when they first 
arrived, the narrow river valleys and hills of the eastern Himalayas 
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provided for an even more fragmented form of settlement than in the 
west. Due to the enormous ‘friction’ of the physical landscape (cf. 
Scott, 2009), it was not until the Gorkha conquest in the late 18th 
century that imperial formation came to the central Himalayas. 
Over the second half of the eighteenth century, the Gorkha king 
Prithvi Narayan Shah and his successors managed to conquer an 
impressive stretch of the Himalayan foothills and adjacent plains. In 
1742 Shah ascended to the throne of the relatively small kingdom of 
Gorkha situated in the hills some fifty kilometres west of Kathmandu 
valley. Until his death in 1775, he managed to extend the kingdom 
eastwards conquering the three Malla kingdoms of Kathmandu valley, 
subjugating the Sen Empire, and placing the areas known as near, 
middle and far Kirat under various degrees of suzerainty. After Prithvi 
Narayan Shah’s death, his successors continued the expansion of the 
Gorkha Empire conquering the ‘twenty-two’ and ‘twenty-four’ 
kingdoms of central and western Nepal as well as areas east of the 
present-day border to India.41 By the turn of the century, the Gorkha 
Empire extended from the river Sutlej in present-day Himalchal 
Pradesh to the river Teesta in the Darjeeling district of present-day 
West Bengal – a large area sometimes referred to as Greater Nepal. 
However, in 1814-1815, confrontations with the British East India 
Company finally blocked the Gorkha conquests. With the subsequent 
signing of the Treaty of Sugauli (1816), the Gorkha Empire was 
reduced at its western, southern and eastern borders and by the mid-
nineteenth century the territorial borders of the empire resembled those 
of present-day Nepal.42  
                                                
41 For a good mapped depiction of the Gorkha conquests see (Gurung, 2006, p. 7), for historical 
narratives see (K. Pradhan, 2009 [1991]; Shaha, 1990). 
42 After the Sugauli Treaty, the territorial extension of the Empire was, in fact, slightly smaller than 
present-day Nepal. However, following the Gurkha assistance to the British during the 1857 Sepoy 
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The fact that Shah and his successors were able to conquer vast 
areas across the Himalayan hills did, however, not mean that the 
government of the area was an easy task. Potential opposition from the 
British East India Company was initially limited due to the efficient 
natural protection of the impenetrable jungles in the southern foothills. 
The British had come to experience this in 1767 during a ‘disastrous 
campaign’ where they had sought to rescue the kings of Kathmandu 
valley from the expanding Gorkhas (Bell, 2012; English, 1985, p. 62). 
However, even without the major external opposition of the British 
until the second decade of the nineteenth century, internal government 
must have been a massive challenge due to the challenging geography 
and great social diversity of the empire. Especially in the east, the 
narrow river valleys running north-south and separated by steep hills 
must have been a major challenge for an empire traversing the 
Himalayas. 
Until the mid-nineteenth century, the Shah family ruled the 
empire. However, in 1846 the royal minister Jang Bahadur Rana 
organized a successful coup and institutionalised a complex hereditary 
system of ‘prime ministers’ (shree tin) that effectively – though not 
officially – put the royal family out of power until the mid-twentieth 
century (cf e.g. Whelpton, 2005, pp. 46-85). Under the Rana family, 
various governmental initiatives provided for a more unified 
governmental gaze than had, most likely, been the case before. 
Importantly for the later national territorialisation of the empire, these 
initiatives de-territorialised earlier categories of difference in a unified 
hierarchy. Analysing pre-Panchayat governmental discourse, Richard 
Burghart (1984) argues that the empire initially consisted of three 
                                                                                                                                  
rebellion, some lands in the southern lowland belt were returned to the Gorkha Empire (from Oudh) 
giving it roughly the present boundaries (cf. e.g. Gurung, 2006, p. 9). 
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separate but overlapping spheres: the ‘possessions’ of the king that 
designated the people and areas paying taxes to the empire; the 
‘spiritual realm’ in which the king “exercised his ritual authority”; and 
the ‘countries of different people’ that were made part of the Gorkha 
kingdom during the conquest (Burghart, 1984, pp. 104-106). Under the 
Ranas these spheres gradually merged. 
Before the 1814 war with the British East India Company, the 
frontier of the Gorkha Empire had not had the character of a fixed 
border. Various feudal landlords in the frontier areas of the empire 
tactically shifted their allegiance back and forth between Gorkha, 
British, and Mughal overlords depending on the conditions of taxation 
etc. (Michael, 1999, 2011). With their shifts, the extension of the 
empire in terms of ‘possessions’ changed similarly. At the same time, 
the ‘spiritual realm’ of the Gorkha kings referred to a range of religious 
places both within and outside those possessions. With the war in 1814, 
these two spheres of the Gorkha Empire were, however, largely forced 
into co-extension along the lines of the more stable border designated 
by the Sugauli Treaty (Burghart, 1984, pp. 114-115). Later, towards the 
middle of the century, the spiritual and territorial aspects of the empire 
were further integrated. As the British had emerged as the rulers of 
most of the subcontinent, the Gorkha Empire could now be represented 
as “the only remaining Hindustan” (Burghart, 1984, p. 116). Merging 
the spiritual and territorial spheres, the image of the empire as the last 
truly Hindu polity on the subcontinent emerged as a central proto-
national representation of the country. 
In line with the designation of the country as the last Hindustan, 
the shifting governmental gaze placed the ‘countries of different 
people’ into a common caste system inspired by the Hindu Varna 
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system in India. Earlier, these ‘countries’ designated “a unique people 
who experience a common moral and natural identity by virtue of their 
living and interacting in the same region” (Burghart, 1984, p. 106). 
With the introduction of the 1854 civil code (Muluki Ain), this 
territorialised form of differentiation changed. Providing a unified and 
de-territorialized framework for governing the population, the civil 
code roughly divided the population into five caste groups (Höfer, 
2004; R. Pradhan, 2002; P. R. Sharma, 1977). At the top of the 
hierarchy were the high-caste, Hindu, ‘cord-wearing’ Brahmins and 
Chettris.43 Below these, most of the former ‘countries of different 
peole’ (desh) were tuned into ‘sub-castes’ (jat) under two caste groups 
of ‘non-enslavable’ and ‘enslaveable alcohol-drinkers’ (matwali). The 
Limbus, whose current politics of place we engage in chapter six, were 
placed in this matwali caste, along with a large number of other 
(typically Tibeto-Burman) ‘indigenous’ groups. At the bottom of the 
hierarchy came the ‘impure’ but ‘touchable’ Europeans, Muslims and 
some service castes and finally the ‘untouchables’. 
In summary, the shifts in the governmental gaze during the 
century of Rana rule provided important groundwork for the production 
of an integrated territory. The emerging governmental identity of the 
country as a last Hindu polity on the subcontinent attached a certain 
uniform meaning to the conquered area. And the corresponding de-
territorialisation of internal differences into the language of the Hindu 
caste hierarchy facilitated centralised government and enabled the 
production of a spatially more uniform, and bordered territory. This is 
not intended to suggest that the differences between people diminished 
                                                
43 While the correct Nepali names would be Bahun and Chettri (variously spelled) conferring to the 
Indian Brahmin and Ksatriya (variously spelled), I have chosen to reflect the typical present-day 
usage in Nepal of Brahmin and Chettri together. 
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under the Ranas. The 1854 Civil Code basically provided a legal 
framework that institutionalised massive inequalities between those at 
the top of the case hierarchy and those in the bottom (Höfer, 2004) – an 
institutionalised hierarchy that was only formally abolished in 1963 and 
continues to be felt today. Rather than abandon differences, the Civil 
Code divorced differences from the physical landscape of the empire. 
In other words, it situated the hierarchical differentiation of people as a 
way to govern a challenging landscape. In the governmental gaze of the 
time, this provided an ostensibly more uniform space across which to 
govern. 
Governing the Borderland: Darjeeling and Pallo Kirat 
Between the eastward expansion of the Gorkha Empire and the 
subsequent British expansion north from Calcutta and into the 
Himalayan foothills, the complex governmental history of my area of 
interest emerges. As the Gorkha’s extended their governmental gaze, 
the hills stretching eastwards from Kathmandu were designated as 
Wallo, Manj, and Pallo Kirat – the near, middle and far areas of 
Kirat.44 Using the Sanskrit exonym, the conquered Limbuwan in the 
easternmost part of the area were Pallo Kirat, the area furthest from the 
governmental centre – initially governed very much at a distance. 
                                                
44 Most historical scholarship seem to attribute the name to the Sanskrit Kirata used 
by the plains empires to broadly designate the savage hill-dwellers of the north-
eastern subcontinent. Current discourse in Nepal and Darjeeling – especially 
among the Kirat ethnic organisations – however refer to Kirat or Kirati as a term 
describing a more coherent civilisation typically taken to encompass the Limbu, 
Rai, Sunuwar and Yakkha ethnic groups (see e.g. Schlemmer, 2010; T. B. Subba, 
1999). There are however differences among these groups in how they approach 
the concept. While the Rais e.g. have been pushing for an overall Kirat state within 
a new federal Nepal encompassing a large part of eastern Nepal, my Limbu 
informants presented Kirat as too broad a category to build local government upon. 
One even emphasised that Kirat was essentially an Aryan exonym designating a 
savage and destructive group and thus full of connotations with historical 
marginalisation. 
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When the British, half a century later, took over Darjeeling from 
Sikkim, this area similarly emerged as ‘excluded’ from the more 
integrated government of the plains to the south. It, instead, emerged as 
a colonial hill station and a ‘planter’s paradise’ where commercial 
endeavours in the tea industry were less regulated than e.g. in 
neighbouring Assam. Both areas were thus, in one sense or another, 
excluded from detailed centralised government and only were 
gradually incorporated into the governmental gaze of the time. 
The area comprised by the present district of Darjeeling45 has a 
long and complex history of shifting territorial domination. Before the 
Gorkha conquest in the late 18th century, the area was, most likely, 
under the shifting influence of the Sikkim and Bhutan kingdoms. 
According to Limbu history, at this time the hills west of the river 
Teesta were part of an ancient Limbuwan stretching across from 
present-day eastern Nepal. Then, in late 18th century, the Gorkha 
emperors subjugated the Limbus in eastern Nepal and subsequently 
clashed with the Sikkimese in the Darjeeling area. Over the next couple 
of decades, the British East India Company however grew increasingly 
vary of the Gorkha expansion and potential monopolisation of trade 
with Tibet. In 1814 this led to the Anglo-Gorkha war fought on the 
western and southern flanks of the Gorkha empire. The eventual 
victory of the British was formalised in the Sugauli Treaty the 
following year. According to this, the Gorkha kingdom lost substantial 
areas of land including the Darjeeling hills and lowland between the 
Mechi and Teesta rivers (Samanta, 2000, p. 194). In 1817, the 
Darjeeling area was returned to the king of Sikkim by the treaty of 
Tatalya. 
                                                
45 Including the Darjeeling, Kalimpong, Kurseon, and Siliguri subdivisions. 
Imperial Landscapes 
 83 
Nonetheless, by 1835 the East India Company returned somehow 
convincing the king of Sikkim to grant them Darjeeling and the 
immediate surroundings in lease for the construction of a sanatorium in 
the cool climate of the hills. This is where the story of Darjeeling town 
as a colonial hill station begins. As such, Darjeeling quickly became a 
hub for scientific explorations into the Himalayas attracting a range of 
characters. In 1849 one of these, Joseph Dalton Hooker, led an 
exploration into Sikkim accompanied by the superintendent of 
Darjeeling Archibald Campbell. Their intrusions provoked the 
Sikkimese king who caught and imprisoned them. The ensuing conflict 
between Sikkim and the Company, led not only to their release, but 
also to a full annexation of the area surrounding Darjeeling by the 
British. From a small tract of leased land, the area had now become a 
part of the Bengal Presidency – and a growing one. By 1865, following 
a war with Bhutan, the eastern part of the area (Kalimpong and Dooars) 
was also annexed by the British and made part of a Darjeeling district 
that now roughly resembled the present.  
Under British rule, the Darjeeling district was, however, never 
treated as a regular district of Bengal. From 1864 it served as the 
summer capital of the Bengal presidency, and its political relation to 
the rest of the presidency was mediated by its role as a ‘tea planter’s 
paradise’. As the tea industry rapidly developed in the second half of 
the nineteenth century and quickly accounted for a large share of the 
imperial profits from Bengal, the planters were allowed a less regulated 
form of rule. Hence, until 1874, the area was considered ‘Non-
Regulated’,46 it was a ‘Scheduled District’ 1874-1919, a ‘Backward 
                                                
46 Khawas differs from this, describing the district as a ”Regulated Area” in the 
period between 1861 and 1870. (Khawas, 2003, p. 4). 
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Tract’ 1919-1935 and a ‘Partially Excluded Area’ under the 
Government of India Act 1935-1947 (T. B. Subba, 1992, p. 36) – all of 
which meant exclusion from the general rules of the Raj (Sonntag, 
1999). Overall, the area however continued to be wedded to Bengal. 
Even during the division of Bengal between 1905 and 1912, it 
remained a small north-eastern outcrop of (west) Bengal. As illustrated 
in chapter seven, this role as a somewhat excluded periphery of Bengal 
had crucial consequences for Darjeeling’s position in the territorialised 
political landscape of independent India. 
A somewhat similar history of government at distance can be 
outlined for the areas on the western side of the 1814 border. Due to a 
relative dearth of historical sources and potentially large local 
variations, interpretations of the exact historical trajectories of 
governmental relations between the Gorkha Rulers and Pallo Kirat 
differ substantially (Caplan, 1991, 2000; Forbes, 1996; K. Pradhan, 
2009 [1991]; Sagant, 1996). Nonetheless, across variations in pace and 
timing, there is substantial agreement on some overall historical 
developments. Firstly, in the period between 1774 and 1950 there has 
been a gradual agricultural settlement of eastern Nepal, that is, a major 
development from rotational, slash-and-burn cultivation combined with 
hunting and gathering towards more settled cultivation in terraced 
fields. Secondly, this agricultural shift seems to have combined with 
population growth and (state-encouraged) in-migration of Hindu 
peasants creating a shift from the initial labour scarcity to land scarcity. 
Thirdly, across the period we also see a spatially uneven but gradual 
unfolding penetration of state administration into the eastern areas. 
Traditional kipat land tenures are gradually turned into centrally 
governed raikar tenures and centralised state authority is gradually 
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super-imposed through various relations of conflict and collusion 
between the central government and local headmen.47 Finally, due to a 
combination of the above developments with capitalist endeavours 
outside the area, the period is also characterised by large-scale 
emigration, first to Darjeeling and the North-East, later to the Nepali 
plains and further abroad. 
Initially, the government of Pallo Kirat seems to have been a 
very broad sort of government at distance. As Sagant notes, during the 
conquest, “fighting between Gurkhas [sic] and Limbus seem to have 
been severe” (Sagant, 1996, p. 320). Hence, when the Limbus finally 
surrendered, they were incorporated into the Gorkha empire through 
arrangements that grated them a substantial measure of local autonomy. 
The traditional Limbu headmen were allowed to keep their privileged 
positions as long as they collected taxes for the new overlords, and the 
taxes they collected were based on the kipat system of land tenure that 
provided a light taxation of people rather than land. The oath instituting 
this agreement between the Limbus and Gorkhas “was restated during 
each regime following that of Prithvi Narayan Shah” (Forbes, 1996). 
However, this symbolic repetition did not preclude a gradual 
penetration of centralised government into Pallo Kirat and over the 
Limbus. Although the civil code of 1856 mentioned above did not have 
much to say about the Limbus, it did shift the governmental gaze 
somewhat from a focus on Pallo Kirat as a ‘country’ to a focus on 
Limbus as ‘enslaveable alcohol drinkers’ in the Hindu caste system 
(Höfer, 2004, pp. 117-119). Concomitantly, the various roles of the 
Limbu headmen were gradually undermined by extension of 
                                                
47 As I analyse in detail in chapter six, the tenure system Kipat has today emerged 
as the main lens through which the government of the eastern borderland of the 
Gorkha empire has been viewed. 
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centralised governmental institutions. Hence, “far” Kirat over time 
moved substantially closer to the governmental centre. 
The Borderlanders: Migration, State Evasion, and Anxious Belonging 
We will now turn our attention towards the people of the borderland 
and their government. Tacit, tactical movements across the border have 
been a salient feature of the history of the Himalayan borderland. The 
early history of imperial relations between the Gorkhas and the British 
in the hills of northern India were largely determined by the political 
economy of land, labour and trade at the time (Michael, 2011). 
Supposedly, one of Prithvi Narayan Shah’s main motivations for the 
conquest across the Himalayan hills, was the monopolisation of trade 
with Tibet – regarded as highly attractive by the British East India 
Company (K. Pradhan, 2009 [1991]). Conquering the eastern hills 
controlled by Sikkim and Bhutan was a crucial part in this objective as 
two of the main passes across the Himalayas into Tibet run through this 
area. However, as the British checked this expansion in 1814 and the 
Darjeeling area was seceded to the British in 1816, other motivations 
took over. At this time, land was abundant in the hills when compared 
to the amount of people available to till it and, consequently, to tax and 
conscribe for military service or corvée labour etc. (K. Pradhan, 2009 
[1991], pp. 212-213). As a consequence, once the territorial boundaries 
of the two empires were forcefully established, an inter-imperial 
politics of attracting manpower emerged. 
In this historic constellation of land, labour and imperial 
authority, large groups of residents in the Gorkha-British borderland 
tactically migrated across the newly established border (Michael, 1999, 
2011). Already when Limbuwan was subjugated in the late eighteenth 
century, large groups of Limbus had fled east into the areas controlled 
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by Sikkim. After the conquest, the Gorkha rulers repeatedly appealed 
to these groups to return and “till the land of their forefathers” without 
any repercussions (Chemjong, 2003; K. Pradhan, 2009 [1991], p. 151). 
However, as the British began to build up Darjeeling from the mid-
1830s many more borderlanders migrated eastwards. From the 
beginning, attracting people from the surrounding hills for the 
development of Darjeeling was a strategy for the British. As many of 
the groups residing in the eastern part of the Gorkha Empire (especially 
Rais and Limbus) conformed to the anthropological type of “sturdy 
hillmen” preferred by the British at the time, they “tacitly encouraged 
the immigration of labor from Nepal” (Middleton, 2010, p. 129). When 
the clearing of forest and planting of tea gardens picked up speed in 
mid-century, along with the recruitment of Gorkhas into the British 
Indian Army after 1857, the incentives to encourage immigration were 
even more obvious. 
During the following many decades, large groups of people 
migrated eastwards across the border evading the emerging feudal 
system of tenure, taxation and exploitation built up under the Rana 
rulers. By 1881, the British judged that 88,000 people living in the 
Darjeeling area had been born in Nepal (O'Malley, 1907, pp. 43-44)48. 
Evading feudal exploitation back home, many of these people plunged 
directly into the capitalist exploitation of the colonial tea gardens 
employing “an enormous quantity of manual labour” (O'Malley, 1907, 
pp. 43-44). Thus, in 1874 almost 20,000 people were employed in the 
tea gardens By 1901 the census “showed that the tea-garden coolies 
and their children accounted for more than two thirds of the total 
                                                
48 Although these figures should absolutely not be taken as accurate, their sheer 
magnitude is hard to ignore. 
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population” – by then a quarter of a million (Hunter, 1876, p. 165; 
O'Malley, 1907, p. 44). In the hills, the vast majority of these were 
from the ‘Nepali’ ethnic groups and most of them probably recent 
migrants.49 
Not unlike Scott’s hill people, these migrants were however – at 
least to begin with – anxiously avoiding the gaze of both imperial 
states. In the 1907 district gazetteer for Darjeeling, O’Mally thus 
describes how during the 1881 census operations “large numbers, filled 
with fears of the intentions of Government, as wild as they were vague, 
fled across the border to Nepal rather than face enumeration.” 
(O'Malley, 1907, p. 44). Middleton further describes how, facing the 
same political economy of land and labour as the British, “the Nepali 
Durbar did not approve” of the migration.50 Hence, when the Gorkha 
rulers form time to time approached the eastern border of the Empire – 
as during Jung Bahadur Rana’s massive hunting trip in 1864 – 
thousands of Nepali tea coolies fled the lines of the plantations 
overnight and disappeared from the gaze of the colonial state 
(Middleton, 2010, pp. 128-134). Nepalis settling as landless 
agricultural labourers were similarly invisible to the governmental gaze 
of the colonial state (Sarkar, 2010, p. 98). As Middleton argues from 
his engagement with the colonial archives: “thinking through the living 
conditions of these colonial labourers, we see that theirs was indeed a 
precarious, liminal dwelling.” (Middleton, 2010, p. 132). 
                                                
49 Michael Hutt states that over 90% of the tea labourers of 1876 came from the 
hills of eastern Nepal (1997, p. 112) and Kumar Pradhan estimates that 12-15% of 
the total Kirant (Rais, Limbus, Sunuwars) population of Nepal emigrated between 
1840 and 1860 (K. Pradhan, 2009 [1991], p. 211). 
50 According to E C Dozey’s early Concise History of the Darjeeling District  “in 
order to discourage emigration the Nepalese Durbar has placed a ban on women 
leaving the country on any pretext whatever” (1922, p. 40). 
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We might, in other words, see these migrants both as hill people 
tactically evading the imperial states and as labourers caught between a 
feudal and a colonial system of exploitation. But no matter the 
perspective, the inter-imperial stakes involved in attracting labour to 
work the land were so high that their migration history “was a history 
that could not officially exist” (Middleton, 2010, p. 130). In addition, 
the ‘planters paradise’ of Darjeeling was under far less governmental 
regulation than e.g. the tea-producing districts of the neighbouring 
areas in the north-east. Regarded as ‘waste land’ in the land 
regulations, the area was un-affected by tenure settlements and land 
reforms way into the post-colonial era (Sarkar, 2010, p. 105). Hence, 
tea plantation labour in Darjeeling leaves “little paper trail” 
(Middleton, 2010, p. 130n111). The historical conditions have, in other 
words, left the ‘Nepali’ migrant population with very little official 
history. And this lack of history can be seen both as an expression of 
and a ground for a fundamental anxiety of (non-) belonging in 
Darjeeling.  
As Middleton describes, this anxiety of belonging was later 
harnessed and amplified by the “affective wizardry of Subash 
Ghisingh” – the leader of the Gorkhaland movement in the 1980s 
(Middleton, 2010, p. 151). During this movement, history thus emerged 
as a crucial stage for the contestation of belonging. From the 1990s 
ethnography emerged as another stage – one in which the self-
fashioning of a range of ‘Nepali’ groups as unambiguous tribal subjects 
in the ethnographic gaze of the state could take place (Middleton, 2010, 
2011). Thus, questions of belonging pervade the history of the ‘Nepali’ 
community in Darjeeling. However, there seems to be a shift in tactics 
taking place already between the major migration of the nineteenth 
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century and the Gorkhaland movement of the following century. 
Whereas the recent migrants were obviously reluctant to be seen by the 
(colonial) state, later political action became largely directed towards 
the state. Tactics of state-evasion were, in other words, supplemented 
or replaced by tactics of state recognition sometime between the late-
nineteenth and the late-twentieth century. As I describe in the following 
section, this shift was connected to a gradual, but conscious 
development of a position as a ‘Nepali’ community with a range of 
politically shared objectives by emerging middle-class academics and 
representative organisations over the first decades of the twentieth 
century. 
Jati Improvement? From Evasion to Recognition 
When Subbash Ghising began his call for a Gorkhaland state in the 
1980s, ethnic and national labels emerged as a contentious political 
matter.51 This sensibility is grounded in a large repertoire of historical 
complexities of identity and belonging caused by the migration history 
just outlined. A number of the people later to be considered ‘Nepalis’ 
probably resided in the Darjeeling area already before the British 
arrived with their governmental tendencies to classify and enumerate 
(see Hutt, 1997, p. 121). As described above, much larger numbers 
                                                
51 Ghising preferred the name ‘Gorkha’ to designate the diverse community he 
claimed to represent, arguing that labels such as ‘Nepali’ indicated foreignness 
from India. While earlier, ‘Nepali’, ‘Gorkha’ and ‘Gorkhali’ had largely been used 
synonymously, they quickly became indicators of political distinction between the 
All India Gorkha League (AIGL, Akhil Bharatya Gorkha League), the GNLF, and 
a range of other academic and political groups (T. B. Subba, 1992, p. 67). Today, 
this search for a name that will, somehow, help solve the problem of precarious 
belonging for the community continues. In various publications and conferences, 
Subba and Sinha have e.g. taken the search further over the last decade suggesting 
various options such as “Indian Nepalis”, “Indians of Nepali Origin” (INO), and 
even “Sakhaa” (“friend”) (Sinha & Subba, 2003; T. B. Subba, Sinha, Nepal, & 
Nepal, 2009). 
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migrated into the area over the following decades. These people 
probably did not consider themselves ‘Nepali’ at the time, but most 
likely identified with a range of different ethnic groups. Many of them 
were from the Kirant groups – Limbu, Rai, Sunuwar – who had directly 
opposed the expansion of the Gorkha Empire. Others were Gurung, 
Magar and Tamang. In the first census of Darjeeling, these groups 
(except the Tamang) were registered as “other than natives of India and 
British Burmah [sic]” with the explanation “i.e. Nepalis”. However, at 
this point in time, ‘Nepal’ was mainly a British term for the Gorkha 
Empire (Burghart, 1984).52 As soldiers the ‘Nepalis’ were nonetheless 
known to the British as ‘Gurkhas’ by the British, a corrupted spelling 
‘Gorkhas’ surviving even today. 
The complexities of ethnic labels and ’Nepali’ belonging in 
Darjeeling are further compounded not only by the variegated history 
of territorial ownership, border-drawing and mobility. As Michael Hutt 
reminds us, what is now routinely referred to as the migration from 
Nepal to India in fact often merely involved moving “a few score 
miles, at a time when nations were less clearly conceptualized and 
national boundaries less clearly demarcated than they are today” (Hutt, 
1997, p. 141n148). In summary: 
(…) it can be argued that the present political boundary of Nepal – 
especially in the east – does not demarcate exactly the region whose 
population is numerically dominated by the originally disparate 
ethno-linguistic groups who are now categorized as ‘Nepalis’ (Hutt, 
1997, p. 103). 
                                                
52 Inside the Gorkha empire, ‘Nepal’ referred solely to the governmental centre of 
the Kathmandu Valley. This name wasn’t extended to the whole empire until the 
1930s (Burghart, 1984). 
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Such a long, rambling sentence – produced by a senior scholar of the 
area – can be seen as symptomatic not only of the historical 
complexities of belonging, but also of the contentious present in which 
interpretations of this history are inscribed. Across the last three 
decades of identity politics in Darjeeling, all of the different names and 
levels of identification have been activated at one point or another. 
Within this complex historical position, projects of shaping a 
common position nonetheless emerged. In the early twentieth century, 
local academics such as Parasmani Pradhan began promoting the 
Nepali language and an agenda of jati (group/community) 
improvement (see e.g. Chalmers, 2009; Hutt, 1997; Onta, 1996b). 
Along with the shared Nepali language, the writings of these academics 
touched upon the common experiences of migration, tea garden labour, 
and Gurkha military service. As Parasmani Pradhan stated at the 
inaugural meeting of the Nepali Sahitya Sammelan (Nepali Literature 
Society) – formed together with the fellow academics Dharanidar 
Koirala, Suryabikram Gyawali and others in 1924: 
The Darjeeling Nepalis have become a j!ti that is bound together by 
the thread (s"tra) of common experience, shared sentiments, and a 
single language (Parasmani Pradhan cited and translated in Hutt, 
1997, p. 117). 
The word jati has multiple uses in Nepali typically referring to a ‘race’ 
or ‘species’ or ‘type’ (e.g. manav jati as human race, Nepali jati as 
Nepali nationality) and is distinct from the word jat indicating caste or 
ethnic group (Hutt, 1997, p. 116). In Parasmani’s speech it obviously 
indicates some form of common identity across the various jat that 
migrated to Darjeeling. 
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While Nepali language and jati improvement in India had already 
been promoted by various people and publications in Banaras, the 
activities in Darjeeling had a different character (see Chalmers, 2002). 
As Rhoderick Chalmers notes, “to a greater extent than in Banaras they 
initiated essentially modern projects, which appreciated the value of 
working with and exploiting the modern state” (Chalmers, 2009, pp. 
110-111). In Darjeeling, the Nepali activists were directly lobbying the 
colonial state. Parasmani and the sammelan thus pushed for, and 
eventually attained, the acceptance of Nepali first as language of 
examination in Calcutta college (1918) and later as a medium of 
instruction in the primary schools of Darjeeling (1935). Alongside this, 
Parasmani managed to get connected to the famous Macmillan 
publishers and had by 1940 produced and published thirty textbooks. 
These continue to be a monolithic reference point for contemporary 
Nepali textbooks in Darjeeling. Hence, in contrast to the earlier tactics 
of state evasion, budding representatives of the ‘Nepali’ community 
had become strongly involved with the state. 
Later, the discourses of both Ghisingh’s and Gurung’s 
Gorkhaland movement have written these early attempts at gaining 
state recognition into the movements genealogy. Although Parasmani 
Pradhan and his group’s initiatives might arguably be seen “as a project 
of differentiation where-by a proto-middle class deploying its 
educational and cultural capital, separated itself from the larger coolie 
population of the Darjeeling area”, they have later been cast as part of a 
genealogy of popular mobilisation (Onta, 1996b, p. 67). Similarly, the 
various proposals presented by the Hillmen’s Association and other 
representatives since 1907 are now routinely rehearsed as historical 
forerunners to the Gorkhaland movement, although they probably 
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represented a highly elitist, pro-British planter position at the time – a 
position that conflicted somewhat with the of Parasmani and the other 
“proto-middle class” intellectuals (Dasgupta, 1999, pp. 58-59).53 
Furthermore, the writings of Parasmani Pradhan and his 
likeminded contemporaries, provided a crucial source of inspiration for 
the national textbooks of Panchayat Nepal (Chalmers, 2009; Onta, 
1996a, 1996b). As I describe in further detail in chapter five, these 
writings provided the new nationalist discourse of the Panchayat with 
notions of a brave past. As with the Nepali community in Darjeeling, 
these notions enabled the Nepali state to differentiate itself from the 
large southern neighbour in a situation where the country was 
increasingly incorporated into regional and global regimes of economic 
development (Onta, 1996a, 1996b). They thus provided a crucial 
backdrop for the Panchayat regime’s central notion of national 
development and, with this, for a further national territorialisation of 
the rugged Himalayan hills. In the following chapter, I analyse this 
territorialisation and the language of difference as it was taught through 
the Panchayat textbooks. 
 
 
                                                
53 Local academics such as T. B. Subba and A.C. Sinha’s have supported this 
genealogy in research projects and writing focused on the ‘identity crisis’ of the 
‘Indian Nepalis’ (see e.g. Sinha & Subba, 2003; T. B. Subba, 1992; T. B. Subba et 
al., 2009). As described in chapter eight, their idea of a historically rooted ‘identity 
crisis’ as it was spawned in reflections on the 80s movement was later brought into 
the discursive and rhetorical repertoire of the recent Gorkhaland movement. 
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Chapter 5: Teaching a Language of Difference 
Nepali historians have dwelt on the historic destiny of Prithvi 
Narayan Shah the Great, who in the mid eighteenth century forged 
the Gorkhali Empire in the hills as a bulwark against the firingis in 
the plains. His patriotism was so great, he defended Nepali 
independence before it was invented. (Bell, 2012) 
On the introductory pages of present-day academic and popular writing 
on the Nepali politics and society, the year 1990 and it’s People’s 
Movement (Jana Andolan) show up repeatedly. As approached from 
the present, 1990 is seen as the first step towards a New Nepal (Naya 
Nepal). Although the political notion of Naya Nepal is often 
approached with a somewhat sceptical attitude, the idea that something 
new is taking place, that Nepal since 1990 has been undergoing rapid 
and radical change, is everywhere to be found. In this chapter, I take a 
look at the immediate background for this notion of newness and 
change – the thirty years of Panchayat rule from 1960 to 1990. In this 
period, a new line of nationalist government was introduced. I 
investigate this government through the school textbooks that emerged 
within one of the main new governmental technologies at the time: 
national schooling.  
Through a comparative analysis of ‘civics’ textbooks from the 
late Panchayat period and those in use today, I argue that the ostensible 
focus on national unity in the struggle for economic development 
obscures an elaborate language of difference. Providing a more 
widespread extension of government across the country than ever 
before, we might see the Panchayat textbooks as producing a more 
integrated territorial imagination of the landscape than before as well as 
the first truly nation-wide language of difference between people. 
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While the governmental gaze under the Rana rulers was built explicitly 
on a language of difference between people – as expressed in 
hierarchical organisation of castes in the civil code – the extension of 
this language across the country was, most likely, patchy and 
concentrated around the governmental centre of Kathmandu (R. 
Pradhan, 2002). But with the introduction of national schooling, a 
language of ‘unity-in-diversity’ with an explicit focus on unity but a 
persistent subtext of unequal diversity could be extended wider than 
ever before. The textbooks thus provided educated citizens with a 
fluency in a language of difference that, possibly for the first time, 
spanned a national scale. As I argue in the following chapter, the 
consequence of this seems to be that this ‘language of the state’ has 
also emerged as the language in which to approach the state – a 
language of politics. 
Panchayat Textbooks as a National Language of Difference 
From the 1960’s, Nepal entered a high time of nationalism under the 
Panchayat rule. In 1950, an alliance of exiled political parties and king 
Tribhuvan succeeded in breaking the hold on power maintained by the 
Rana lineage of prime ministers since 1846. Over the following years, 
shifting constellations of the King, Ranas and political party 
representatives ruled the country while shuffling for power between 
each other. In 1959 an election for parliament was held, but already the 
following year, king Mahendra dissolved parliament and imprisoned 
many of the political leaders. Mahendra’s justification was that multi-
party democracy had been proven unsuitable for Nepal. Banning 
political parties, Mahendra instead presented a vision of a party-less 
‘Panchayat democracy’. This ‘unique’ system of government evolved 
around the king and village councils (panchayats) – two supposedly 
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‘native’ institutions “commonly known and understood by the people” 
(King Mahendra cited in  Khadka, 1986, p. 433).54 Through these 
institutions, Nepali citizens were supposed to unite as one nation under 
the ubiquitous aim of economic development (bikas) (Gellner, 2007, p. 
10). 
Supported by early American aid to the education sector,55 
Panchayat ideology foregrounded education as a key element in the 
overall goal of national development. While school education had 
deliberately been restricted under most of the Rana rule (Onta, 1996a, 
p. 215; Whelpton, 2005, pp. 83,165)56, the Nepali education system 
was nationalized and extended more widely than ever before during the 
Panchayat period (Caddell, 2006; Onta, 1996a, p. 221; Petersen, 
2011).57 The 1971 National Education System Plan presented education 
as “an investment in human resources for the development of the 
country” (cited in Onta, 1996a, p. 220). Education was to “serve the 
                                                
54 Between these extremes, representation was organized in multiple layers of 
decreasing popular influence from the village council (gaun panchayat) to the 
national council (rastriya panchayat) (see e.g. Borgström, 1976; Gellner, 2007, p. 
10; Khadka, 1986). 
55 See http://nepal.usaid.gov/about-us/history.html. The American assistance to the 
education sector was personified in the ’education advisor’ Hugh B. Woods who 
played a key role in the development of Nepal’s first national education plan (cf 
e.g. NEPC, 1956). 
56 As presented later in this chapter, the Panchayat discourse foregrounds and 
dramatizes the restrictions on education as illustrative of the ’dark age’ of Rana 
rule prior to Panchayat developmentalism (see Onta, 1996a; N. P. Shrestha, 1989 
[2046 BS], pp. 52,56). 
57 In 1951, by the end of the Rana regime, Nepal had only 321 primary and 11 
secondary schools for a population of about 8,25 million (1952/4 census). By the 
end of the Panchayat period in 1990 the number of primary schools was 14,500, 
lower secondary schools 3,964, and upper secondary schools 1953 (Shrestha cited 
in Stash & Hannum, 2009) for a population of 18,5 million (1991 census). 
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country’s need and aspiration”58 in terms of both material development 
and national cohesion. As the plan states: 
(…) roads and tracks are not laid-out by natural volition just as 
sectional parochialism cannot be transformed into social cohesion 
without deliberate effort (…) politicisation of the traditional multi-
ethnic Nepalese societies will not lead to national solidarity and 
independent sovereign nationhood without a central guidance in 
planned socialisation (…) (cited in Onta, 1996a, p. 220). 
Through the construction of schools and distribution of centrally 
prescribed textbooks, the new nationalised education system was to be 
the main institution for such “planned socialisation” providing national 
unity for the sake of development. 
With education posed as a deliberate means to promote national 
cohesion and development, educational material provides an important 
source for analysing the Panchayat state’s discourse on the nation and 
national space (cf. Onta, 1996a; Pigg, 1992).59 As the education system 
expanded during the Panchayat period, centrally prescribed school 
textbooks attained a broader reach in Nepali society than most other 
media reaching “places where even state newspapers like the 
Gorkhapatra did not” (Onta, 1996a, pp. 231-232).60 Textbooks should 
therefore not only be seen as a medium for transmitting the Panchayat 
state’s discursive representations of national space. In their 
                                                
58 This needs discourse resembles Indian national discourse on development in the 
same period as described by (S. Roy, 2007, pp. 106-114). While both countries 
present discourses on supposedly distinctive national development they, at the 
same time seem to be entangled in a ”’development hegemony’ on a global scale” 
(S. Roy, 2007, p. 107). See also (Ludden, 1992, 2005a). 
59 According to a government official who worked with textbook production under 
Panchayat rule, the curriculum and textbooks were until 1990 “fully controlled by 
the palace”. Interviewed during fieldwork, Sanothimi, September 2010. 
60 Radio broad-casting might have been the only farther-reaching media at the time 
– cf. (cf. Onta, 1996a). 
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unprecedented dissemination throughout national territory, the 
textbooks themselves were artefacts of a nation-wide spatial practice. 
New school buildings and textbooks arriving from the central printing 
press in Kathmandu valley were, in the various localities of Panchayat 
Nepal where they were received, important material representations of 
‘development’ and the existence of a uniform national space within 
distinct territorial borders (cf. Skinner & Holland, 2009 [1996]). Both 
the discursive representations in the textbooks and their spatial 
dissemination thus contributed to the production of a national space 
within territorial borders. 
For many, the Panchayat schooling of the 80s provided the first 
entry into a nation-wide literacy of governmental differentiation – 
within a discourse of unity in national development. As Skinner and 
Holland argue on the basis of detailed, long-term fieldwork with Nepali 
students: 
Even by the mid-1980s, the young Nepalis that Skinner followed 
from 1985 to 1993 were still some of the first in their area to 
experience state-provided schooling. (…) young Nepalis in their 
school and subsequent careers readily appropriated the development 
rhetoric presented to them in their textbooks and classroom lectures. 
In our frequent talks with them, the students passionately identified 
with the needs of their country and spoke of preparing themselves for 
a future of good works directed towards the development of their 
community in particular, and Nepal in general (Skinner & Holland, 
2009 [1996], pp. 295-296). 
Across a period where the literacy rate for Nepalis rose many-
fold61, the discursive underpinning of this literacy was, in other words, 
                                                
61 Although the figures are probably not very precise, Skinner and Holland report a 
rise from about 5% adult literacy in the early 50s to about 36% by the end of the 
80s (Skinner & Holland, 2009 [1996], p. 301). 
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highly influenced by the governmental gaze of the developmentalist 
state. Concomitantly, education, along with the related possibility of 
emerging attractive jobs in the development sector, folded the image of 
the education person back onto notions of development. As Skinner 
and Holland argue, being a developed (bikasi) was largely equated with 
being educated (parhne manche) and vice versa (Skinner & Holland, 
2009 [1996]). A consequence of this, I argue, is that literacy in the 
specific, nation-wide language of difference that provides the subtext to 
the Panchayat textbooks’ overt focus on unity in development has 
become a marker of being developed/educated. Hence, fluency in one 
categorisation within the language of difference between people has 
emerged as a distinguishing characteristic within another. 
The Brave Beginning of a Territorialised Time-in-Space 
The Nepali historian Pratyoush Onta has already analysed some 
Panchayat textbooks.62 Onta shows that the national history (Rastriya 
Itihas) presented in these textbooks is rendered in what he calls “bir to 
bikas (brave to development) narrative mode” (Onta, 1996a, p. 222; see 
also Onta, 1997). This implies a description of pre-Rana national 
history in terms of the bravery (bir) associated with the ‘unification’ of 
Nepal as a basis for the post-Rana focus on national development 
(bikas). Onta argues that: 
Nationalization of the past in the bir mode and that of the future in 
bikas mode have been critical to the functioning of the state in the 
post-Rana era. (…) Bir history provided the bearings of an 
independent land on which bikas projects could be enacted. With 
                                                
62 While Onta bases his analysis on two Nepali language primers 
(”Mahendramala”, grades four and five) from the early 70s, my analysis focuses on 
’civics’ textbooks from the 80s (grades six and seven, based on a curriculum from 
1981) and late 2000’s (grades six to ten, based on a curriculum from 2005). 
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foreign money and models pouring into Nepal in the name of 
development, it was bir history that made the country’s bikas 
“Nepali” (Onta, 1996a, p. 232). 
The writing of a brave national history was, in other words, part of 
what enabled an extensively nationalist discourse on development even 
in a time of increasing openness to ‘foreign’ influence (see also Chene, 
1996, p. 266). 
In my analysis of later Panchayat textbooks, similar notions of a 
past cast in terms of braveness and a future described in a language of 
development come out clearly. The 1989 (2046BS) ‘civics’ textbook 
for grade seven e.g. commences with a long range of lessons that 
chronologically follow the lineage of Nepali kings from Prithvi 
Narayan Shah to Birendra.63 These lessons take the reader through the 
glorious past of the early kings ‘unifying’ Nepal, over the “Dark Age” 
of Rana rule and into the Panchayat periods renewed development of 
the country (N. P. Shrestha, 1989 [2046 BS], p. 56). Approached from 
the Panchayat present the immediate past of Rana rule is strongly cast 
as a “Dark Age” due to its failure to deliver development. The Ranas 
are described as autocrats that “could not take benefit from [the] 
independence” that they had inherited from the brave past. They failed 
to “use Nepalese manpower” to improve international trade and 
development (N. P. Shrestha, 1989 [2046 BS], pp. 53-54) and thus to 
live up to the promises of the brave Gorkhas that had secured the 
territory and people needed for such development. In other words, by 
                                                
63 During my fieldwork, I located copies of the textbooks analysed in this chapter 
in the Department of Education library in Sanothimi. Narayan Adhikary later 
helped in acquiring copies of the textbooks and Yubaraj Ghimire assisted in 
translating substantial sections for analysis. When quoting from the translations, I 
present Ghimire’s translation with minor alterations when needed to enhance the 
legibility of the text. 
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not exploiting the territorial foundation established by bir history, the 
Ranas were robbing the country of bikas.64 
Tying a line from a brave past to a future of development, the 
textbooks provide a national time-in-space that connect the 
contemporary territorial borders of the country with a historical 
beginning in the brave conquests of Prithvi Narayan Shah – referred to 
as the ‘unification of Nepal’. The 'unification' discourse in turn imbues 
Shah with the vision of a pre-nation nationalist. While government 
documents as late as the 1930s, in fact, referred to the imperial area as 
“the entire possessions of the Gorkha king” (Burghart, 1984, p. 119), 
this discourse sees a national territory of ‘Nepal’ already in the Gorkha 
kingdom. 65 This gives rise to a national ‘time-in-space’ (see Ludden, 
2012, p. 5) that ties the beginning of Nepali history to the figure of 
Prithvi Narayan Shah and renders all time before his rule as ‘pre-
history’.66 In this representation, national notions of a unified history 
and territory are, in other words, pushed back into what is essentially 
an imperial history (see especially K. Pradhan, 1991). 
In the textbook, the stories of Prithvi Narayan Shah and his brave 
men territorialise the imperial landscape of the Himalayan hills 
extending the contemporary borders of Nepal back into the time of the 
early Gorkha Empire. Vividly illustrated by an image that 
superimposes the characteristic profile of Prithvi Narayan Shah onto 
                                                
64 Education is a central element in this narrative. One textbook e.g. states that 
“Nepalese society suffered from deep sickness because of the lack of education” 
(N. P. Shrestha, 1989 [2046 BS], p. 60) – restricted by the Ranas (N. P. Shrestha, 
1989 [2046 BS], p. 52) while the hallmark of Panchayat developmentalist ideology. 
65 The British in India referred to the Gorkha kingdom as Nepal (or Nipal, or 
Nepaul) much earlier, while inside the kingdom the name Nepal was used to refer 
to the Kathmandu valley (Burghart, 1984). 
66 See e.g. (CDC, 2009a:114-123; 2009b, pp. 83-92), (Shaha, 2001), and 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_nepal (accessed June 2012). 
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the present-day borders of the country (see illustration 1), these stories 
fuse the temporal association of the 18th century Gorkha ruler with the 
territorial delineations of the contemporary Nepali nation-state – 
emphasising independence and sovereignty at a time when this was, in 
fact, increasingly compromised by reliance on foreign aid (Chene, 
1996). Elaborating on Shah’s alertness to the threat of the Mughal 
Empire the grade seven, ‘civic’ textbook e.g. poses Shah’s conquest of 
the Kathmandu valley as part of a ‘unification’ that saved the liberty of 
Nepal: 
The rich kings from Kathmandu were not only sinking in 
amusement, they were ready to give the area to foreign countries. But 
Prithvi Narayan Shah saved the liberty of Nepal. (N. P. Shrestha, 
1989 [2046 BS], p. 5). 
In line with the quote introducing this chapter, Shah is thus presented 
as a pre-nation nationalist, and territorial sovereignty of the nation itself 
is pushed back into his time.  
 
 
Illustration 1: Prithvi Narayan Shah’s characteristic pose superimposed onto 
borders of the national territory that weren’t settled until half a century after his 
death (N. P. Shrestha, 1987 [2044 BS], p. 36). 
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A range of subsequent stories of the following decade’s 
conquests and battles provide the material for further cementation of 
the territory in relation to the bravery of Nepali soldiers.67 As the 
textbook goes through the various conquests leading up to the 
encounter with the British, the territorial references obviously shift as 
the borders are expanded. In spite of this, the reference to present-day 
borders is maintained through a distinction between what is phrased as 
“unification” of Nepal and what is phrased as “extensions” of Nepali 
nationality (Nepali Rastriyata) into a “greater Nepal” (visal Nepal) (N. 
P. Shrestha, 1989 [2046 BS], pp. 8-13, 20-21).68 The use of these 
linguistic distinctions related to the movement of the Gorkha troops 
helps to create the representation of a fixed, demarcated territory of 
Nepal.  
The representation of fixed territorial borders is further supported 
by the visual mapping of the area in the Panchayat textbooks. One book 
e.g. displays first a map of the present-day Nepali borders with the 
Greater Nepal areas added in a darker shade. Halfway through the 
                                                
67 In the article mentioned above, Pratyoush Onta (1996a) shows how this is done 
in relation to the famous story of the Gorkha officer Balbhadra’s brave battle with 
the British. Attempting to hold a fort at Nalapani (near Dheradun in present-day 
Uttarakhand) against overwhelming British force, Balbhadra and his men, women 
and children fight bravely, but have to finally abandon the fort when the British cut 
off the water supply (see CDC, 2009d, pp. 118-119 for a present-day textbook 
version of the story). Though they lost the battle in the end, the Panchayat “desire 
to read Nepal’s independence and sovereignty in its past is so strong that 
Balbhadra’s temporary supremacy over the British becomes the story of Nepali 
bravery at work” (Onta, 1996a, p. 231). Whether the ‘boulders’ are Mughal or 
British, the representation of national space that comes out of the Panchayat 
textbooks is thus already territorialised within specified borders and kept 
independent and sovereign through the bravery of Balbhadra and other famous 
figures. 
68 While the brave Gorkha army officers thus “reached the Teesta in the east 
singing the slogan of nationalism” (N. P. Shrestha, 1989 [2046 BS], p. 20) this was 
part of ‘the extension of nationality’ - not the ‘unification’. 
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book, the map is repeated but now the surrounding areas of Greater 
Nepal have been removed and the country has been divided into the 
Panchayat administration’s “development regions” (N. P. Shrestha, 
1989 [2046 BS], pp. 30, 96).69 Both discursive and mapped 
representations thus provide a territorialisation of the landscape 
combined with a national time-in-space that moves from bravery 
towards development. 
 
 
Map 1: Greater Nepal (N. P. Shrestha, 1989 [2046 BS], p. 30) 
 
                                                
69 Likewise, the 2009 textbook’s lesson on “attempts for the unification of Nepal” includes an 
assignment in which the students are asked to locate the central historical places of Gorkha and 
Nuwakot in a map of Nepal that displays the present-day borders and administrative delineations 
(fourteen zones) (CDC, 2009d, pp. 108-109). 
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Map 2: Panchayat Nepal with Development Regions (N. P. Shrestha, 1989 [2046 
BS], p. 96) 
 
The Timeless Present in ‘a Garden of Diverse Flowers’ 
As the past in Panchayat discourse is imagined in terms of bravery, the 
present is repeatedly represented through the timeless and harmonious 
image of a flowering garden. The representation of Nepal as flower-
garden (phulbaari) stems from Prithvi Narayan Shah’s memoire (Divya 
Upadhes, ‘divine’ teachings) where he, supposedly, likened his empire 
to ‘a garden of many different flowers’. While the original text’s 
“archaic language” means that “nobody”, according to the historian 
John Whelpton, “can be sure what the intended meaning was” 
(Whelpton in K. Pradhan, 2009 [1991], p. xiii), a common, nationalist 
interpretation was in place throughout the Panchayat period. Here, the 
metaphor of the flower garden is seen to represent the beautiful 
diversity of the country as well as Prithvi Narayan Shah’s wise – 
almost multiculturalist – acknowledgement of this. The flower garden 
emerges as a timeless characteristic of national space, that, in line with 
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its timelessness is repeated across Panchayat and present-day 
textbooks.  
With obvious connotation to beauty, fertility and harmony, the 
imagination of the country as a flower-garden is seen as an expression 
of the equality of all Nepalis within a notion of unity in diversity (N. P. 
Shrestha, 1989 [2046 BS], p. 2). In contrast to the jungle, the garden 
(baari) connotes an organised and harmonious space – not unlike the 
image of the colonial hill station presented in the previous chapter. As a 
recent textbook recycles the metaphor, it states that: “we all castes, 
classes and ethnic groups (…) live together in harmony. We make a 
garland of all castes like the bouquet of flowers” (CDC, 2009c, p. 30). 
The notion of a garland brings out how the different people of Nepal 
are tied together – a peaceful unity that is repeatedly posed as a 
defining characteristic of the country (cf. e.g. CDC, 2009a, p. 61). 
Hence, while recognising ethnic, religious and caste diversity, the 
image of the national garden de-emphasises the salience that these lines 
of division held in Panchayat Nepal and largely continue to hold today 
(see e.g. WB, 2006). Along with the 1963 revision of the Civil Code’s 
formalised hierarchy of people, the representation of the country as a 
garden imposes a harmonious surface onto a highly uneven landscape 
of imperial difference. 
Even in the contemporary conjuncture, where differences 
between people (of caste, ethnicity, religion, gender etc.) are 
increasingly politicised on a background of past inequalities, the 
representation of Nepal as a diverse, but harmonious, flower-garden 
lives on in the centralised discourse of present-day textbooks. A grade 
six textbook e.g. states:  
Teaching a Language of Difference 
 108 
“Nepal is our motherland. It is called a common garden of four castes 
and thirty-six sub-castes. We, the people of the country, are like 
different flowers grown in a garden. We are different in face and 
colour. Apparently, there is a difference in our forms and kinds. This 
variation is called thirty-six sub-castes.” (CDC, 2009b, p. 26) 
In spite of differences, “all people living in Nepal have similar interests 
and aspirations” (CDC, 2009b, p. 34). Harmonious coexistence is thus, 
even today, represented as a timeless condition of the nation rather then 
something that has to be achieved. 
Outside the official discourse of the textbooks, the image of the 
flower-garden has, however, come under attack. Kumar Pradhan’s 
history book The Gorkha Conquest e.g. provides an explicit attack on 
the Panchayat framing of Shah’s vision (cf. Gellner in K. Pradhan, 
2009 [1991], p. vii). The research for the book was undertaken in 
relation to Pradhan’s doctoral dissertation published almost a decade 
earlier in 1982, but its publication as a book in 1991 was clearly part of 
an upsurge of critical reflection after the Panchayat period (K. Pradhan, 
2009 [1991], pp. vii, xiv, xxiii).70 Pradhan argues that Shah’s lesson on 
Nepal as a flower-garden has been “misquoted” suggesting instead the 
following translation: 
If (my) soldiers and courtiers are not given to seeking pleasure, my 
sword can strike in all directions. If they are given to pleasure, this 
will not remain a kingdom acquired with no little pain by me, but (it 
will be) a common garden of all kinds (of people). But if everyone is 
watchful, this will be a true Hindusthan (Hindu Land) … of all 
higher and lower castes (…) (K. Pradhan, 2009 [1991], p. 169) 
                                                
70 References in this dissertation are to a reprint of Pradhan’s book, published by 
Himal Books in 2009 and now widely available in Nepal.  
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Such a translation clearly leads to a very different image of the garden. 
In contrast to the ‘true Hindustan’ organised hierarchically into higher 
and lower castes, the garden now shows up as an unwanted, chaotic 
place. The critique thus provides the representation of Nepali national 
space as a flower-garden with bleaker connotations to the hierarchical 
differentiation of people that characterised the government gaze of the 
Gorkha kingdom. 
In line with this, it has repeatedly been pointed out over the last 
two decades that the superficially harmonious representation of Nepal’s 
unity in diversity silences and aggravates the economic marginalisation 
and political underrepresentation of a large majority of Nepal’s (non-
high caste, Hindu, male) population. In 1992, Nepali social scientist 
Prayag Raj Sharma in 1992 e.g. asked: “Why not pull down the hedges 
and let a hundred wildflowers bloom?” (P. R. Sharma, 1992, pp. 7, 9; 
see also P. R. Sharma, 1997). Sharma’s critique is interesting as it 
indicates some of the political work done by the aesthetic image of the 
garden. Under the title “How to Tend This Garden,” his article alerts us 
to another dimension of the garden metaphor. While the garden is an 
organised space, it is so because it has been ‘tended’, ‘weeds’ have 
been uprooted and harmony established through the centralised vision 
of the gardener (cf. Malkki, 1992).  
In the 1982 Panchayat textbook for grade eight the national 
garden’s need of ‘tending’ comes out strongly. A lesson on the 
‘qualities of a good citizen’ conjures up the image of the development 
of a communal garden and the works involved such as ‘watering’ 
and ’weeding’ (N. P. Shrestha, 1987 [2044 BS], pp. 34-35). It suggests 
that “we can trim the plants of many types to give them beautiful 
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shapes to decorate the garden,” and – bringing the notion of 
development up to modern times – exclaims: 
How enticing the garden would be if we could generate hydro-
electricity from nearby waterfalls or rivers and adorn the garden with 
illuminating electric bulbs like thousands of stars in the sky! Our 
beautiful tranquil country (…) is in fact a natural garden (…). (N. P. 
Shrestha, 1987 [2044 BS], pp. 34-35) 
In the Panchayat rendering, development - in the tangible form of 
electric lighting - is brought about through the careful tending of the 
garden that is Nepal. And, in the bir to bikas narrative form of the 
textbooks, this tending is brought home as “our responsibility” to the 
bravery of the national past epitomised in Shah’s visionary effort (N. P. 
Shrestha, 1987 [2044 BS], p. 35). 
Following Sharma’s indication, I would argue that the ostensibly 
unifying image of the organised and tended garden incorporates a 
subtext that brings the imperial landscape into the national territory. 
When seen in relation to the history of cultivation and settlement across 
the Himalayan hills, the organised garden brings out an ecological 
division between settled cultivation and chaotic wilderness. As Marie 
Lecomte-Tiluoine has recently argued, this division maps onto the 
earlier hierarchical differentiation of people along lines of Hindu purity 
that was formalised in the civil code in the mid-nineteenth century. 
Here, upper caste Hindus migrating eastwards across the Himalayan 
hills are seen as the bringers of settled cultivation engendering a 
“transformation of jangal into mangal, or wilderness into 
auspiciousness” (Lecomte-Tilouine, 2010, p. 120). During the 
Panchayat years, this image was underpinned by an intensification of 
existing policies that encouraged (mainly Hindu) migration for 
agricultural settlement especially in the eastern hills and the plains. 
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Across the Rana and Panchayat periods of government, this settlement 
did in fact transform the landscape substantially from the “wild” 
aesthetic of sparser settlement and rotational cultivation to the more 
ordered aesthetic of permanent, terraced farming (Sagant, 1996, pp. 
328-335). Hence, there continues to be a subtext of hierarchical 
difference attached to the continued use of the flower-garden metaphor. 
In summary, the Panchayat textbooks’ discourse on the brave 
past territorialise Nepali national space within distinct borders that did 
not, in fact, exist in the early 18th century. Within this territory, the 
image of a well-tended garden ostensibly dissolves the imperial 
hierarchies of people within a harmonious aesthetic. Nonetheless, this 
aesthetic concomitantly conceals and delivers a language of ecological 
and anthropological difference. As Pradhan and other critics have 
pointed out, these representations of national space are obviously “born 
out of a hindsight view of Nepalese history in modern times” (K. 
Pradhan, 2009 [1991], p. 168). Nonetheless, they continue well into the 
textbooks used today in Nepali public schools across the country, and 
continue to support a certain overlap between a national language of 
difference and education. 
Towards the Future on the Waves of Development 
Let us all go to the school for education. Let us go to the health post 
when we are sick. Let us make the village and town bright with 
electricity. Let us drive motors in all regions of Nepal. Let us drink 
safe water in each house. Let us send messages to friends through e-
mail. (CDC, 2009c, p. 13) 
A final and overwhelming focus of Panchayat discourse is that of 
development – a focus that largely similarly stretches across the 1990 
watershed. With the overthrow of the Rana regime in 1950, Nepal 
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quickly followed India in adopting governmental discourses and 
policies explicitly aimed at national development. Albeit phrased 
explicitly in nationalist terms, Nepal’s new project of development 
connected the country tightly into the expanding post-war development 
regime (Ludden, 2005a; Pigg, 1993, p. 45). During the Panchayat 
period, the net inflow of official development assistance (ODA) to the 
country multiplied. From an average of 80 million US$ per year in the 
60s, it more than doubled over the 70s and finally exploded to an 
average of 561 million US$ per year in the 80s.71 Nonetheless, as Stacy 
Leigh Pigg suggested in 1993, “judging from the changes in Nepal, 
development has proved much more effective as an ideology than as a 
set of technical solutions” (Pigg, 1993, p. 47). As an ideology, 
however, development has become ubiquitous across the nation from 
the Panchayat period onwards – even in areas where the practical reach 
of development projects has been limited (Chene, 1996; Pigg, 1992; 
1993, p. 48). 
The massive focus on development provides a direction to the 
Nepali nation that reorganises national space within territorial 
boundaries. Much in line with the Nehruvian development discourse 
discussed in the previous chapter, the Panchayat nation is presented as 
in need of development and the national citizens as resources with an 
obligation to fulfil this need. As they are harnessed to the overall 
objective of development, people and places are ostensibly detached 
from their earlier differences. Again bringing up clear similarities with 
India, national space is represented through the supposedly uniform 
image of the backward village (Pigg, 1992). The Panchayat textbooks 
                                                
71 All figures are in constant 2009 US$. Since 1990 figures have been consistently 
high, averaging 553 million US$ per year in the 90s and 589 million US$ per year 
in the 2000s. (Source: World Development Indicators 2011). 
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e.g. repeatedly refer to common sentiments of national loyalty in “our 
villages” or among “every family in every village” (N. P. Shrestha, 
1987 [2044 BS], p. 12; 1989 [2046 BS], pp. 17, 39). From the 
centralised perspective of planned state-led development, the landscape 
is thus flattened into a “sea of villageness” (Pigg, 1992, p. 503) onto 
which the “wave of development” (CDC, 2009a, p. 104) can roll. And 
as the 1963 administrative reorganisation of the country into five 
“Development Regions” and fourteen “Development Zones” named 
after geographical features such as river and mountains, this sea of 
villages is organised through categories unmarked by earlier forms of 
governmental differentiation.  
However, the superficial uniformity of the sea of villages in the 
development representations of national space does not really erase 
earlier differences and even brings about its own form of spatial 
inequality. In the developmental map of Panchayat discourse, the 
periphery of ‘village’ Nepal – home, at that time, to more than ninety 
per cent of the Nepali population – is presented as ‘underdeveloped’ or 
‘backward’. As Pigg argues: 
Development focuses its efforts on villages because (ostensibly) 
most Nepalis live in them, but in doing so it reifies the village as the 
locus of Nepal’s underdevelopment. Hence, the village becomes a 
space of backwardness – a physical space that imprisons people in 
what is considered an inferior and outmoded way of life. (Pigg, 1992, 
p. 507)  
As this developmental map not only charts national space in terms of 
development, but also orients people in certain directions within that 
space (see also Lakier, 2005, p. 145; Pigg, 1992, p. 499) it provides a 
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hegemonic, uniform but unequal, representation of national space that 
stretches well into present discourse. 72 
This representation of national space as a ‘sea of villageness’ 
continues today. The grade six textbook from 2009 e.g. ask the students 
to “complete the following dialogue” that illustrates “the problems in 
the absence of electricity” (CDC, 2009b, p. 22): 
Shyam: Our country first started electricity production in 1965. 
When did you start using electricity in your village? 
Hari: We don’t have electricity even now. Our village is in darkness. 
Shyam: I’m sorry to hear that. How do you study, listen to radio or 
watch the interesting programmes on television? 
Hari: Our life is dark. We have been living a life of difficulty. 
Shyam: It seems your village is still not developed.  
Hari’s village still hasn’t got electricity – the epitome of development – 
today although the national production (i.e. in the cities) began in 1965. 
As the textbook spells it out, the consequence is that the villagers live a 
life of ‘darkness’ without radio, television or even electric light to 
study by. Albeit part of a superficially uniform national space, Hari’s 
village is situated on the periphery of the developmentalist map of 
Nepal. Within the sea of development, as the grade seven textbook 
states, “the wave of development has not reached all places (…) in a 
uniform manner” (CDC, 2009a, p. 104). 
As the wave of development hasn’t conquered all parts of the 
sea, the developmental representation of national space gives rise to a 
                                                
72 Pigg’s concepts of charting and orienting obviously resemble de Certeau’s idea 
that space can be narrated either as maps or tours (Certeau, 1984, pp. 118-122). For 
a delineation of what we might understand by hegemonic space see (Kipfer, 2008), 
for a critique of the idea that Panchayat ideology was hegemonic see (Lakier, 2005, 
p. 156) 
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differentiation in which ‘remote’ areas are considered ‘backward’. 
Here, spatial distance becomes temporal distance. A Panchayat 
textbook lesson brings this points forward rather starkly, stating that: 
During the reign of King Mahendra, there were many 
underdeveloped places in Nepal that were just waking up from the 
19th century’s revelation and many places were sleeping in the 
middle ages. In addition, in some of the places in remote Nepal they 
were just trying to step out from the Stone Age. (N. P. Shrestha, 1989 
[2046 BS], p. 71) 
In slightly less forceful terms, the same notion of an opposition 
between remoteness within the national territory and development 
continues in present textbooks. A lesson on the administrative zones of 
Nepal e.g. simply states that the “Karnali Zone is very remote while 
Lumbini and Narayani zones are somewhat more developed” (CDC, 
2009a, pp. 7, 67). This spatial differentiation between developed and 
remote areas provides a direction to development – as Pigg puts it: 
“bik!s comes to the local areas from elsewhere; it is not produced 
locally” (Pigg, 1992, p. 499).  
There is a certain circularity to this opposition between 
development and remoteness. As Pigg describes “the topographical 
constraints we call ‘remoteness’ are commonly blamed for the limits of 
development’s reach in the countryside” (Pigg, 1993, p. 48). Similarly, 
as education is seen as the “primary institution of bikas” (Onta, 1996a; 
Pigg, 1992, p. 502; Skinner & Holland, 2009 [1996]), we can regard 
the movement of textbooks as a spatial practice physically manifesting 
this direction of development. The movement of textbooks, even today, 
trace out routes from the urban centre to the rural villages. All 
textbooks continue to be not only edited, but also printed in the central 
Teaching a Language of Difference 
 116 
education offices in the Sanothimi area of Kathmandu valley.73 At the 
beginning of each school year, the books are distributed from here to 
the District Education Offices (DEOs) in all seventy-five districts of 
the country from where they are again re-distributed to the individual 
schools. With this system, books often arrive late and in insufficient 
quantities to the ‘remote’ areas of the country. The spatial practice of 
textbook production thus reinforces the connotation of remote areas 
with lack in education and development.74 
As argued above, the Panchayat discourse on development 
obviously contains its own hierarchies of central development and 
remote backwardness in spite of its superficially uniform representation 
of Nepal as a sea of villages. Furthermore, while Panchayat 
government obviously sought to overcome the social hierarchies of the 
Rana period by abolishing the old civil code, reorganising territorial 
administration, applying a language of equal national citizenship etc. 
these differences remained visible below the surface of the 
developmental ‘sea’. Out there in ‘village’ Nepal the old hierarchies 
coexisted with the new differentiation of centres and peripheries of 
development leaving people “simultaneously caught up in two social 
orders” (Pigg, 1992, p. 510). In some instances, notions of development 
even intensified existing social differences (Pigg, 1993, p. 54). Pigg 
(1992, p. 501) e.g. presents an illustration from a Panchayat textbook 
(see illustrations below). Seemingly inspired by an Indian textbook 
illustration from the same period depicting “citizens of India”, the 
                                                
73 The Department of Education (DoE), the Curriculum Development Centre 
(CDC) and the Janak Education Materials Centre Ltd. (JEMCL) are the three 
central offices all placed in Sanothimi. 
74 The information given here is based on a range of interviews with officials from 
the education bureaucracy (central and district level) and schoolteachers conducted 
during fieldwork in the autumn of 2010. 
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accompanying text explicitly describes people in equal terms  as 
“having the same red blood” (N. P. Shrestha, 1987 [2044 BS], p. 18). 
The illustration itself, however, re-inscribe a hierarchy of development 
that follows ethnic, religious and ecological lines of distinction – from 
backward mountain dwellers, over hill ethnic groups, to high-caste 
Hindu hill and plains-dwellers. 
 
 
Illustration 2: Stating that "all have the same red blood" this Panchayat textbook 
page, however, illustrates a hierarchy of development from the mongoloid 
matwalis in the upper left to the educated man wearing national dress in the 
bottom right (N. P. Shrestha, 1987 [2044 BS], p. 18)(cf. Pigg 1992, p.502). 
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Illustration 3: A similar presentation from an Indian textbook. Here the differences 
are, however, not so obvious (Muley, Sharma, & Das, 1988, p. 47). 
 
Even in the present-day textbooks, we might trace the ‘imperial 
debris’ of old hierarchies behind notions of development. Across the 
present social studies textbooks there is, e.g. a striking amount of 
emphasis on the problems of drinking (CDC, 2009b, pp. 47-48; 2009c, 
pp. 50-55). Although presented in the neutral language of a ‘social 
evil’, this emphasis brings up unwarranted remnants of the earlier use 
of the ‘alcohol drinkers’ (matwali) category as a placeholder for race 
and/or ethnicity (see also Pigg, 1993, p. 55). It is, obviously, not the 
high-caste Hindu – supposedly shying alcohol as a polluting substance 
– that are the target audience for the textbooks’ insistent condemnation 
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of drinking. Rather, it is the ‘drinking’ Tibeto-Burman population that 
is the target of moral ridicule (see illustration below). And as education 
– a major marker of development – as well as the civilizational notions 
of “good traditional (…) and indigenous concepts” are presented as the 
remedy for social evils, notions of lacking civilisation and 
developmental backwardness is once again tied up with their position 
in the national hierarchy (CDC, 2009c, pp. 51-52). 
 
 
Illustration 4: The results of drinking as illustrated in the present social studies 
textbook for grade eight (CDC, 2009c, p. 52) 
 
In summary, the notion of development provided a crucial point 
around which the representation of national space was produced in the 
Panchayat era. Mapping out national space as a ‘sea of villageness’, the 
development discourse oriented people towards the crests and the lulls 
in the ‘waves of development’. The Panchayat discourse thus sought to 
overwrite earlier forms of difference with a spatio-temporal distinction 
between development and remoteness. However, this didn’t fully erase 
earlier hierarchies leaving various ‘imperial debris’ to be taken up in 
the changing political circumstances after the 1990 ‘people’s 
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movement’ (Jana Andolan) overthrew the Panchayat regime. 
Furthermore, though some critique of the ‘development’ discourse has 
surfaced since then (e.g. Fujikura, 2001; Pigg, 1993; Tamang, 2003), 
political agendas and a steady flow of international development aid 
has kept the spatial differentiation according to development alive and 
well – in the present-day school textbooks as well as beyond. Notions 
of development thus continue to play a crucial role in the spatial 
organisation of Nepal. 
In summary I have, so far, argued that Panchayat schooling 
provides an important moment in the transformation of the imperial 
landscape into a more integrated, bordered and uniform national 
territory. Concomitantly, Panchayat schooling also provides an 
important moment in the development of a nation-wide language of 
difference. This language replays elements from the imperial landscape 
of the past combined with new anthropological and ecological 
distinctions according to notions of development and backwardness. 
Due to the unprecedented spatial reach of Panchayat education; the 
concomitant increase in literacy; and the positive evaluation of ‘school 
knowledge’ that the combination of education with employment 
opportunities and notions of development facilitate, we should, I would 
argue, expect that this language of difference has had a major impact 
on Nepali society. As such, Panchayat schooling provides a crucial 
‘past’ to the contemporary imagination of Naya Nepal – a past that in 
many instances continues as the present for contemporary textbooks. 
But what about contemporary schooling? In the section below, I 
provide a brief discussion of developments in the centralised 
administration of education combined with examples from 
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contemporary schooling in eastern Nepal. We begin with a small 
anecdote. 
Schooling the ‘Infantile Citizen’ as a Moral Agent 
In the grade eight classroom, the teacher begins today’s lesson: “the 
executive”. Listening to my assistant’s whispering translation, I am 
taken aback by the degree to which what is taught seems detached from 
the outside world. It is September 2010, and since the Congress prime 
minister resigned in July, the Nepali political parties have not been able 
to agree on a new candidate as the basis for the formation of a new 
government.75 Though this political deadlock is all over the news76, the 
teacher proceeds through “the formation of government” following 
closely the ideal and abstract form in which it is presented in the 
textbook. “Do you know the constitution,” the teacher asks the pupils 
when explaining the basis for the formation of the executive. As their 
“yes” rings through the classroom I wonder what constitution they are 
referring to – the last constitution from 1991, the interim constitution 
promulgated after the peace agreement between the Maoist insurgents 
and the main political parties, or the constitution presently in the 
making inside the walls of the Constituent Assembly? But is seems to 
be none of these. The constitution of this class and its lesson in the 
textbook seems to be a more abstracted and idealized one. 
As the bell rings and the pupils start pouring out into the school 
playground from this lesson on “the executive” no mention has been 
made, no reference drawn, to neither the current constitution-making 
                                                
75 After “nearly seven months of leadership vacuum”, Jhalanath Khanal of CPN 
(UML) was finally chosen as the new Prime Minister in the beginning of February 
2011 (see e.g. Rai, 2011) 
76 See e.g. ”How do we get out of this hole?”, Nepali Times 10 September, 2010, p. 
4 
Teaching a Language of Difference 
 122 
process nor the political deadlock. The school space is left in the ideal 
world of the textbook – a world that seems curiously out of sync with 
the surrounding world. The next day, my assistant and I join the 
chatting of the teachers in the teachers’ room. Here, another social 
studies teacher expresses concern with the current political situation: 
“How can you teach who is the prime minister, when he keeps 
changing all the time?” she asks rhetorically. Her concerns tell a story 
of the contemporary political volatility in Nepal, but also about what is 
deemed appropriate to teach in school and what is not. Unstated, but 
clear from her comments, you cannot tell the children that the prime 
minister keeps on changing. This just won’t fit into the ideal world 
presented in the textbooks, where the constitution is the constitution 
and the prime minister is the prime minister. 
 
 
Illustration 5: Still tending the garden? Painting on the wall of a school near Ilam 
in eastern Nepal 
 
The same idealism is reflected in the contemporary textbooks: 
“Draw a picture that represents an ideal community and explain it”, 
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“Present a model of an ideal municipality”, “Draw a sketch that shows 
an ideal community”. These sentences present activities for the pupils 
reading the social science textbook for grade nine (CDC, 2009b, pp. 
3,7,9). The accompanying lessons tell us that “people live in 
communities” (CDC, 2009b, p. 2) and presents the government of these 
communities through an introduction to Village Development 
Committees (VDCs) and municipalities.  
On a first reading, the details of these institutions seems very 
mundane – so and so many members elected, nominations of ‘social 
workers’, ‘backward classes’, ’ethnic groups’ and so on. On a second 
reading, another perspective stands out from these mundane facts and 
figures. When the student Pawan in lesson two asks the teacher Urmila 
how the VDC members are elected she readily answers, “they are 
elected by the citizens who have attained the age of 18 years and have 
been living in the village development area for at least one year” (CDC, 
2009b, p. 4). A conversation is played out and a question is exchanged 
with the correct answer – the nominal rule for how these things work. 
But the VDC members are not elected in Nepal. The latest local 
election in Nepal was held in 199777 nine years before the end of the 
Maoist insurgency, and twelve years before the present edition of the 
social science textbook was revised in 2009 (see e.g. International 
Crisis Group, 2006). It is thus, not only the students that “draw a 
picture that represents an ideal community.” The very textbook that 
gives the activity does the same. 
                                                
77 In 2006 King Gyanendra called for Municipal elections, but with the Maoists 
controlling of extensive parts of the country, the major political parties boycotting 
the election, and a voter turnout of only 20% these are rarely counted among the 
local elections (International Crisis Group, 2006). 
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What does this mean for the role of schooling in relation to the 
contemporary political conjuncture in Nepal? We might see schooling, 
as it is presented above, as a rehearsal of what Laurant Berlant has 
referred to as ‘infantile citizenship’ (Berlant, 1993). This notion 
describes the youthful innocence of a naïve, utopian imagination of the 
nation. The innocence of the infantile citizen lies in marked contrast 
between the ideal image of the nation that occupies the infantile 
imagination and the harsh realities of the nation that one encounters 
outside this imagination. So far the schooling of Nepali children 
follows Berlant’s notion. But while the infantile citizen in Berlant’s 
description elicits “scorn and cynicism from ‘knowing’ adults” 
(Berlant, 1993, p. 399), the school children I met in Ilam seemed to 
engage the surrounding society from a different position. In the semi-
urban public space of Ilam town they showed up, instead, as a sort of 
‘moral agents’ clearly visible in their school uniforms in everyday 
activities and public events. The following vignette illustrates this 
presence. 
One morning, a few day after my arrival in Ilam Bazaar, I found 
the main square of the town thronged with lines of school children 
facing a podium at the edge of the square. What was going on? Why 
were, what seemed to be a substantial part of the town’s school 
children lined up here? The event turned out to be a public campaign 
possibly organised by the Election Commission and meant to get the 
adult citizens of Nepal to re-register onto the electoral roll and get 
copies of the new voter ID cards with pictures.78 But none of the pupils 
                                                
78 As a consequence of the perceived high level of errors in the electoral roll for the 
CA elections, the Election Commission has initiated this process that, among other 
initiatives, will provide voter ID cards with pictures and fingerprints to be used in 
future elections. The related registration process was ongoing during my stay in 
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were anywhere near voting age – so why were they there? Apparently, 
from the signs they had brought they were there to encourage others 
from the local community to register for the new voter ID and be able 
to participate in the later elections. Lined up in the square by their 
teachers, they thus sent out a message of civic engagement to the rest 
of society. A few days later, an even larger display of school children 
showed up in the square. This time the occasion was “Children’s Day” 
– arguably more relevant for their age groups (see picture below). 
Again, the school children had written “moral” slogans on various 
signs that were now being carried around displaying the moral integrity 
of the school children towards the surrounding society. 
 
 
Illustration 6: School children in the main square of Ilam 
 
In these events, the school children seemed less like ‘infantile 
citizens’ in need of real education from the surrounding society and 
more like moral agents put out there to change that society. In the 
                                                                                                                                  
Nepal (September-November 2010) and the first phase was concluded in January 
2011 with a 40% reduction in the list of registered voters (nepalnews.com, 2011). 
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image of the educated person presented above, they are put out there in 
their ostensible capacity as ‘developed’ citizens. As another textbook 
lesson blankly states, “when a person is educated, the level of his/her 
consciousness increases. It is this personal consciousness which makes 
a person able to judge what is right and wrong” (CDC, 2009a, p. 72). 
Across text and practice, today the educated person thus continues to 
be presented as more conscious and morally superior to the uneducated 
people of the population (see also Fujikura, 2001). And this is again 
folded back onto the anthropological differentiation of people. As a 
present-day textbook for grade five illustrates, school children are 
imagined as able to disentangle themselves and walk away from the 
“custom[s] and traditions performed in the past [that] would not be 
good in [the] present” (CDC, 2005, p. 41). As ‘conscious’ and 
developed the educated children are thus cast as superior to the cultural 
bickering of the ‘traditional’ adults (see illustration below).79 
 
                                                
79 For another analysis of the illustration and the lesson that accompanies it see 
(Caddell, 2005) 
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Illustration 7: School children leaving a circle of traditionally clad adults (CDC, 
2005, p. 38) 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have shown the language of anthropological as well as 
developmental difference that emerges as a subtext within Panchayat 
textbooks and in large measure continues into the present. I have 
argued that this textbook language of difference within comes at a 
crucial moment in Nepali history and attains a wide scope due to the 
concomitant and hitherto unseen expansion of the education system as 
a governmental technology. As notions of development and education 
are repeatedly folded onto each other across the Panchayat period and 
into the present, the textbook language of difference, I argue, emerges 
as a privileged language of politics and civic engagement. Although the 
educated person her- or himself is cast as a person able to walk away 
from the anthropological differences of ‘traditional society’, a certain 
‘educated’ fluency in anthropological difference nonetheless continues 
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– as I argue in the following chapter – to mark out the persons that have 
a political say in relation to the on-going imagination of Naya Nepal. 
This latter point can be illustrated by a final observation from the 
Nepali education system. In line with pressure from ‘ethnic’ 
organisations and recommendations from international donors, there 
has over the last few years been a movement towards more teaching in 
the pupils’ ‘mother tongues’ and more ‘local knowledge’ in the 
curriculum. In relation to the former, new textbooks have been 
produced for the early classes and (after further pressure) some of these 
have been distributed to the districts. In the area where I conducted 
fieldwork, pupils however ubiquitously chose optional English (seen as 
the language of development par excellence) rather than e.g. Limbu 
language. With regards to ‘local knowledge’ – a priority point for e.g. 
the Limbu organisation Kirat Yakthum Chumlung – a similar situation 
presented itself. While education bureaucrats in Kathmandu 
understandably stated that the presentation of ‘local knowledge’ – now 
valued twenty per-cent in the curriculum for ‘social studies’ – should 
be a local responsibility, local ethnic representatives pointed to the 
teachers to produce the materials for such lessons and the teachers in 
turn pointed toward the curriculum materials centre in Kathmandu. 
While ‘local’, ‘indigenous’ knowledge was thus praised in principle 
across the board, in reality other, more centralised forms of knowledge 
emerged as more important for the ‘infantile citizens’ of Naya Nepal. 
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Chapter 6: Ethnic Fluency in Naya Nepal 
Today, the governmental imagination of Nepal is in transition. After 
the 1990 people’s movement (Jana Andolan), the royal rule of the 
Panchayat regime was abandoned, the political parties reinstated and 
electoral processes reinstituted. With the promulgation of a new 
constitution in 1991, multiparty democracy had officially arrived. 
Nonetheless, governmental alliances were continuously shifting and 
governments changed rapidly usually re-reshuffling a limited number 
of familiar faces from the political elite. Six years later, a Maoist 
‘insurgency’ broke out in the western hills. What looked like a spatially 
limited uprising to start with emerged as a serious threat to national 
government by the turn of the millennium. Violent clashes between 
central state forces and Maoist rebels ensued, leaving many dead 
behind. In 2005, the king utilised the occasion of the ‘insurgency’ to 
take over central government. Finally, in 2006, a peace accord was 
made between the central political parties and the Maoists. A second 
people’s movement (Jana Andolan II) led by this coalition managed to 
oust the king.  
Subsequently, the central political parties and the Maoists 
initiated a peace process evolving around the integration of the two 
armies (the central Nepal Army and the Maoist Peoples Liberation 
Army) and the formulation of a new constitution through an elected 
constituent assembly (CA). As discussions before and during the 
constituent assembly developed, Nepal was declared a republic. The 
king was removed from his palace in central Kathmandu and stripped 
of his title. With increasing pressure from a variety of organisations 
representing formerly marginalised ethnic and caste groups, it was also 
decided that Nepal is to become a federation. In the interim constitution 
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that was promulgated to provide the temporary framework for 
government until the CA had finished a new constitution, Nepal was 
thus refashioned as a “Federal, Democratic, Republican State” (UNDP, 
2009, p. 56). The CA, however, did not manage to fulfil its mandate 
even after two extensions of its initial two-year period. In late May 
2012, the CA’s final tenure ran out in the middle of fervent 
negotiations among the country’s political elites. The major question of 
how to reorganise the national territory into federal states seemed to be 
the one that broke the CA’s back in the final hour. At the time of 
writing, no alternative solution to the question of formal governmental 
arrangements for a Naya Nepal has been given. 
In this chapter, I look at the contemporary politics of difference 
in the open-ended contemporary situation of government in Nepal. I 
argue that the folding of a language of difference related to 
development, education and awareness onto an imperial landscape of 
ecological and anthropological difference that I illustrated in the 
Panchayat and present-day textbooks in the preceding chapter provides 
the grounds for a contemporary claims to ‘ethnic’ difference. And I 
show how the widespread fetishisation of education substantially 
influences the language through which one can engage in a politics of 
difference today. As claims to ‘ethnic’ difference have become 
increasingly legitimate in contemporary Nepal, the way these claims 
can be presented relies on a certain language of the ‘educated’ or 
‘aware’ person. What emerges from this is thus a sort of academic 
politics. Here fluency in a specific language of ethnic claims becomes, 
concomitantly, a marker of development and awareness. This fluency, 
in turn, structures who can legitimately engage in the contemporary 
politics of difference and who cannot. In conclusion, the open-ended 
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contemporary conjuncture might be seen both as harbouring a potential 
for increased local autonomy within future federal states and as 
producing a refashioned division between a somewhat changed 
political elite and a large, backward and unaware population. 
In the following I develop the connections I see between notions 
of academic awareness and the politics of ethnic difference. I do so, 
first in relation to contemporary ethnic self-fashioning, mapping and 
classification in the contemporary conjuncture in general and then in 
relation to one of the most prominent claims to federal stateness: 
Limbuwan. I begin with a brief outline of the contemporary 
combinations between notions of development and refashioned forms 
of anthropological difference. 
Differences Refashioned and Recombined 
(…) we have to look for a new Nepali nationalism on the faces of all 
kinds of Nepalis, their lifestyles and cultures.80 
Since 1990, new constellations of difference and representations of the 
national territory and space have sprung up in Nepal. A large number 
of organizations seeking to represent formerly marginalized groups 
have emerged pushing for new ways to articulate old differences (see 
e.g. Gellner, 1997; Gellner, 2007, 2009; Gellner, Pfaff-Czarnecka, & 
Whelpton, 1997; Onta, 2006). By bringing women, low castes and 
‘indigenous’ peoples into an armed struggle with the central 
government, the Maoist insurgency from 1996 to 2006 similarly altered 
the old representations of difference. As the insurgency ended and a 
peace process was initiated, these new representations of difference 
have been connected to ideas of territorial reorganisation with the 
                                                
80 UML Politbureau member and Coordinator of the Adivasi Janajati Caucus 
Prithvi Subba Gurung (interviewed in Dhungel & Adhikari, 2012). 
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prospect of Nepal becoming a federal state. Especially during the last 
four years of negotiations in the Constituent Assembly, federalism has 
become one of the most hotly debated issues81 in Nepali politics, 
capturing the high expectations of a multitude ‘indigenous’ groups 
towards a ‘new Nepal’ as well as the luring anxieties of others (see e.g. 
International Crisis Group, 2011). In this new situation, old categories 
of difference are re-evoked and re-valued from a multitude of positions 
in Nepali society, new connections have been made and the future 
territorial organisation of the landscape is openly contested. 
With the fall of the Panchayat regime, categories of 
differentiation that were essential parts of the pre-Panchayat 
governmental gaze are being re-articulated with a new valuation and in 
new combinations with continued notions of development. Through the 
discursive intervention of a broad range of ‘ethnic’ organisations, the 
former matwali jat (‘alcohol-drinking sub-castes’) have been 
refashioned as adivasi janajati. Adivasi is a Sanskrit term that is 
typically translated as ‘first settlers’ and is widely used in India when 
referring to the so-called scheduled tribes (see e.g. P. Sharma, 2008, p. 
3). Janajati, on the other hand, is a Nepali neologism. While it is often 
translated as ‘nationalities’ its use in relation to internationally 
supported discussions of ‘indigenous peoples’ has connected it to the 
globalised concept of ‘indigeneity’ (Onta, 2006, p. 311; 2011). In 2002, 
official state recognition was given to the term in the National 
Foundation for Development of Indigenous Nationalities (NFDIN) Act 
that listed 59 adivasi janajati communities in Nepal. Together with 
                                                
81 The issue of how many states there should be and on what basis they should be delineated 
recently resulted in the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, when the fourth extension of its 
tenure ran out on 27 May 2012, before a new constitution was promulgated. As new elections are 
slated for being planned for November 2012, a range of ’ethnic’ political representatives are 
discussing whether to form a united front for federalism (see e.g. The Himalayan Times, 2012)  . 
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continuing public discourse (see e.g. Onta, 2011) and the  utilisation of 
the term as part of the basis for an elaborate quota system for the 2008 
Constituent Assembly election, the NFDIN has supported the 
refashioning of the former matwalis into janajatis. 
This conceptual shift has facilitated new connections between 
notions of ethnic and ecological difference and notions of economic 
development. While development assistance to Nepal, as described 
above, exploded in the 80s it has remained at a consistent high since 
then with many donors encouraged by the seemingly positive 
developments towards a more democratic political system.82 However, 
in line with global changes, the developmental discourse in Nepal has 
changed substantially from the Panchayat period. While the Panchayat 
discourse sought, at least superficially, to dissolve earlier difference in 
a ‘sea’ of development the focus is now very much on ‘targeted’ 
development directed exactly at the formerly marginalised groups now 
typically articulated in terms of ‘caste’, ‘gender’ and ‘ethnicity’.83 
Under the overall agenda of developing Nepal as an inclusive 
democracy, the inclusion of these groups in societal decision-making 
has become tantamount to development efforts. Thus today, 
development works through and reinforces, rather than overwrites, 
‘ethnic’ and other forms of differentiation.  
The ’old’ development discourse’s focus on physical 
infrastructure and remoteness is still in practice, though. During my 
                                                
82 Since 1990 development assistance to Nepal has been consistently high. 
Measured in 2009 US$ it averaged 553 million US$ per year in the 90s and 589 
million US$ per year in the 2000s. (Source: World Development Indicators 2011). 
83 These observations regarding the current ’development regime’ (see Ludden, 
2005a) in Nepal are based on my own work in the sector in 2007-2008 combined 
with the reading of a variety of development reports from around that time (see e.g. 
WB, 2006). 
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fieldwork, people often remarked that I was lucky to be working in 
eastern Nepal. In accordance with the traditional development 
mapping, they pointed out that this was a ’developed’ region with good 
roads. However, the Panchayat periods’ representation of ‘remote’ 
villages as ‘backward’ is changing. For the ‘ethnic’ organizations, the 
refashioning of the former ‘sub-castes’ in terms of ‘indigeneity’ 
typically involves their rooting in specific and often ‘remote’ places.84 
Consequently, the representation of remote villages as underdeveloped 
is increasingly being supplemented with representations of the same 
places as culturally ‘authentic’. Thus, many people would ask why I 
was conducting what they perceived as my 'research on the Limbus’ in 
a semi-urban environment. After all, they implied, such environments 
are characterised by a diversity of groups and cultural influences. A 
place like remote Panchthar or Taplejung, by contrast, would let me 
encounter a more ‘authentic’ Limbu culture and identity. 
Reflecting these shifts in the language of ethnic difference and 
development, mapped representations of Nepali national territory are 
also changing. Since 1990, census operations have changed with the 
increased recognition of the country’s ethnic and linguistic diversity. 
The 1991 census was the first nation-wide census to enumerate 
ethnicity – collecting district population figures for fifty-nine different 
groups (P. Sharma, 2008, p. 8). No longer ‘fuzzy’ in the eyes of the 
state, the new enumerated communities were quickly taken up by 
prominent Nepali cartographers and population specialists (especially 
Harka Gurung, see Gurung, 1994, 1996, 1998).85 The result is a new 
                                                
84 See (Handler, 1996; Ludden, 2003b; Malkki, 1992) for discussions of the 
dynamics of ’rooting’. 
85 See (Kaviraj, 2010, pp. 187-201) on ’fuzzy’ and enumerated communities in 
India. See also (Cohn, 1987b; Kaviraj, 1997; Scott, 1998). 
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kind of ‘mosaic’ map providing nation-wide representations of space in 
which a multitude of colours or patterns display the ethnic diversity of 
the country. The 2001 census provided data for 100 groups with 
increased spatial disaggregation down to the Village Development 
Committee level. Combined with powerful developments in 
Geographical Information System (GIS) technology, this has enabled 
the production of even more elaborate, complex ‘mosaic’ maps over 
the last decades (cf. e.g. Gurung, 2006; P. Sharma, 2008) further 
pushing the boundaries of mapped representations of the ethnic 
diversity within Nepali territory (see map below).86 
 
 
Map 3: A 'mosaic' map of Nepal's population (from Pitamber Sharma’s atlas 
reviewed in Nepali Times, 2008) 
 
This emergence and success of the ‘mosaic’ maps marks a 
departure from the mapped representations of the country in earlier 
times. While the Nepal: Atlas of Economic Development (1980) was 
apparently one of the most significant maps during the Panchayat era, 
‘mosaic’ maps increasingly supplement such ‘development’ maps. 
Over the last two decades, the changes in both discursive and mapped 
representations of the differences between people and places have, in 
                                                
86 One could liken the innovations in GIS technology with development of the 
cadastral map in the nineteenth century in the powerful effects it has on the way we 
can territorialize a certain select picture of a complex reality (see Scott, 1998, pp. 
1-52). 
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other words, been substantial. While the diversity of the central 
Himalayas has obviously been recognised at least since Prithvi Narayan 
Shah’s conquest, it is today more visible and ready at hand for 
discussions of Nepal’s future than before. And, with the widespread 
diffusion of mosaic maps, the complex array of cultural differences are 
explicitly visualised within the territorial borders of the nation-state. As 
such, the present recasting of largely imperial categories of difference 
provides the grounds unto which imaginations of and proposals for the 
territorial reorganisation of the country are brought forward. 
Mapping Federal Futures 
In 2007, after pressure from ethnic and madeshi87 leaders, the first 
amendment to the interim constitutions inserted federalism as a binding 
principle for the Constituent Assembly’s reorganisation of the Nepali 
state structure. After the ball was given up for the delineation of future 
federal states, a host of different ‘federal’ maps began circulating (see 
maps 4 and 5).88 These maps differ substantially. Based on a variety of 
different criteria, the proposed number of federal units e.g. ranges 
between three and fifteen (P. Sharma et al., 2009). Even within the 
purview of the Constituent Assembly (CA), the sub-committee in 
charge ended up proposing two different models – one delineating 
fourteen states, another six.89 Among the political parties, the United 
Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists) – the biggest party in the CA – 
                                                
87 The term Madeshi refers to the non-hill-origin population from Nepal’s southern 
plains. 
88 The Centre for Constitutional Dialogue (CCD, now renamed as ’Support to 
Participatory Constitution Building in Nepal’) has compiled a range of these maps. 
These federal maps originate with a variety of organisations, political parties and 
individuals. See also (P. Sharma, Khanal, & Tharu, 2009). 
89 As the question was later placed onto an ‘expert committee’ outside the CA, two 
proposals were again produced – one suggesting eleven states, the other six. 
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have spoken for a solution with many, ethnically based states from 
early on while the older United Marxist Leninists and Nepali Congress 
have been more hesitant, emphasising the need to keep the Nepali 
nation integrated and the federal states economically viable. Providing 
another new force in formal politics the ‘Madeshi’ parties – 
representing the non-hill-origin population of the southern Nepali 
plains – are pushing for the integration of the southern plains into one 
state running the length of the country under the slogan ‘ek Madesh, ek 
Pradesh’ (one Madesh, one state). Adding proposals from various 
individuals, the sum is obviously a confusing jungle of proposals 
feeding onto the on-going politics of territorial reorganisation. 
 
 
Map 4: A proposal from the United Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists). 
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Map 5: One of two proposals from the CA committee for state restructuring. 
While most of the proposed maps reflect a territorial organisation 
of ‘ethic’ differences in some way, federal restructuring however also 
bring notions of development into renewed connections with the 
national territory. While proposals for federal set-ups with many states 
typically rely on histories of ‘indigenous’ belonging to different areas, 
proposals with fewer states often rely on notions of development, 
resources, and economic viability. Woking both on the ‘mosaic’ 
mapping of Nepal and on the evaluation of proposed models (including 
his own), geographer Pitamber Sharma occupies a central position on 
the ‘development’ side of the debate. In one of his publication Sharma 
states that “federalism should provide the basis for regional 
development” and that it “has to be conceived of as an exercise in 
addressing the multiplicity of issues that form the agenda of Nepal’s 
development” (P. Sharma, 2008, p. 83). The idea that Nepal’s 
demographic ‘mosaic’ and proposed federal models can be made the 
object of “dispassionate analysis” (P. Sharma, 2008: back cover) leaves 
the door open for the notions of development to re-enter the politics of 
territorial re-structuring. 
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As Pitamber Sharma’s involvement illustrates, the new federal 
representations of Nepali national territory take part in a politics of 
space that is heavily infused with notions of academic and scientific 
authority. Committees and commissions, prominent academics (P. 
Sharma, 2008; P. Sharma et al., 2009), and international development 
agencies evaluated federal proposals in terms that often bring notions 
of ‘development’ back in. Sharma’s involvement is just an example of 
this tendency, which is also supported by the involvement of 
development agencies. The UNDP-supported Centre for Constitutional 
Dialogue for instance produced a paper (unpublished, but seemingly 
widely circulated) which provided ”Provincial Profiles” for the 14 
states suggested in the CA. The main bulk of this profiling regards the 
usual development indicators. On the other side of the debate stand 
other academics such as the Limbu population geographer Balkrishna 
Mabuhang – a former president of NEFIN, the Nepal Federation of 
Indigenous Nationalities (Mabuhang, 2009). For them, ethnic histories 
and population statistics describing the marginalisation of ethnic 
groups by high-caste Hindus are more important for the evaluation of 
the federal proposals, but the notion of academic, scientific grounding 
of discussions are the same. The mapping of a federal future for Nepal 
illustrates the contemporary combination of notions of development 
and ‘ethnic’ difference that circulate within a field of academic politics. 
In the following, I analyse this combination in further detail as it is 
expressed in the contemporary ‘ethnic’ refashioning. 
Ethnic Fluency in Contemporary Politics 
In the shift from matwali to janajati, ‘ethnic’ identity has become an 
important point of self-fashioning. I repeatedly encountered this among 
my relatively affluent informants in Kathmandu. One colleague, during 
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my first stay in Nepal in 2007, pointed out that he was not an ordinary 
chettri (the high, ‘warrior’ caste in the Hindu hierarchy). He was Khas 
(the old name for the original migrants into eastern Nepal) he said, and 
thus a matwali chettri – an alcohol-drinker of the warrior caste and 
hence, in some sense, as ‘ethnic’ as the other janajati groups in Nepal. 
On my next visit in 2010, several friends and informants from the Kirat 
groups (they were Rai and Limbu) made a somewhat similar gesture. 
They all referred to their supposedly common ethnic trait of being loyal 
to their friends, but short-tempered. Several of them relayed a common 
proverb jokingly stating that a three-inch cut by the traditional curved 
khukuri knife was merely what could happen, when one was kidding 
around. None of them, however, acted particularly short-tempered 
when I was around. As I later realised, their ethnic self-
characterisations replayed central elements from colonial ethnographies 
of the Kirat ‘tribes’.  
These are, obviously, merely anecdotal illustrations of the 
contemporary life of the language of ‘ethnic’ difference in Nepal. 
Nonetheless, I will argue that they fit into a larger trend around ‘ethnic’ 
fluency that tie the contemporary mosaic mapping of Nepal together 
with a more on-going redistribution of ‘voice’ in the contemporary 
politics of difference. Here, the ability to identify, characterise, list, 
enumerate, and categorise ‘ethnic’ differences becomes as a central 
marker of contemporary ‘awareness’ and ‘development’. With this, 
fluency in a specific ‘academic’, ‘educated’ language of ethnic history 
and diversity tends to become a criteria for entry into the on-going 
politics of territorial restructuring. Hence, in some sense, one has to 
‘speak like a state’ in order to engage the state and be taken seriously. 
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At an inter-personal level, I experienced the contemporary 
dynamics of ethnic fluency in repeated encounters with people eager to 
map out ethnic groups in the area, explain their relations, population 
numbers, hint at their histories and ‘cultural traits’ etc. How many 
Limbu’s lived in Ilam district? Were they more concentrated in the 
Taplejung or Panchthar? Which groups should be sorted under the 
Kirat designation? Many informants quickly jumped at the opportunity 
to engage in lengthy discussions on questions such as these. While the 
overtly essential notions of ‘ethnicity’ that such discussion relied on 
would bring nervous twitches to even moderately constructionist 
students of anthropology, I found that the pivotal part of this ‘found 
ethnography’ was the way in which it seemed to work as a marker of 
‘educated’ fluency in a specific language of ethnic difference.90 This 
fluency resonated very well with a host of exercises that are included in 
the present-day social studies textbooks. These repeatedly encourage 
the students to ‘map’ their environment, often along ‘ethnic’ or other 
cultural lines (cf. e.g. CDC, 2009a, p. 40; CDC, 2009b, p. 26; see also 
Middleton & Shneiderman, 2008).  
While such practices of ethnic mapping might have also been 
prevalent before 1990, the contemporary ‘mosaic’ maps obviously 
provide them with resonance at a national scale and the federalism 
agenda gives them an increased salience in connection to centralised 
territorial politics. Outside school textbooks and ethnographic 
experiences, we can re-find the contemporary practice of ethnic 
characterisation and classification in the wider public. The Nepal 
Federation of Indigenous Nationalities (NEFIN), an umbrella 
                                                
90 See Christopher Townsend Middleton’s recent dissertation for a related 
discussion of ‘found anthropology’ in Darjeeling (Middleton, 2010). 
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organisation for a range of ‘indigenous peoples organisations’, e.g. 
quickly combined the 59 recently classified janajati groups with tried 
and tested notions of development in a new classification. Here the 
fifty-nine groups are ordered according to region and development: the 
former indexing mountain, hill, inner terai (plains) and terai and the 
latter endangered, highly marginalised, marginalised, disadvantaged, 
and advantaged (see e.g. Onta, 2006, p. 313).91 As was probably 
intended, the resulting table has been widely used in relation to national 
and international development projects in Nepal. 
The Academic Politics of Limbuwan 
The demand for a Limbuwan state in eastern Nepal has been one of the 
earliest and most vocal statehood demands expressed in relation to the 
agenda of turning the country into a federal state. In the following, I 
illustrate how the academic politics of place-making and local 
autonomy is presently evolving around the demand for Limbuwan. I 
argue that this academic politics is productive for the attainment of a 
more local autonomy as it connects the Limbuwan claims to globalised 
notions of indigenous rooting in the landscape. However, towards the 
end of the chapter, I argue, that this academic politics is concomitantly 
bordered by notions of ethnic fluency and national territory in ways 
that might end up repeating a powerful differentiation 
between ’developed’ and ‘backward’ people as well as reducing 
possibilities of cross-border cooperation. I begin with an anecdote 
illustrating one of the many ways in which the ‘academic’ side of 
contemporary ethnic politics unveiled itself during my fieldwork. 
When my initial interest in eastern Nepal began some years ago, 
I read the British anthropologist Lionel Caplan’s classical book Land 
                                                
91 See also www.nefin.org.np. 
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and Social Change in East Nepal: A Study of Hindu-Tribal Relations 
(1970). At that time, I did not expect that this 40 year old book would 
turn up again much later, during my doctoral fieldwork in the area. The 
next encounter was in eastern Nepal in 2010, during an interview with 
Mohan - a local leader of the “Limbu indigenous peoples’ 
organization” Kirat Yakthum Chumlung (KYC). Interviewing Mohan 
about the present-day movement for a Limbuwan federal state, I 
became aware, firstly, of numerous historical references often going as 
far back as to the official ‘birth’ of Nepal with Prithvi Narayan Shahs 
conquests in the later eighteenth century, and secondly, of the 
similarities between his perspective on the history of Limbuwan and 
the one presented by Caplan’s book. Further into the conversation 
direct references to Caplan’s book came up in relation to arguments 
about kipat land tenure, and by the end of the interview, Mohan 
showed me numerous copies of the book - in Nepali translation - piled 
up in the back of his small shop. 
The experience took me by surprise. I somehow expected such 
academic discourse to be situated ‘at home’ separated from the 
empirical, political reality of ‘the field’. Suddenly, this separation 
seemed untenable as I was being fed back the same academic discourse 
that shaped my initial perspectives on the social and political situation 
of eastern Nepal.92  
When I returned to Kumar’s shop a year later, I asked him more 
in depth about the Caplan book. As it turns out, the book was translated 
and printed by the Centre for Ethnic and Alternative Development 
                                                
92 The experience somewhat resembles the ‘found’ anthropology Christopher Townsend Middleton 
describes in his study of the production of ethnic subjects across the border in Darjeeling 
(Middleton, 2010). For Middleton, ‘found’ anthropology describes “those forms of anthropological 
knowledge being circulated, produced, and practiced in the social world beyond the academy” 
(Middleton, 2010, p. 8). 
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Studies (CEADS, a Kathmandu based research and advocacy 
organization) and distributed to KYC members and other interested 
people in connection to a seminar in the area. The seminar was 
conducted by Balkrishna Mabuhang and Mahendra Lawoti - two 
Limbu academics. Lawoti is currently working as an associate 
professor of political science at Western Michigan University while 
Mabuhang is professor of population studies at Kathmandu’s 
Tribhuvan University. Lawoti has written extensively on the exclusion 
of ‘indigenous peoples’ from politics and public institutions in Nepal 
and has repeatedly argued for ‘ethnic federalism’ as part of a 
consociational approach to creating an inclusive Nepal (Lawoti, 2005, 
2007, 2008; see also Lijphart, 1977). Mabuhang, the former general 
secretary NEFIN, presently serves as the chairman of CEADS. He is, 
as described above, one of the main ‘academic’ spokes-persons in 
favour of an ethnically-based federal model for Nepal and thus a 
Limbuwan state (see Bhattachan, 2010; Mabuhang, 2009). Mabuhang 
has also taken direct part in the production of a KYC proposal for an 
autonomous Limbuwan state.93  
The anecdote illustrates the existence of a certain degree of 
‘intellectual activism’ among ‘indigenous’ academics. This is hardly 
surprising. In a study of the reconstruction of Limbu local history, 
Grégoire Schlemmer has even proposed a name – ‘indigenist’ – for this 
sort of academics working on “their own” ‘indigenous’ belonging 
(Schlemmer, 2003/2004, p. 120). However, the anecdote also indicates 
one way in which the academic politics that the ‘indigenists’ are part of 
is distributed among a much broader range of people as a specific 
                                                
93 Interview with Balkrishna Mabuhang, Kathmandu, September 2011; Interview 
with KYC president Arjun Limbu, Kathmandu, August 2011. 
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language in which one can and ought to engage contemporary politics. 
This language reiterates specific elements of both ‘indigenist’ and – as 
the anecdote above illustrates – foreign academic texts. Hence, what I 
analyse in the following is a widespread discourse on Limbuwan as an 
‘indigenous’ place that is saturated with academic narratives and 
supported occasionally with direct references to academic texts 
circulated – sometimes physically, sometimes electronically; 
sometimes at length, sometimes in bits and pieces – among a broad 
range of people. 
Indigenous History: Predating the Nation, Bordering Limbuwan 
(…) we raise the issues of Limbuwan on the basis of the historical 
background (…) [and a] certain autonomy before introducing the 
land reform act in 1964. So, we have to be treated as a people of 
autonomous areas, you know.94 
As the quote above suggests, ‘indigenous’ history has emerged as a 
major battleground for the academic politics of Limbuwan, not just a 
specialist concern. During my first stay in Ilam, the local schools were 
e.g. shut down for a day or two by the student wing of the Federal 
Limbuwan State Council (FLSC). The students presented a range of 
demands for the decentralisation of education, but among these one 
stood out. The students opposed the use of a specific economics book 
in the local college on the grounds that it painted a misleading picture 
of Limbu history. The book stated that Limbus had migrated into, 
rather than fled, the area when Prithvi Narayan Shah conquered it in the 
late-eighteenth century. It seemed that the students would not let this 
mistake pass without public action. 
                                                
94 Interview with Arjun Limbu, Kathmandu, August 2011 
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As I analyse below, the contemporary discourse on Limbu 
history is characterised by an academic language that often refers back 
to the work of Iman Singh Chemjong. Chemjong, is probably both the 
first and most important ‘indigenist’ of the Limbus (Gaenszle, 2002; 
Schlemmer, 2003/2004). He was born in Darjeeling in 1904, went to 
high school in Kalimpong and college in Calcutta.95 According to his 
main historical book, Kirat Itihas (1948) (translated and “enlarged” as 
History and Culture of Kirat People (1967)), Chemjong’s father – a 
Christian minister – encouraged Chemjong to study Kirat script already 
in 1916. After the father’s death in 1928, Chemjong returned to the 
hills to teach Limbu and Lepcha script in Darjeeling and Sikkim and 
was later appointed revenue inspector in Sikkim. In 1952 he travelled 
to East Nepal and, according to Gaenszle, “it seems that he increasingly 
got involved in the political struggle of the Limbu in Nepal after the 
downfall of the Rana autocracy” (Gaenszle, 2002, p. 337). In 1961 the 
Nepali king Tribhuvan invited Chemjong to take up a position as 
“Specialist in Kirat Language and Literature” at Tribhuvan University 
in Kathmandu. He held this position until his retirement in 1975 and 
died the same year. 
Among the Limbu representatives I talked to, Chemjong’s work 
on the history and culture of the Kirat people (mainly focused on the 
Limbus) was seen as foundation of Limbu history. In the words of 
KYC president Arjun Limbu: 
Iman Singh Chemjong (…) collected whatever he [could] get and he 
published in the book, you know. So now, we have to find out what 
                                                
95 The following brief biography relies mainly on  (Gaenszle, 2002, pp. 336-337). 
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is right and what is wrong and we consider that as the foundation of 
our history, because on his works we can advance our research.96 
Among foreign academics, Chemjong’s historical approach has been 
characterised as “imaginative,” “speculative,” and “hypothetical”, but 
the importance of his writing for establishing “a new discourse on 
Kirati identity which is no longer mythological but academic in 
character” has been recognised “in spite of his methodological 
shortcomings” (Gaenszle, 2002, p. 340; see also Schlemmer, 
2003/2004).97  
Beyond many academic references to Chemjong’s work (e.g. 
Caplan, 2000; K. Pradhan, 1991; Sagant, 1996; C. Subba, 1995; T. B. 
Subba, 1999) Chemjong has also become a somewhat symbolical 
figure in Limbu identity politics.98 In 2003, Chemjong’s main book, 
The History and Culture of the Kirat People was published in a fourth 
edition by the KYC. The book is a mixture of (relatively) chronological 
historical chapters (covering the ‘epic’ period, the 7th-10th century, and 
the 16th-18th century) and more ethnographic explorations of Kirat 
culture. The text relies mainly on a mixture of British colonial sources, 
some Indian scholars, and unpublished Kirat/Limbu manuscripts 
(Chemjong, 2003, pp. 244-247; see also Gaenszle, 2002). Chemjong 
places great emphasis on the accounts of the European authors, most 
importantly the British colonial resident in Kathmandu between 1833 
and 1844, Brian Hodgson, whom Chemjong quotes stating that: 
                                                
96 Interview with Arjun Limbu, Kathmandu, August 2011. 
97 It should be noted that my objective with this text is not an evaluation of Chemjong’s academic 
credentials. I leave this to people more knowledgeable of Limbu culture and history (such as 
Schlemmer and Gaenszle) and focus instead on the political productivity of the discourse in which 
Chemjong’s book takes part in terms of giving Limbuwan an authentic ’indigenous’ history. 
98 Chemjong is e.g. presented by Kirat Yakthung Chumlung’s homepage in line with the Limbu 
personalities of Sirijunga and Phalgunanda (see www.chumlung.org.np) and he is celebrated 
annually on his January 1 anniversary both in Nepal and India (see also Rapacha, 2009, pp. 70-71). 
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The Kirati on account of their distinctly traceable antiquity as a 
nation and the peculiar structure of their language are perhaps the 
most interesting of all the Himalayan races. (Hodgson quoted in 
Chemjong, 2003, p. 1) 
This, and a range of other texts by Chemjong are currently 
circulated widely on the internet with or without references.99 Recently, 
the Facebook page “LIMBU” e.g. featured the following post 
informing its approximately 2000 followers of Limbu ancient history: 
 (I was going through LIMBUS at Wikipedia and I tracked few 
sentences for you :) Guess it will be useful.) The Kirant are 
aboriginal tribe of Nepal and also, the Kirat were the earliest 
inhabitants of the Kathmandu Valley. Nepal (Kathmandu valley) is a 
very ancient country, which has been ruled by many dynasties. 
Among them, the Kirat rule is taken as a very significant one, being 
the longest period that extended from pre-historic to historic period. 
In ancient Hindu scriptures, Nepal is referred as the "Kirat Desh" or 
"the Land of Kirats".100  
The post is interesting, as it circulates a history that roots the Limbus 
not only in ancient history but also in the centre of Nepali national 
space – Kathmandu valley. It refers to a widespread story about the 
Kirat kings of ancient central Nepal101 that finds support mainly in 
Chemjong’s book. 
Chemjong’s story recounts thirty generations of Kirat rulers from 
the first king Banashur, over the prominent king Yalamba to the last 
                                                
99 See e.g. different entries on http://www.kiratisaathi.com, entries such as “History of Limbuwan” 
and “Limbuwan Gorkha War” on Wikipeadia, and pages such as ”Limbu” and “The Limbus 
Collection” (each followed by app. 2000 persons) on Facebook. 
100 Posted on LIMBU Facebook page 15 February 2012 (retrieved same date). The administration 
behind the page is unknown to the author, but it’s information pages refers to the website of Kirat 
Yakthung Chumlung (KYC, www.chumlung.org.np) and reprints the information from that page at 
length. I have not been able to find the mentioned Wikipedia page nor the exact same wording in 
related Wikipedia pages. 
101 The story has, e.g. found its way into the Wikipedia entry for the ”History of Nepal” even though 
it definitely isn’t part of the official ’national’ history of the country.  
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king Gasti who was driven out of the Kathmandu valley by the 
Lichchhavies in the 4th century AD (Chemjong, 2003, pp. 5-16).102 
While the typical national ‘time-in-space’ of Nepali history begins with 
the Lichchhavies – of not with Prithvi Narayan Shah himself – 
Chemjong’s story predates this with thirty generations of non-Hindu 
Kirat rulers situated squarely in the centre of present-day National 
territory.103 While not directly countering the Nepali ‘national’ history 
of space, the story of the thirty Kirat kings tactically circumvents this 
history. By presenting the Kirat as ‘indigenous’ not only to Nepali 
national space but to the very centre of it, the story also implicitly 
undermines the lingering representation of this space as ‘Hindu’. 
Another of Chemjong’s stories tells of how the victory of ten 
Limbu chiefs (sardar) gave birth to Limbuwan in Eastern Nepal. This 
story, again, seems to circulate widely. Santosh, a Limbu historian and 
KYC central committee member told me the story as follows: 
There were eight sadars [chiefs] and the leader of the eight sadars 
was Sawargen Yetan […]. The society wasn’t called Limbu at that 
time. After that ten [other] sadars came from north and south – all 
during the agricultural period. And there was a battle between the 
eight sadars and the ten sadars. The ten sadars were immigrants from 
north and south and the eight were from this region and a battle 
between them took place. Then the ten sadars wished to pray to win 
the battle over the eight sadars, with the use of their weapons - bows 
and arrows. After that the battle began and they won over the eight 
sadars. Then the ten sadars made the decision, at Amde Panzung,104 
                                                
102 Other accounts count 29 kings beginning with Yalamba. 
103 Chemjong even adds that the first Lichchhavi king Nemikh was himself a Kirat who had 
“adopted Hinduism” (Chemjong, 2003, p. 16). 
104 Chemjong refers to this as ”Amde Pojoma” (Chemjong, 2003, p. 50). 
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because they won the battle using bows and arrows, to name the 
region Li-abu-wan-sing.105 
While the story of the Kirat kings of central Nepal connected Limbu 
indigeneity to Nepali national history, this story on the contrary 
provides a foundational history of Limbuwan that is distinct from the 
‘national’ history of Nepal – supporting the notion of Limbuwan as a 
separate ‘indigenous’ territory.  
Describing the “emergence of the name ‘Limbuwan’” 
(Chemjong, 2003, p. 51), Chemjong’s version of the story binds this 
‘indigenous’ Limbuwan territory within concrete geographical borders. 
Chemjong writes: 
After their victory, [the ten Limbu chiefs] assembled at their holy 
place, consulted and fixed the boundaries of the conquered land. 
They fixed the northern boundary in Tibet; the southern boundary in 
the Indian plain at Jalal Garh near Purnea; the eastern boundary at 
river Teesta and the western boundary at river Dudkoshi. (Chemjong, 
2003, p. 51) 
This notion of the territorial borders of Limbuwan: from that Arun (and 
Dudkoshi) river to the Teesta river is repeated ubiquitously almost as a 
mantra in contemporary claims for a Limbuwan state. One Limbu 
representative e.g. referred to Limbu oral tradition to bring about the 
same point stating: 
(…) we use these terms during our funeral rites. We say we have 
brought this water from Tista and Arun [rivers] and the mountain and 
the sea and give this to you [i.e. to the soul of deceased]. (…) we can 
proudly claim the historical boundaries [of Limbuwan] by referring 
to these chants. 106 
                                                
105 Interview with Limbu historian and KYC central member, Ilam, September 2010. 
106 Interview with KYC member and historian, Ilam, September 2010. 
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Hence, the concrete and presumably lasting character of the Teesta and 
Arun/Dudhkoshi river valleys provides a substance to the bordering of 
Limbuwan that cuts across time and connects distant - even mythical - 
history with present-day politics. 
This territorialisation of Limbuwan across history is also 
repeated in contemporary political practice. The Federal Limbuwan 
State Council (Lingden) has e.g. organised a range of marches that 
trace out specific lines in the landscape of Limbuwan.107 One march, 
e.g. led to the Koshi river barrage. Here the south-eastern corner of 
Limbuwan territory was marked out by placing flags on the barrage 
structure and connections to the contemporary territorial politics were 
emphasised with the burning of symbols of the “unitary state” by the 
river (see photo below). Another march made its way from the plains 
town Itahari and up to a place near Dharan at the edge of the hills. 
Here, Bijaypur, an ancient capital of the Sen Empire is supposed to 
have been. According to Chemjong, the Sen Empire relied strongly on 
the Limbus and it is therefore included in contemporary references to 
Limbuwan. What is striking about these two marches is the way in 
which they are only intelligible if seen in relation to the ‘indigenous’ 
history of Limbuwan. They support the notion of academic politics as 
they rely, fundamentally, on a certain level of ‘ethnic’ fluency in the 
territorial history of Limbuwan to be understood. 
                                                
107 My description of these marches relies on information and pictures received 
from Kumar Lingden, the leader of FLSC (Lingden) whom I interviewed in 
Kathmandu in the autumn of 2011. 
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Illustration 8: The FLSC rally to the Koshi barrage. Photo by Kumar Lingden. 
 
Connections to indigenous history come up repeatedly even 
when I interviewed Limbu representatives explicitly about 
contemporary territorial politics. When I e.g. asked the leader of the 
political party Federal Limbuwan State Council,108 Kumar Lingden, 
about the most recent developments in the parliamentary politics of 
federalism his answer was one long reference to eighteenth century 
Nepal: 
(…) Nepal was a federal country in history. (…) So, what we are 
going to now, federalisation of Nepal, is not actually new to Nepal. 
Nepal was, in the history, a federal country. At the same time, east of 
Saptakoshi-Arun land the name was Limbuwan and it was a federal 
state. In Bikram Sambat 1831, 1780-something, the Gorkha king’s 
army and Limbuwan’s army fought on the bank of the Arun river and 
the war was equal and, at final, a treaty was done between Limbuwan 
and the Gorkha king (…) in the treaty, the main condition was for 
Limbuwan to stay [as an] autonomous region, autonomous state. So, 
                                                
108 The Federal Limbuwan State Council (FLSC) is a Limbu-oriented political party. In 2008 FLSC 
split into two parties, one led by Lingden, the other by Palungwa. Only Lingden’s branch chose to 
contest the Constituent Assembly (CA) elections and did so under the Federal Democratic National 
Forum (FDNF) – an ’umbrella’ party for ethnic/federal groups. The FDNF won 2 seats in the 601 
seat in the CA one of which was given to the FLSC (see e.g. International Crisis Group, 2011). 
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(…) Limbuwan was an autonomous state (…) 1780-1960 (…). And, 
around 1960, ’65, the late king Gyanendra’s father, Mahendra, he 
captured all power and dismissed the treaty of Limbuwan and Nepal. 
Then, finally Limbuwan was “uniterised” and that is just 40 years 
ago. So, in the blood of the Limbuwani people, they feel: we are 
different people from Nepal because we have the specific history, 
unconquerable or undefeated history, and Limbu and the Limbuwani 
… I feel, in my blood, this my blood is federal blood, because we 
have a long history of federalism and Limbuwan, our blood is 
undefeated blood – so, we are fighting for not “free Limbuwan”, but 
“autonomous state Limbuwan”, inside Nepal. 109 
The treaty Lingden mentions, made in 1774 between the Gorkha 
conqueror Prithvi Narayan Shah and a number of Limbu chiefs, is 
probably the most frequent historic reference evoked as a support for 
the historic existence and present day viability of Limbuwan as a 
separate, ‘indigenous’ territory. The treaty today is taken as signifying 
the opposition between the Limbus and the high-caste Hindu rulers of 
central Nepal, the bravery of the Limbus, and the relative autonomy of 
Limbuwan from the Gorkha empire it was made part of in the late-
eighteenth century. The narrative of the treaty furthermore carries 
substantial academic authority, as it has been treated not only by 
Chemjong, but also by major academic figures such as the Nepali 
social scientist, Mahesh Chandra Regmi (1978)  and the Indian Nepali 
historian Kumar Pradhan (1991). In Regmi’s translation, the central 
part of the treaty text reads as follows – written from the perspective of 
the Gorkha emperors: 
Although we have conquered your country by dint of our valor, we 
have afforded you and your kinsmen protection. We hereby pardon 
all of your crimes, and confirm all the customs and traditions, rights 
                                                
109 Interview with Kumar Lingden, Kathmandu, September 2011. 
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and privileges of your country. … Enjoy the land from generation to 
generation, as long as it remains in existence. … In case we 
confiscate your lands … may our ancestral gods destroy our 
kingdom. (Regmi, 1978, p. 540) 
In the academic/political discourse on Limbuwan the treaty is 
seen both as the institution of Limbuwan as an autonomous area – often 
likened in character to the autonomy of a future federal state – and as a 
confirmation of Limbuwan as an “ancestral land”110 “being enjoyed 
since the time of forefathers” (K. Pradhan, 1991, p. 204). The treaty 
thus comes to signify both an ancient, indigenous rooting of the 
Limbus in Limbuwan and the (second) birth of Limbuwan as an 
autonomous area. As reflected in Kumar Lingden’s argument quoted 
above, the treaty provides a turning point around which Nepal can be 
described as having a history of federalism and Limbuwan in turn can 
be described as an ‘indigenous’ and ‘autonomous’ territory. Hence, 
together with the discourse on kipat described below, the story of the 
treaty supports the argument that the federal state-like autonomy of 
Limbuwan is actually the historical norm – from which only the last 
40-so years, following the abolishment of kipat, differ.  
‘Indigenous’ Rooting: Kipat and Limbu Connections to the Land 
The specific land tenure arrangement called kipat is one of the main 
references in academic publications on eastern Nepal and the Limbus. 
Kipat is also an important point I the contemporary academic politics 
of Limbuwan. As I argue in the following, the way in which the notion 
of kipat has been brought out and interpreted within the academic 
literature facilitates the contemporary making of Limbuwan as an 
‘indigenous’ place. 
                                                
110 Interview with Arjun Limbu, Kathmandu, September 2010. 
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Kipat is typically described as a ‘communal’ form of land tenure 
practiced until the land reforms in the late 1960’s.111 While a number of 
‘indigenous’ groups have, most likely, been practicing kipat (see e.g. 
Regmi, 1978) it is today most strongly associated with the Limbus 
(possibly somewhat due to Caplan’s book). The practice is seen as 
‘communal’ in the sense that kipat land is regarded as inalienable from 
the local ‘indigenous’ community. Only members of this community 
can own kipat land although they can give the land in lease to other 
groups in exchange for loans. As opposed to other forms of land tenure, 
the tax paid on kipat to the central state is based on landholding 
households rather than the actual area of usable land (see e.g. Caplan, 
1970, 1991, 2000; Forbes, 1996; Regmi, 1978). As a ‘head-tax’ rather 
than a ‘land-tax’, kipat thus exemplifies the limited reach central 
control over the territory in eastern Nepal until well into the twentieth 
century. 
The book by Lionel Caplan, that I encountered in Mohan’s shop, 
appears as one of the main academic references on the local politics of 
kipat tenure in eastern Nepal (Caplan, 2000).112 Before Caplan, Regmi 
also wrote extensively on kipat in relation to his research on land 
tenure systems in Nepal (Regmi, 1978, pp. chapters VII-XI) and a 
couple of (the few) later studies of eastern Nepal continue the focus on 
kipat (Caplan, 1991; Forbes, 1996; parts of Jones, 1976).  Hence, the 
discourse on kipat bears a substantial academic authority in Nepal and 
a (critical) Nepali scholar in 1996 noted that, “of the many works 
published by foreign anthropologists on Nepal, Lionel Caplan’s (…) is 
                                                
111 According to Forbes, kipat was actually practiced as late as 1994 in some areas of eastern Nepal 
due to the slow progression of the cadastral surveys needed to implement the land reforms (see 
Forbes, 1996). 
112 Several of my informants, for instance, immediately connected Caplan’s study to the notion of 
kipat when it came up in our conversations. 
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one of the most widely read” (Dahal, 1996, p. 50). At the same time, 
kipat shows up repeatedly in Limbu claims to territory and federal 
autonomy. Between academic texts and territorial claims kipat goes 
beyond simply signifying a specific relationship of tenure and taxation 
between the rulers in central Nepal and the people living in the eastern 
periphery (see e.g. Forbes, 1996, p. 40). The notion of kipat also roots 
the Limbus deeply in the soil of Limbuwan signifying the Limbus’ 
ancient ‘indigenous’ relationship to the land as well as their political 
autonomy from the rest of Nepal up to the land reforms in the late 
1960’s.113 
In most of his book, Caplan maintains a traditional 
anthropological village focus and his descriptions of the relationship 
between kipat and ancestral land is thus restricted to concrete local 
kinship networks. Later appropriations of the study, though, seem to 
have broadened this focus and kipat has come to be related more 
broadly to the Limbus as an ‘indigenous’ group. This perspective is 
also evident in Caplan’s own later writing e.g. in an article from 1991 
where he states that: 
(…) the Limbus shared a conception of land as held by countless 
indigenous or tribal peoples around the world, for whom membership 
in the community generates an attitude to the land which is 
antecedent to the working of it (…). Kipat was thus more than a 
system of land tenure; it was the basis of Limbu identity as a people. 
(Caplan, 1991, pp. 312-313) 
Here, Caplan connects kipat not only to Limbu identity, but to a 
supposedly global identity of indigenous peoples. Such global 
connections have recently been re-emphasised in relation to the global 
                                                
113 Forbes describes something similar with regards to kipat among the Yamphu Rai stating that,“as 
a symbol expressing the past glory of their ancestors, kipat was part of a narrative that links the 
Yamphu Rai to their past and to the lands on which that past has unfolded” (Forbes, 1996, p. 39). 
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environmental crisis, where the ‘indigenous’ link between Limbus and 
Limbuwan soil associated with kipat is presented as an “indigenous 
system of sustainable conservation” and preservation of natural 
resources (see e.g. Chettri, Shakya, & Sharma, 2008; Maden, Kongren, 
& Limbu, 2009; Mishra, 2003, p. 125). 
With the connection between the indigeneity of the Limbus and 
kipat established, the gradual takeover of land by high-caste Hindu 
money-lenders described in detail by Caplan (and criticised by Dahal, 
1996) and the final abolishment of kipat with the 1968 land reforms, 
becomes not only a loss of land, but a loss of culture. In the new 
postscript to a second edition of Caplan’s book,114 he states that:  
(…) the loss of kipat represented not simply a material loss, for kipat 
exceeded its own materiality. With its abolition, the Limbus were 
denied a part of their past and so, inevitably, of their sense of 
continuity in the present. Kipat provided a means of belonging, to a 
place and a distinctive community – the one was not separable from 
the other. (Caplan, 2000, pp. 211-212) 
Often seen in connection with the Limbu-Gorkha treaty, the 
notion distinct community of kipat-holders (kipatiya) furthermore 
comes to signify a position of relative autonomy from the centre. The 
president of KYC, Arjun Limbu, e.g. formulated that “we consider the 
kipat as some remnant of the autonomy of what they have been 
practicing over there [i.e. in Limbuwan].”115 Such a description of kipat 
is also echoed in discussions on local governance where it is described 
as an ‘indigenous’ practice of local governance and grass-root 
                                                
114 Published in 2000 by Himal Books. Himal Books is part of The Himal Association, “a 
Kathmandu Valley-based not-for-profit organisation established with the objective of informing the 
Nepali people of various issues, local, national and international, to help them become aware and 
responsible national and global citizens” (www.himalassociation.org). The book was reprinted again 
in 2002 and 2007. 
115 Interview with Arjun Limbu, Kathmandu, September 2010. 
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democracy suitable for the development of Nepal (see e.g. Bhattachan, 
2002). With this in mind, the abolishment of kipat signifies not also the 
loss of land, but with that a loss of both culture and historical autonomy 
by the hands of the central state personified by king Mahendra. Kipat 
thus brings out a position of opposition vis-à-vis high-caste Hindus. For 
both Caplan and some of my informants the practice of kipat indicated 
more of an inverse relationship of power between ‘indigenous’ Limbus 
and high caste Brahmins and Chettris than what is found in national 
politics. As such, the cultural uprooting emphasised by Caplan in 
relation to the abolishment of kipat comes to signify an extension of 
Hindu dominance even into the formerly ‘autonomous’ areas of 
Limbuwan.  
The various elements in the discourse on kipat obviously 
resonate with both global and regional notions of indigeneity. In 
Caplan’s language, the notion of a unique connection to the land, a 
rooting of the Limbus in the landscape of Limbuwan is prominent. It 
brings out exactly the point about indigeneity that Liisa Malkki has 
reminded us about – that it operates through an imagination of solid, 
typically arboreal roots within a specific soil (Malkki, 1992). As 
notions of indigeneity have increasingly informed Nepali politics since 
1990, this element in the discourse of kipat is important. It now fits 
perfectly not only with globalised notions of indigeneity, but with the 
Nepali state definition of who are indigenous (janaj!ti) as the 
communities “who have a separate collective cultural identity; (…) are 
traditionally located in particular geographic regions;  [and] who do not 
have [an] influential role in the modern politics and state governance of 
Nepal” (cited in Onta, 2006, pp. 311-312). In one national definition of 
indigeneity, kipat has even slipped in as a possible defining criteria 
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(Onta, 2006, p. 311). The discourse on kipat thus contributes to the 
making of Limbuwan as an ‘indigenous’ place justifying Limbuwan as 
a future federal state. 
Conclusion: Bordering Politics, Raising Awareness 
In summary, even in the contemporary conjuncture of governmental 
transition and political shifts, there seems to be a certain structuring of 
the way in which the politics of territorial reorganisation and place-
making is taking place. As I show above, languages of ethnic and 
developmental differentiation are currently being refashioned and 
recombined in novel ways. And as I have argued with regards to 
Limbuwan, one of the important assemblages that are emerging out of 
these shifts in the politics of difference is the glocal indigenous place. 
In this assemblage, the academic treatment of ‘ethnic’ culture and 
history originating from local as well as international scholars attains a 
political life. Academic narratives are circulated in full or in bits and 
pieces, physically and electronically, with or without references. This 
circulation builds up a language of ethnic difference that enables claims 
for a Limbuwan state to resonate strikingly with globalised as well as 
nationally translated notions of indigeneity. The ability to strike this 
note repeatedly in a on-going academic politics obviously helps to 
empower the demand for a Limbuwan federal state in the present 
conjuncture of Naya Nepal. 
The contemporary politics of difference is, in other words, 
enabling for claims to local autonomy through glocal ‘indigenous’ 
place-making in a sense that was not possible one or two decades ago. 
However, this politics is also bordered in, at least, two senses.  
Firstly, the academic politics of indigeneity involve, as I argue 
above, a certain notion of ethnic fluency. In order to engage in 
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contemporary politics, one needs to be able to speak about history and 
culture in a certain way. Ethnic fluency, in other words, borderes 
politics. It is beyond the scope of this study to evaluate strictly how 
hard this border is today, but we can note certain ressonances with the 
continued language of developmental difference and awareness. More 
or less across the bord, all the ethnic representatives that I talked with 
during my fieldwork brought out notions of a loss of culture and lack of 
awareness among their ‘ethnic kin’. They, consequently saw it as one 
of the main tasks of their organisations to “raise awareness” about their 
indigenous history, culture, language etc. The knowledge that they 
sought to distribute was often, like the physical distribution of Caplan’s 
book illustrates, an academic re-construction of supposedly lost history 
and culture. This notion of rasing awareness directly relates to the 
developmental differentiation of people and places as developed in and 
around Panchayat and contemporary schooling (Fujikura, 2001). 
Hence, while remote localities and the people living there are, in one 
sense, cast as authentic, they continue in another sense to be “unaware” 
– lacking the fluency of a specific, valued form of ethnic knowledge. 
Secondly, the politics of Limbuwan that I have studied is stongly 
territorialised by the national border even though it relies on a history 
that both pre-dates and streches across this border. Although the 
contemporary politics are focused on claims to more local autonomy, 
the longer history of Limbuwan describes a movement from state 
evasion towards state legibility. Today, claims are obviously directed 
towards the national centre. When the end of the CA tenure approached 
in May 2012, the FLSC and other Limbuwan organisations put their 
marches along the historic lines of Limbuwan on hold and began 
marching around the ring-road of Kathmandu. As this physcial 
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movement indicates, gaining more say in local matters has become a 
question to discuss with Kathmandu and not a matter that builds 
connections across the border.  
Many of the ‘ethnic’ representatives I talked to signaled 
sympathy towards the Gorkhaland movement. However, in spite of the 
common goal of local autonomy, none of them had made connections 
to organisations across the border. In the replies I got from them, it was 
obvious that although the border allows free movement of people, it 
does not allow the movement of “politics”. I was told of multiple 
familial and social relations, but not of “political”. Hence, the national 
border doubled as a border between what was considered “personal” or 
“social” and what was considered “political”. On the other side, in 
Darjeeling, I got similar signals. As one representative told me, they 
did not dare make too many connections with similar organisations 
across the border, as that would put them in danger of being associated 
with supposed Maoist activity in Nepal. In their quests for autonomy, 
the Limbuwan and Gorkhaland movement thus turn their backs to each 
other and their fronts towards the national centres reinforcing the 
national border that runs through the landscape.116 
In closing, the contemporary politics of territorial reorganisation 
and glocal place-making appear both enabling and limiting for claims 
to local autonomy in Nepal. A report published by the Carter Center in 
2010 based partly on survey data states that:  
citizens who support federalism tend to associate it with 
decentralisation of power and hope that government will be brought 
closer to the people, allowing for greater access to the state, more 
                                                
116 As Srirupa Roy suggests for India, this illustrates a certain historic dynamic 
where the nation-states of South Asia are brought together around a shared 
orientation towards the developmentalist state (S. Roy, 2007). 
Ethnic Fluency in Naya Nepal 
 162 
accountable discision-making, improved service delivery, an end to 
disciminatory practices, and more equitable representation. (The 
Carter Center, 2010) 
The report also describes “strong and consistent sentiments in favour” 
of “ethnic based federalism” among the Limbus in the Eastern Hills. In 
what light does the contemporary politics of difference place these 
aspirations? My analysis suggest that the academic politics of 
difference, on the one hand, facilitates strong claims to ethnic 
federalism based on glocal indigenous place-making. The question, 
however, is whether this politics will bring government “closer to the 
people” giving them “greater access to the state”. With the centralised 
politics of constitution-writing stalled, this obviously remains an open 
question. Nonetheless, the way in which fluency of a specific language 
of ethnic difference borders contemporary politics poses obvious risks. 
What might happen is simply a reorganisation of people into the 
familiar developmental categories of “aware” and “backward” citizens. 
And if the bordering of politics along lines of ethnic fluency continues, 
these categories of people will inevitably have very different amounts 
of say in a local politics that is still largely directed towards the 
national governmental centre.  
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Chapter 7: ‘Ruly Hills’ 
As described in chapter four, the governmental gaze of the British 
colonisers in northern India was fundamentally shaped by a distinction 
between the plains and the hills. Civilisation was equated with 
sedentary settlement and seen as the necessary basis for a uniform 
government. The hills, on the other hand, inhabited by less civilised, 
slash-and-burn farming tribals, were seen as spaces of exception - areas 
“not yet suited” for the same government as the plains. As the 
government of the subcontinent was handed over the new national elite, 
these notions of exceptionalism continued to characterise the 
government of the hills in north eastern India. The internal 
governmental border of the ‘Inner Line’ separating the settled plains 
areas from the savage hills under British rule continued to shape the 
governmental gaze of independent India (Baruah, 2005, p. 37; Maaker 
& Joshi, 2007, pp. 381-382). Even today, a notion of the ‘unruly hills’ 
in need of special governmental measures dominates the political 
discourse (Karlsson, 2011). The north-eastern hills are typically 
represented in a discourse of “nameless ‘insurgencies’” and counter-
insurgencies (Baruah, 2005, p. vii). And while sympathies are 
obviously split between the ‘rebels’ and police, the common language 
of engagement is usually one of exception and disorder. 
Within this political landscape, where the distinction between 
hills and plains also divides governmental intervention, the Darjeeling 
area is situated in an ambivalent position. Although periodically 
referred to in the language of unruliness, this area is predominately 
represented through references to a more distant past, a selective 
memory of the colonial hill station. In this representation, the hills are 
marked more in terms of harmony than unruliness. Jungled hills full of 
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armed insurgents and home-made bombs vie for the image of the tea 
garden’s neat rows of lush green bushes and the puffing sound of the 
steam-driven old Toy Train making its way towards Darjeeling town. 
In these ‘ruly’ hills, pre-independence past and present commercial 
endeavours blend so seamlessly that national rupture of 1947 and the 
in-between interruptions of the Gorkhaland insurgency apparently 
disappear from view. Here, we are neither in the supposedly uniform 
national space of village India nor in the ‘unruly’ hills of the nearby 
areas. But, where are we then? 
In this chapter I take up exactly this question: Where is 
Darjeeling? Obviously, “where” is not to be understood, here, in the 
established sense eliciting answers such as “in northern West Bengal, 
India” or “at X latitude and Y longitude” etc. Rather, I seek to examine 
the spatial practices and representations that have historically 
positioned the Darjeeling area in relation to the governmental gaze of 
the colonial and post-colonial state. More specifically, I am interested 
in exploring the position of the Darjeeling area in relation to the 
multiple, divergent meanings that have been attached to hills and plains 
in the intersection between colonial and post-colonial government. As 
distinctions of place and landscape have obviously informed the 
government of colonial and national territory, asking the simple spatial 
question “where” brings out underlying dynamics that shape the area’s 
position in the political landscape (see Ludden, 2005b). 
Village India 
As introduced in chapter four, the process of sedentary settlement 
across the subcontinent fed into the production of a distinct normative 
landscape across late colonial and post-colonial India – a framework of 
belonging, identity, and difference that posed a distinct landscape and a 
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distinct form of settlement in this landscape as the norm. Across 
‘territorial colonialism’ and post-colonial developmentalism, this 
normative landscape was largely shaped in the image of the settled 
agrarian village of the plains and thus excluded the ‘wild’ hills of the 
north east as well as the more ‘ruly’ hills of Darjeeling. (cf. Inden, 
2000, pp. 131-157; Ludden, 1993). 
In the nationalist discourse of Nehru, Gandhi and Ambedkar, 
exactly the image of the rural, sedentary village of the plains emerges 
as a sort of microcosm representing “real” India (Gandhi, 2010; 
Jodhka, 2002; Nehru, 1998). While, as Guha suggests, this image 
probably co-developed with the sedentarisation taking place only 
during late colonial rule, in the national discourse the generic village 
becomes an image of how the Indian peasant is “wedded to the soil 
from immemorial generations” (Nehru, 1998, p. 53). The generic 
village, thus, enables Nehru to speak of Bharat Mata (mother India) in 
the language of an ancient, agricultural connection to the soil, to speak 
of the present in the language of rural backwardness, and to speak of 
the future in terms of economic development (Khilnani, 1997; Nehru, 
1998; S. Roy, 2007) – images repeatedly recycled in school textbooks 
and official discourse at least till the late 1980’s (Advani, 1996, 2009; 
Inden, 2000; Muley & Sharma, 1987; S. Roy, 2007). 
In Indian national discourse, the idyllic but backward village 
enabled a representation of the space of the nation as relatively 
homogenous. As Srirupa Roy suggests in her study if Nehruvian India: 
The homogenous configuration of the nation-state as a space peopled 
by identical, substitutable individuals would be enabled in the Indian 
context by the discourse of needs rather than the discourse of rights 
or of cultural commonalities (S. Roy, 2007, p. 114). 
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The discourse of economic development, facilitated by a ‘state-
representing-the-nation’ (Chatterjee, 1986, p. 168), thus enabled the 
representation of Indian national space through the uniform image of 
the backward village (Ludden, 1992; S. Roy, 2007).117 In turn, 
initiatives such as the massive state-led Community Development 
Programme initiated in 1952, honed the governmental vision of the 
state to see the agricultural, rural village as the generic object of 
intervention.118 Hence, the generic village enabled a centralised state 
legibility of the landscape in much the same way as the normalbaum 
enabled the centralised legibility of German scientific forestry in James 
Scott’s account (1998, pp. 11-22). As a later civics textbook tells the 
story (see also illustration below): 
The aim of the Community Development Programme is to develop 
the villages which depends on three factors: (i) increase in the 
production of the crop and other commodities produced in the area; 
(ii) total development of the rural people; and (iii) cooperation of the 
villagers in rural development. (Muley & Sharma, 1987, p. 13) 
Consequently, Nehruvian developmentalism crucially supported the 
representation of Indian national space as a relatively homogenous 
landscape of backward, rural, sedentary villages producing a distinct 
landscape of identification for the new nation.  
                                                
117 Within this vision, even issues of social differentiation, such as the question of 
untouchability, are translated into the language of development because, as the 
textbooks states, “as long as these people are considered inferior, we cannot get 
their full cooperation in the programmes for the progress of our country” (Muley & 
Sharma, 1987, p. 11). 
118 The village was, in fact, such an important figure of spatial imagination in early 
post-colonial India that the constituent assembly even discussed whether the village 
should be primary unit of the Indian polity instead of the individual (Jodhka, 2002, 
p. 3344). 
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Illustration 9: Telling the villagers about development (Muley & Sharma, 1987, p. 
14) 
 
Where does this image leave the forests and hills in relation to 
the normative, national landscape of the agrarian village of the plains? 
As Guha suggests, the sweep of sedentary settlement moulded large 
areas of the subcontinent in the image of the agrarian village (see also 
Bhattacharya, 2012). The “north-eastern and north-western boundaries 
of the empire” were, however, an exception – the last “no-go areas” of 
the twentieth century (S. Guha, 1999, pp. 4, 200). Here, the division 
between hills and plains was in fact legally solidified. In 1873 an ‘Inner 
Line’ was introduced “drawn along the foothills”, a line that 
distinguished the settled plains areas that were to be governed normally 
from the “backward” and “frontier” tracts of the hills in need of a 
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different sort of management (Baruah, 1999, pp. 28-29). The notion of 
the timeless tribal and the consequent paternalist approach of the 
colonial state left these areas in a position of isolation that, according to 
Guha, was in fact unprecedented (S. Guha, 1999, p. 201; Sonntag, 
1999).  
The legislative institutionalisation of the exceptionalism attached 
to the north-eastern hills of the subcontinent was maintained across 
colonial and post-colonial government. In the 1874 Scheduled Districts 
Act, and the 1919 and 1935 Government of India Acts, these areas 
were designated as ‘scheduled districts’, ‘backward tracts’, and 
‘excluded’ or ‘partially excluded’ areas. The significance of these 
designations was that the common rules and regulations of the raj did 
not automatically apply. What Gait referred to as government “in a 
simpler and more personal manner” essentially meant that the areas 
were placed under the direct administration of the British governor of 
the province in which they were situated. Furthermore, when a limited 
degree of public representation was introduced into the legislative 
councils of the raj from 1909 onwards, these areas were excluded from 
this representation (Baruah, 1999, p. 37). From 1935 and well into the 
governmental history of independent India, the issue of these areas was 
taken up under what became known as ‘the tribal question’. Splitting 
public opinion between paternal protectionism and developmental 
upliftment, these discussions re-emphasised the exceptional character 
of the hills leading to the constitution of independent India’s 
designation of them as ‘scheduled’ and ‘tribal’ areas under the fifth and 
sixth schedule. By law, these areas were to be managed differently 
from the rest of the country.  
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As I argue in the following, the colonial moulding of the Indian 
landscape in terms of large scale practices of encouraged sedentary 
settlement, the accompanying normative representation of the 
landscape in the image of the agrarian village, and the contrasting 
representation of the north-eastern hills in terms of timeless tribal 
isolation circumscribe Darjeeling’s position in the post-colonial 
political landscape. As independence arrived, the position of Darjeeling 
in this landscape was conditioned by a range of negotiations taking 
place in relation to the production of a bordered and organised national 
territory. However, these negotiations (of the partition of the 
subcontinent and the following reorganisation of states within an Indian 
union) largely took place outside Darjeeling and outside the influence 
of people living there, in the centres of Calcutta and Delhi. Here, in a 
period of substantial uncertainty, self-interested political negotiations 
defaulted on existing lines of territorial distinction. As a result, 
Darjeeling’s territorial future was wedded to West Bengal, while the 
area’s position in the political landscape, and the meaning attached to it 
as a place, continued to be ambiguous: it was neither part of ‘village 
India’ nor the ‘unruly’ hills of the north-east. 
Colonialism and National Territorialisation of the Political Landscape 
The transition from British to Indian rule obviously involved a range of 
territorial negotiations, most importantly the partition of the 
subcontinent and the following reorganisation of states within the 
Indian union.  In a sense, this period could be seen as one of 
extraordinary openness to territorial restructuring. It was, indeed, a 
period in which a multitude of different suggestions for the Darjeeling 
area were brought up. However, existing territorial borders and 
political arrangements under British, rule in fact, largely determined the 
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role of the Darjeeling area in these complex political negotiations. In 
the end, Darjeeling ended up as the northern-most territorial outcrop of 
the West Bengal state – territorially detached from the rest of the state 
between 1947 and 1956.  
In Bengal, the British partition plan was based on a (limited) 
Indian participation through the Bengal legislative assembly. Out of the 
250 members of this assembly, only two were elected from Darjeeling 
(Dasgupta, 1999, p. 61) while the two major parties, the Indian 
National Congress and the Muslim League had 86 and 113 members 
respectively.119 In a situation surrounded by a great uncertainty as to 
where the borderline would eventually be drawn, the ensuing 
negotiations were narrowly focused on the claims of core constituency 
areas for the main political players (Chatterji, 1999, 2007). In these 
discussions, the role of Darjeeling was that of “a glittering prize” rather 
than an essential part of the negotiations. The area, after all, produced 
“practically all of India’s finest teas” and was therefore “potentially a 
significant source of revenue for the new state” (Chatterji, 2007, p. 48). 
Consequently, Darjeeling was claimed by six out of seven ‘non-
Muslim’ proposals as well as by the Muslim League who, apparently, 
even had the Pakistani flag raised over Darjeeling town hall from 14-18 
August 1947 (see Chatterji, 1999, pp. 197-200; 2007, p. 51; Schendel, 
2005, p. 52n27).  
Albeit largely isolated from the negotiation process, the territorial 
position of the Darjeeling area was, nonetheless, affected by partition. 
As the borderline was drawn, the ensuing arrangement not only split 
East Pakistan from West Bengal. The former colonial state of Bengal - 
                                                
119 One of the Darjeeling MLAs, Damber Singh Gurung of the All India Gorkha 
League, went on to become the only ‘Gorkha’ in the Constituent Assembly. 
‘Ruly Hills’ 
 171 
along with the Sylhet area of colonial Assam120 - was in fact divided 
into four major pieces121 (Schendel, 2005, pp. 43-44): East Bengal (that 
joined Pakistan in 1947), West Bengal (that joined India in 1947), 
Tripura (a princely state that joined India in 1949), and North Bengal 
(comprising the districts of Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri that joined India 
in 1947 and the princely state of Cooch Behar that joined India in 
1950). Out of these, North Bengal was administratively part of West 
Bengal, but territorially cut off from the rest of the state until the States 
Reorganisation Act in 1956. Centred on existing lines of territorial 
division and systems of political representation, the partition 
negotiations placed Darjeeling and the other northern areas in a 
territorially separate, passive and “quasi-colonial” relationship with the 
political core around Calcutta (Chatterji, 2007, pp. 51-52). 
Although the ‘core-constituency’ focus of the Bengal partition 
negotiations and the general national emphasis on Hindu-Muslim lines 
of division largely overshadows other discussions, this territorial 
arrangement for Darjeeling wasn’t the only option out there at the time. 
As mentioned above, the Muslim league e.g. suggested that Darjeeling 
should be a part of East Pakistan and Assamese politicians also 
encouraged “anti-Bengali movements in north Bengal” in the context 
of partition (Chatterji, 2007, p. 48n68). In Darjeeling, various alliances 
between British planters and Nepali elites had, already from 1907 
onwards, led to a series of proposals for separation from Bengal (see 
e.g. Dasgupta, 1999; T. B. Subba, 1992). As partition drew closer, 
association with Assam was seen as a favourable option in these 
circles. In 1930, the newly formed Hillmens Association suggested 
                                                
120 See (Ludden, 2003a) for an earlier history of the Sylhet border. 
121 And no less than 197 smaller enclaves – 74 Pakistani ones located within Indian 
territory, and 123 Indian ones located in Pakistani territory (Schendel, 2005, p. 43). 
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separation from Bengal, backed by Assamese politicians and favoured 
by the tea planters “who saw advantages in having their estates in the 
less volatile province of Assam, safe from the communist menace” of 
West Bengal (Chatterji, 2007, p. 48n68). Among the intellectual middle 
class, Parasmani Pradhan and others spoke against this option, focusing 
instead on the more introspective agenda of ‘jati improvement’ 
including the promotion of Nepali language and some measures of 
regional autonomy within West Bengal (Dasgupta, 1999, p. 59; Onta, 
1996b). 
After partition, the list of propositions only grew longer. In 1949, 
the All India Gorkha League proposed the formation of a separate 
provincial legislature (i.e. a new state within the Indian union to be) 
called ‘Uttarakhand’.122 The area of this legislature was left open to 
include anywhere between just the existing Darjeeling district and all 
of Darjeeling, Sikkim, Jalpaiguri, Dooars, and Coochbehar (T. B. 
Subba, 1992, pp. 86-89). Later, in 1952, the League also proposed 
setting up Darjeeling as a Union Territory (M. P. Lama, 1996, p. 10). In 
a more radical vein, two local leaders of the (undivided) Communist 
Party of India (CPI), even suggested the formation of an independent 
state of ‘Gorkhasthan’ comprising all of Nepal, Darjeeling and the 
southern parts of Sikkim. This long range of options illustrates that the 
position of Darjeeling within the new political landscape of the 
emerging national territory was rather ‘unsettled’. Although important 
territorial decisions were made in relation to Darjeeling during 
partition, these did not involve any new, national ascription of meaning 
to Darjeeling as a place in this landscape.  
                                                
122 Not to be confused with the 27th Indian state formed as ’Uttaranchal’ in 2000 
and renamed ’Uttarakhand’ in 2007. 
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After partition, the question of reorganising the territory of 
independent India quickly re-surfaced. Between 1953 and 1956 a 
complex negotiation process took place in the purview of the States 
Reorganisation Commission (Franda, 1968, pp. 8-61). During these 
negotiations a broad range of different options for the reorganisation of 
West Bengal were taken up. However, although petitions continued to 
come in from North Bengal and Darjeeling, the fate of this area is 
hardly mentioned in relation to these negotiations. Judging from the 
language of the report and Marcus Franda’s detailed description of the 
negotiation process (Franda, 1968; States Reorganisation Commission, 
1955) the main reason seems to be that the existing states – inherited 
from the British colonial administrations – were taken as the ultimate 
reference point framing the discussions. In the Bengal area, the 
reorganisation wasn’t seen as a fundamental restructuring, but rather as 
an adjustment of the borders between existing states. Thus in the 
discussions as well as the final report, the perspectives of the existing 
states were foregrounded and personified to the extent that the report 
even refers to the feelings of West Bengal (States Reorganisation 
Commission, 1955, p. 174). 
Overall, the issue of reorganisation was cast as a question of 
negotiating territorial demands between the existing states of Bihar and 
West Bengal so as to allow ‘mainland’ West Bengal access to and 
control over the northern districts that were included in the state after 
partition.123 Within this framework, the recent “dismemberment” of 
(West) Bengal during partition was seen as an important background 
event and the claims to Darjeeling from both Assam and Bihar were 
                                                
123 This focus even led to a period in the discussion where a full merger of the two 
states was considered as a solution (Franda, 1968, pp. 36-51). 
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quickly dismissed (Dasgupta, 1999, p. 61; see map in Franda, 1968, p. 
23; States Reorganisation Commission, 1955, pp. 171, 192). Darjeeling 
and north Bengal were by now seen as a part of West Bengal, and the 
main problem related to the area as one of making the state “a compact 
and integrated unit” (States Reorganisation Commission, 1955, p. 172). 
This problem was, furthermore, approached from the spatial 
perspective of Calcutta: Since “the northern districts of the Presidency 
division have become less accessible from Calcutta” after partition, the 
solution should enable “West Bengal (…) to control road traffic with 
Darjeeling and other places in the North” (States Reorganisation 
Commission, 1955, pp. 172, 175 – my emphasis).  
With the dry statement that, “the continued isolation of the 
northern districts from the rest of West Bengal will tend to foster and 
accentuate separatist trends in these districts” (States Reorganisation 
Commission, 1955, p. 175) the States Reorganisation Commission  
repeated the partition negotiations’ relegation of the area to the 
periphery of territorial decision-making. As the discussion across the 
two territorial reorganisations illustrate, the attachment of meaning to 
Darjeeling and its surroundings as places was still unsettled. However, 
as the following section argues, the territorialisation of the political 
landscape into the separate states of West Bengal and Assam had 
important ramifications for the position of the Darjeeling area in 
relation to the ascription of ‘tribalness’ and the ensuing possibilities for 
various degrees of local autonomy. 
Darjeeling on the edge of the ‘Tribal Question’ 
In close relation to the discussions of territorial reorganisation, the 
question of a ‘tribal’ identity calling for special governmental 
arrangements for specific people and places was part of the constituent 
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assembly debates. The question of how best to handle ‘tribal’ 
population and areas within the emerging national territory was taken 
up and discussed in various committees and ultimately in the 
constituent assembly. Although thoroughly discussed, evidence for the 
Darjeeling area suggests that colonial territorial divisions and 
categorisations of ethnic difference again played a determining role. As 
the British administration had consistently regarded Darjeeling as 
separate from the wild hills of Assam, the question of Darjeeling 
‘tribalness’ ended up being judged in a different forum and following 
different criteria than that of the neighbouring areas to the east. Due to 
this, the special territorial arrangements implemented in Assam were 
not considered for Darjeeling. Here, like in the rest of the country, non-
territorial reservations and other privileges were seen as the solution. 
Hence, also in relation to the ‘tribal question’, Darjeeling ended up 
occupying a position somewhere in-between the major categories of 
national space – the agrarian village of the plains and the tribal 
settlements of the hills. 
When the Government of India Act introduced the designation of 
areas as ‘excluded’ and ‘partially excluded’ it raised “a storm in 
nationalist circles” (Ramachandra Guha, 1996, p. 2375). The initiative 
was seen as yet another way to divide and rule the Indian people. 
Between the passing of the Act in 1935 and the promulgation of the 
Indian constitution in 1950, this initial outrage introduced what was to 
be called the ‘Tribal Question’124 into discussions of the spatial and 
territorial organisation of colonial and independent India. Involving a 
                                                
124 Sometimes more negatively referred to as the ’Tribal Problem’. 
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mixture of politicians, social workers and academics125 the discussions 
about how best to handle the tribal population quickly crystallised into 
two camps. The ‘isolationists’ or ‘protectionists’, with the British 
anthropologist Verrier Elwin in the forefront, argued in favour of 
setting aside certain areas for the ‘tribal’ population in which they 
could practice their supposedly harmonious, wholesome, social life as 
they would ‘naturally’ do without interference from the state. The 
‘assimilationists’ or ‘interventionists’ led by the congress leader A. V. 
Thakkar and anthropologist G. S. Ghurye, on the other hand, posed the 
‘tribals’ as a ‘backward’ part of the population in need of ‘upliftment’ 
(Ramachandra Guha, 1996; R. Guha, 1999). 
After independence, the ‘tribal question’ was taken up in the 
context of two subcommittees under the Constituent Assembly. The 
“North East Frontier (Assam) Tribal and Excluded Areas Sub-
Committee” presided over by Gopinath Bordoloi was to provide 
recommendations for the Assam area while the “Excluded and Partially 
Excluded Areas (other than Assam) Sub-Committee” led by A. V. 
Thakkar was to recommend actions for areas outside of Assam 
designated as ‘excluded’ or ‘partially excluded’ under the Government 
of India Act. Hence, the territorial delineations of British colonial 
legislation provided the main frame for bringing discussions of the 
tribal question into the Constituent Assembly. The division of the tribal 
question into two sub-committees reflected the colonial designation of 
the north eastern areas (i.e. colonial Assam) as a fundamentally 
different place from the rest of India. 
                                                
125 Such as A. V. Thakkar (congress politician and social worker), Verrier Elwin 
(British Anthropologist ’gone native’), G. S. Ghurye (prominent Indian social 
anthropologist), see (Ramachandra Guha, 1996; R. Guha, 1999). 
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Obviously, the Bordoloi and the Thakkar committees applied 
very different approaches to the tribal question. Thakkar was 
thoroughly in the ‘assimilationist’ camp speaking against the territorial 
isolation of ’tribal’ communities which he saw as striking “at the root 
of national solidarity” (Ramachandra Guha, 1996, p. 2380) and 
regarding the ultimate goal of the regulations to be the ‘upliftment’ and 
incorporation of the ‘tribals’ into the national mainstream. Bordoloi, on 
the other hand, was – along with Nehru himself – much more in line 
with Elwin (Ramachandra Guha, 1996; R. Guha, 1999). With this in 
mind, it seems apparent that the geographical delineation of the 
committees and the choice of their chairmen was informed by a 
continued conception of the north-eastern hills as fundamentally 
different from the rest of the country – as was the results of the 
committees’ deliberations. As a joint report of the two committees 
expressed it: 
(…) we are of the view that although certain features are common to 
all these areas, yet the circumstances of the Assam Hill Districts are 
so different that radically different proposals have to be made for the 
areas of this Province.126 
They, in other words, clearly distinguished between measures 
appropriate for the Assamese hills and measures appropriate for the 
other ‘excluded’ and ‘partially excluded’ areas where “the degree of 
assimilation is on the whole greater”.127  
For the Assamese hills, the report recommended the setup of 
“special local councils” to provide a measure of local autonomy to the 
                                                
126 Constituent Assembly of India Debates, Vol 7, Part 1i. Available at 
http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/vol7p1i.htm (accessed August 2012). 
127 Constituent Assembly of India Debates, Vol 7, Part 1i. Available at 
http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/vol7p1i.htm (accessed August 2012). 
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tribal areas along with their continued exclusion from the normal acts 
and laws of the nation if deemed inappropriate. These 
recommendations were incorporated into the sixth schedule of the 
constitution in 1950. For the other provinces that had areas designated 
as ‘excluded’ or ‘partially excluded’ under the 1935 Government of 
India Act a range of non-territorial measures were instead suggested 
such as: 
proportionate representation for the tribals as a whole in the 
Legislature [as well as] the scheduling of certain areas as in need of 
special attention and in which the protection of land and the social 
organisation of the tribals is an indispensable need.128 
In contrast to the proposition for the Assamese hills, this involved 
treating “all persons of tribal origin as a single minority”. While the 
Assam area was thus seen as in need of certain measures of local 
territorial autonomy, the tribal population of the other provinces were 
mainly treated through non-territorial measures, expressed in the fifth 
schedule of the 1950 constitution. 
Evaluations of the ‘tribalness’ of the former ‘excluded’ and 
‘partially excluded’ areas obviously relied on the internal border of a 
territorial distinction between Assam and the rest of the country. 
Hence, the territorial settlement of Darjeeling as a part of West Bengal 
rather than Assam (as several groups had suggested) had important 
consequences for Darjeeling’s position as a ‘tribal area’. External 
territorial decision and the representation of Darjeeling as a place 
interacted. The consequence for Darjeeling was that its position in 
                                                
128 Constituent Assembly of India Debates, Vol 7, Part 1i. Available at 
http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/vol7p1i.htm (accessed August 2012). 
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relation to the ‘tribal question’ was taken up under the Thakkar 
committee rather than the Bordoloi committee. 
The Thakkar committee report highlights two basic features of 
the committee’s work with the Darjeeling area. Firstly, the discussion 
of the area fundamentally relies on designations made under British 
colonial rule. The very reason for taking up Darjeeling district in the 
committee is a direct reference to its designation as a ‘partially 
excluded’ area under the 1935 Government of Indian Act. The report 
notes that: 
The partial exclusion of Darjeeling was recommended by the 
[British] Govt. of Bengal not because it was considered a backward 
area but because it was felt that safeguards were necessary in the 
interests of the hill people. The fact that Darjeeling was the summer 
capital of the Government of Bengal and the existence of European 
tea-planters may have played some little part. 129 
Furthermore, while report recognises the presence of “141,301 tribes 
out of a total population of 376,369 in 1941,” it goes on to point out 
that the prominent “Gurkha” or “Nepalese” community is “not 
regarded as a backward tribe and the thirteenth schedule to the [1936] 
Govt. of India (Legislative Assemblies) Order does not include 
Gurkha.” The evaluation of both territory and population in the area 
thus explicitly relies on colonial governmental designations.  
Furthermore, while the joint report of the two committees 
considered the Assam area in need of special treatment due to its 
excluded and anthropologically specific character, the Thakkar 
commission report instead evaluated the Darjeeling area and its 
                                                
129 Constituent Assembly of India Debates, Vol. 7, Thursday 4 November 1948, 
available at http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/vol7p1g.htm (accessed May 
2012). 
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population mainly in terms of ‘backwardness’. While it is noted that 
the “Gurkha” feel “neglected,” the main thrust of the evaluation refers 
to the (lack of) backwardness of the area. Translated into the 
manageable figures of literacy, the report notes that “even among the 
tribals (mostly tea garden coolies) there was 16,450 literates out of a 
total population of 141,301 and 2,571 of these were women.” – 
supposedly good figures for the time. Subsequently, the report goes on 
to conclude that "undoubtedly the land [of] the hill tribes needs to be 
protected from the maw of money lenders but there is little case 
otherwise for continuing partial exclusion or special administration.”130  
As a consequence of this evaluation, the Darjeeling area was not 
inscribed as a ‘scheduled area’ in the fifth schedule of the new 
constitution. Albeit obviously not part of ‘village India’, territorial and 
‘tribal’ negotiations reiterated Darjeeling’s separation from the ‘unruly’ 
hills of the tribal north-east.131 In this ambiguous position, the very 
different representation of Darjeeling as the ‘ruly’ hills of a colonial 
hill station, of tea gardens, and of tourism largely prevailed – at least 
until the Gorkhaland movement in the mid-1980s forced Darjeeling 
                                                
130 Constituent Assembly of India Debates, Vol. 7, Thursday 4 November 1948, 
available at http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/vol7p1g.htm (accessed May 
2012). 
131 Seen as the original inhabitants of the area, the Lepcha and Bhutia were 
individually recognised as scheduled tribes (STs) under the fifth schedule in 1950. 
Among the ‘Nepali’ groups, this sort of non-territorial recognition was, however, 
not extended until 2003 when the Limbus and the Tamang were accepted into the 
schedule (see 
http://www.anagrasarkalyan.gov.in/pdf/constitution_scheduled_tribes_order_1950.
pdf (accessed August 2012)). Many other groups still have pending applications for 
such a status and the benefits that follow in terms of educational and occupational 
reservations (Middleton, 2010). 
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“into the post-Independence national consciousness of India” (N. 
Lama, 2006).132 
Taking the Heritage Train through a Crack in National History 
At the stroke of the midnight hour, when the world sleeps, India will 
awake to life and freedom.(…) India discovers herself again. - 
Jawaharlal Nehru, 14 August 1947. 
In this section, I argue that Darjeeling’s ambivalent position within 
Indian national delineations of space is reflected in the way in which 
the area evades the foundational watershed in Indian national history – 
August 14, 1947. 
British Colonialism, Nehruvian Post-colonial rule and that date in 
1947 that ostensibly separates the two are obvious, towering landmarks 
in Indian national discourse. No matter whether the ancient Indian 
civilisation is fashioned in the universalistic image of Nehru’s Bharat 
Mata (Goswami, 2004; Nehru, 1998, pp. 52-54; S. Roy, 2007) or in the 
saffron shades of Hindu nationalism, this civilisation was supposedly 
reawakened from a long colonial slumber “at the stroke of the midnight 
hour” on 14 August 1947 to be “rediscovered” by every Indian citizen 
and school child since then (see e.g. Government of India, 1986, p. 6). 
Darjeeling, however, provides the space for a very different history. In 
the dominant history of Darjeeling the great national disjuncture of 
1947 is all but forgotten, overshadowed by the continuities of British 
heritage.133 As a consequence, Darjeeling might be placed in the hills, 
                                                
132 In the meantime, a range of Nepali activists in Darjeeling focused, instead, on 
the acceptance of Nepali as an official language of India – another non-territorial 
form of recognition – achieved in 1992. 
133 Following Laurajane Smith, I see heritage as “a cultural tool that nations, 
societies, communities and individuals use to express, facilitate and construct a 
sense of identity, self and belonging in which the ‘power of place’ is invoked in its 
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but the ordered ones: those of the neat colonial tea gardens, the cute 
world heritage Toy Train, and the historic Queen of Hills Stations. As a 
place, the historical meaning typically attached to Darjeeling, in other 
words, differs widely from that of national, mainland India as well as  
from the ‘unruly hills’. 
For the visitor arriving from the plains of Siliguri, the spatial 
experience of entering the Darjeeling area underlines the complex 
meaning attached to the ‘ruly’ hills of Darjeeling. The main road into 
the Darjeeling hills follows the railroad tracks of the Darjeeling 
Himalayan Railway (DHR) along much of its length. For both train and 
car passengers, the railway provides a physical manifestation of the 
space one is entering. In Producing India, Goswami makes a strong 
argument that the railways established under the British ‘territorial 
colonialism’ were quickly appropriated as symbols of national 
development and integration after 1947. From Nehru onwards, 
“railways are a chief leitmotif in the on-going practices and rituals of 
Indian nationhood” (Goswami, 2004, p. 130) – as the slogan of the 
Indian Railway company states: “Indian Railways – Lifeline to the 
Nation”134. Similarly, in the school textbooks of the late 1980s a train 
bursts ahead along with other items of “our national property” 
obviously bound for a modern, developed future (Muley & Sharma, 
1987, p. 44). Although constructed during the high tide of territorial 
colonialism135, the DHR has not undergone such translation into a 
symbol of the Indian nation. 
                                                                                                                                  
representational sense to give physical reality to these expressions and 
experiences” (Smith, 2006, p. 75). 
134 See the Ministry of Railways homepage - http://www.indianrailways.gov.in/ 
(accessed August 2012). 
135 Financially supported by the Government of Bengal and apparently motivated by economic 
considerations (price differences for essential commodities and the need to transport tea out of 
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Made a UNESCO world heritage site in 1999, the DHR instead 
suggests connections to a globalised history of heritage where 
nationalist distinctions between colonial and post-colonial rule fade 
from view. As the official UNESCO introduction states, “the 
Darjeeling Himalayan Railway is intimately linked with the 
development of Darjeeling as the queen of hill stations and one of the 
main tea-growing areas in India, in the early nineteenth century.”136 As 
such, the colonial legacy of the ‘Toy Train’ merges with the other T’s 
repeatedly listed across tourist brochures and official state descriptions 
of the area. As the official government website for Darjeeling states on 
its front page: “It is certainly that Darjeeling in the post modern era 
[sic] comprises of six T’s -Tea, Teak, Tourism, Toy Train, Tiger Hill 
and Trekkers’ paradise”137. The ‘Toy Train’ thus provides a physical 
manifestation of the representation of Darjeeling as a heritage site, a 
colonial hill state, a tourist destination and a geographical reference 
point for tea as a globally branded commodity. 
In this commodified form, we might re-raise the question: where 
is Darjeeling? Or, to paraphrase a question Jayeeta Sharma asks herself 
in her recent book on the colonial history of Assam: “is Darjeeling 
merely a label, like Demerara or Madeira, an adjunct to the term ‘tea’, 
for the world at large?” (see also Baruah, 1999, pp. xviii-xix; J. 
Sharma, 2011, p. 19). In other words, what becomes of Darjeeling as a 
                                                                                                                                  
Darjeeling for export from the port in Calcutta) the Eastern Bengal Railways agent Franklin 
Prestage initiated constructions in 1879. Two years later, in 1981 the new Darjeeling Himalayan 
Railway (DHR) Company opened a small 2-feet gauge railroad connecting the plains station of 
Siliguri with Darjeeling hills. Connecting the Darjeeling hills to Calcutta and mainland India, the 
DHR by 1914/15 carried 250,000 passengers and transported 60,000 tons of freight including 5,354 
tons of tea.  http://dhr.indianrailways.gov.in/view_section.jsp?lang=0&id=0,1,261 
(accessed August 2012) see also http://www.dhrs.org/page16.html    
136 See http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/944 (accessed August 2012). See also the BBC 
documentary “The Darjeeling Himalayan Railway”. 
137 See http://darjeeling.gov.in/ (accessed August 2012). 
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place when its commodified avatars – tea, heritage, tourism – take over 
the global imagination of the area? I suggest that Darjeeling, in this 
form, attains some of the characteristics of a ‘non-place’, a place that is 
everywhere and nowhere (Augé, 2008). Although Darjeeling obviously 
occupies a specific physical position on the globe, it’s production as an 
‘anthropological place’ – through local ascription of meaning – 
inevitably takes place in a context characterised by representations of 
Darjeeling as a commodified non-place. Branded tea, BBC 
documentaries about the world heritage Darjeeling Himalayan 
Railway, and tourism brochures create a “false familiarity” with 
Darjeeling, a globalised sense of Darjeeling as a place mediated by the 
image of the heritage hill station and harmonious tea gardens (cf. Augé, 
2008, pp. 26, 96). 
In the following, I suggest that the imagination of Darjeeling 
through the lens of the colonial hills station and geographically 
certified tea production produces an image of the area as ‘ruly’ and 
harmonious – and as untouched by historical ruptures. Although the 
violence of the Gorkhaland movement cannot be fully concealed it is 
presented as an anomaly. While the other hills of the north-east are 
framed in terms of perpetual unruliness, the unruliness of Darjeeling is 
merely periodic – brief disruptions before the area ‘returns to peace’. 
Exploration and Nostalgia: Colonial Imagination of the Hill Station  
The hills stations of the British Raj fulfilled a multitude of functions 
and, as places, they were imbued with a complex set of meanings (see 
e.g. Kennedy, 1996, p. 4). As many of the hill stations, Darjeeling was 
established as a sanatorium, a place of refuge from the heat of the 
plains for the British troops and administrators. However, like many 
other hills stations, Darjeeling quickly also became a place for 
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scientific exploration, military recruitment, imperial government, 
commercial ventures and homely leisure. As such Darjeeling shaped 
and was in turn shaped by the specific colonial gaze of the ‘hill 
station’. As a 1857 ‘guide’ to Darjeeling states “the natural scenery of 
the Darjeeling territory is full of interest to the admirer of nature and 
the man of science”.138 In a mixture of homely nostalgia, exotic 
romance and picturesque aesthetic with cutting-edge scientific inquiry, 
colonial administration and imperial commerce, the landscape of the 
Darjeeling hills was sets aside both from the confusion of the hot and 
crowded plains as well as from the ‘unruly’ hills of the north-east.  
From the explorations of the early eighteenth century onwards, 
the Himalayan foothills were seen as virtual botanical and ethnographic 
museums, and the Himalayan hill stations quickly became important 
hubs for scientific knowledge production on nature and people (Arnold, 
2006). Darjeeling, for longer or shorter periods, housed a range of the 
foremost academics of the time. The first superintendent of the 
Darjeeling sanatorium, Dr. Archibald Campbell, was keenly interested 
in geography, ethnography and botany and initiated the first 
experiments with tea cultivation in the area. Similarly, from 1845-
1858, the ornithologist and ethnologist Brian Houghton Hodgson 
stayed in Darjeeling to continue his explorations of the Himalayan 
region after his former position as the British Resident in Kathmandu. 
Campbell and Hodgson were furthermore friends of Sir Joseph Dalton 
Hooker, a famous British botanist and explorer of the time who stayed 
with them during his mid-century expeditions to Darjeeling and the 
surroundings. As a close friend of Charles Darwin, Hooker connected 
                                                
138 ”The Darjeeling Guide” was originally published in the quarterly Calcutta 
Review, Vol. LV, 1857, pp. 196-225. It is reprinted as an appendix to (O'Malley, 
[2001] 1907, pp. 283-320). 
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their explorations of the Himalayan region with the foremost theories 
of environment and race available at the time (Arnold, 2006, pp. 185-
224). The scientific investigations of the Darjeeling hills not only fed 
into the knowledge production of the local colonial administration, they 
were in the forefront of contemporary global knowledge production. 
As much as Darjeeling hill station was a place for making sense 
of the surrounding landscape and its people, it was at the same time a 
place for organising and governing this landscape. As a long range of 
studies have argued, colonial knowledge production was intimately 
intertwined with colonial government – shaping the governmental gaze 
(Breckenridge & Veer, 1993; Cohn, 1987a, 1996; Dirks, 2001). In the 
hill stations, the British perspective on the Indian landscape was 
mediated by a prevalent ‘picturesque’ aesthetic (Kennedy, 1996, p. 40). 
Substantially informed by comparison to the homely landscapes of the 
British hills, the British residents of the hill stations represented the 
landscape – graphically and discursively – in a nostalgic and romantic 
light.139 A range of physical interventions, from the felling of forest to 
the construction of European style cottages, further moulded the 
landscape to fit this image (Kennedy, 1996; Kenny, 1995). In 
Darjeeling, large amounts of forest were cut down giving way to ‘tea 
gardens’ (Hunter, 1876, p. 19; Kennedy, 1996, p. 53). The 10,000 acres 
under tea cultivation in 1866 had, by 1905, been expanded to more than 
50,000 (Hunter, 1876, p. 165; O'Malley, 1907, p. 94). Combining 
botanical knowledge and commercial endeavour, this large-scale 
transformation of unorganised jungle into neatly organised ‘tea 
                                                
139 Even in the highly formal reporting of the Bengal District Gazetteer for 
Darjeeling this nostalgia shows up in the comparison of temperature averages for 
Darjeeling with those of London (O'Malley, 1907, p. 22). 
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gardens’ crucially supported the aesthetic moulding of the Darjeeling 
landscape.140 
The result of such interventions was, as Kennedy argues, that, 
“over time, hills stations were drawn so tightly within the aesthetic 
confines of British landscape traditions that they became divorced from 
the surrounding environment, particularly when that environment was 
as intimidating as the Himalayas” (Kennedy, 1996, p. 52). The rough 
Himalayan environment was recast as friendly hills increasingly 
regarded, among the British, as preferable to the “heat-shimmering, 
monotonously unvarying landscape” of the plains (Kennedy, 1996, p. 
61). Through a combination of representations and interventions, the 
jungle of Darjeeling was turned into tea gardens, and – as the word ‘hill 
station’ itself indicates – the sharp ridges turned into homely rounded 
hills (cf. Kennedy, 1996, p. 46). The aesthetic moulding of the 
Darjeeling area as a hill station landscape thus removed it not only 
from the plains of ‘village India’ but also from the wild hills of the 
north-eastern subcontinent. 
In his detailed book on the British hill stations, Dane Kennedy 
argues that the British, in the hill stations, essentially sought a space 
that they could mould more freely than the plains already crowded with 
foreign people and customs (Kennedy, 1996, pp. 60-61). In this vein, 
descriptions of early encounters with the area Darjeeling area 
repeatedly pose it as “virtually uninhabited” “terra incognita” (Rose, 
1994, p. 105) (O'Malley, [2001] 1907, p. 283). As Hunter states in his 
description of the first survey of the entire Darjeeling district, “there 
are no villages in the proper sense of the term” (Hunter, 1876, p. 40). 
While the certainty of this description seems dubious given the limited 
                                                
140 See (J. Sharma, 2011) for a comparable perspective from Assam. 
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scope of early British settlement, the problems encountered in 
enumerating the population of the area, and probable movements back 
and forth over the border before the British arrived (Hunter, 1876, pp. 
40-41; Hutt, 1997, p. 112) it obviously poses the Darjeeling hills and its 
population in a very different light than the ‘village India’ of the 
‘crowded’ plains.  
Like the other hill station areas, Darjeeling could, however, not 
be fully regarded as a ‘terra nullius’ free of “the imprint of Indians” 
(Kennedy, 1996, p. 63).141 Hence, in a confluence of science, 
commerce, military conscription and romanticism, similar to that 
informing the shaping of the landscape, the inhabitants of the 
Darjeeling hills were likewise represented as markedly different from 
both the plains-dwellers and the inhabitants of the wilder hills of 
neighbouring Assam. The hill stations, in other words, reflected and 
reinforced assumptions of social and racial difference that largely 
followed the environmental distinction between the hills as the plains 
(Kenny, 1995, p. 695). As Judith Kenny describes it, “by ascribing 
qualities of gentleness, grace, and simplicity to the hill tribes, the 
British representations contributed to the ‘imaginative geographies’ of 
the hills and plains (…) depict[ing] highland and lowland peoples as 
intrinsically different, as two places and two people” (Kenny, 1995, p. 
709). 
Of the people that the British encountered in Darjeeling, the 
Lepchas – seen as the original inhabitants – were widely described as 
“a fine, frank race, naturally open hearted and free handed, fond of 
change, and given to the out-door life” (Hunter, 1876, p. 47). The 
                                                
141 See also (Cerwonka, 2004) on the notion of ’terra nullius’ as played out in 
relation to the Australian landscape. 
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various groups labelled as ‘Nepali’ or ‘Gurkha’ were also described as 
“light and nimble” and as having “a pleasing expression of 
countenance” (O'Malley, [2001] 1907, p. 317). Seen exclusively as 
labour immigrants to the area, they were however considered to be of a 
more “pushing, thriving” and “virile race” – “quick-tempered” but 
“remarkably willing and loyal, if treated with consideration” (Hunter, 
1876, p. 53; O'Malley, 1907, p. 51). As such, they became a favoured 
‘race’ for recruitment into the British ‘Gurkha’ regiments when, after 
the 1857 rebellion, the British became increasingly distrustful of the 
other ‘martial races’. The ‘Gurkhas’ were furthermore widely 
employed in the expanding tea industry and hence largely provided the 
labour for the physical transformation of the hill station into the orderly 
aesthetic of the ‘tea garden’. In each their way, the (colonial 
imagination of) the Darjeeling inhabitants thus supported the 
distinction between the plains and the hills. 
In summary, the colonial imagination of the hill station 
assembles a range of different interest and perspectives that, taken 
together, produce the hill station as a ruly and civilised place. This 
imagination essentially describes a merger of the governmental gaze 
with the gaze of the tourist or explorer (see Urry, 2001). Many 
documents from the colonial period combine the statistics and 
ethnographic descriptions of the gazetteers and other governmental 
documentation with the perspective of the tourist. E. C. Doze’s A 
Concise History of Darjeeling, the first local history of Darjeeling, e.g. 
commences with a picture of the beautiful view of Kanchenjunga one 
can obtain when travelling to Darjeeling followed by a range of “hints 
to visitors” about how to book train tickets, get the best seats, and avoid 
mountain sickness (Dozey, 1922, p. x). Here, as in the 1857 Darjeeling 
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Guide mentioned above, the more detached descriptions of the 
landscape and people of the gazetteers combine with colourful 
descriptions of the sights, sounds and experiences the hill station has to 
offer the tourist visitor. As I illustrate in the following section, this 
merger of gazes continue largely unabated across the national historical 
watershed of 1947 and into the present discourse of the West Bengal 
state. 
Repeated Connections: The Governmental Gaze and the Tourist Gaze 
Although fundamentally relying on the contemporary scientific and 
aesthetic dispositions of the British colonists, the merger of the 
governmental gaze with that of the tourist is to a striking degree 
repeated in the post-colonial discourse on Darjeeling. For the new 
rulers in Calcutta, Darjeeling continued to be a ‘hill station’ with all the 
associated meanings after the stroke of midnight in 1947. Here, in spite 
of the anti-colonial rhetoric of Indian nationalism, the colonial history 
and heritage of Darjeeling continues to be celebrated. In addition, new 
connections with global heritage regimes and tea branding repeat and 
reinforce the merger of governmental and tourist gazes in the continued 
re-imagination of Darjeeling as a peaceful hill station. As a 
consequence, a global sense of Darjeeling as a commodified (non-
)place, seen from the outside perspective of the tourist and of a 
government at-a-distance circumscribes the local production of 
Darjeeling as a place. 
To take one example, the Government of West Bengal in 2001 
republished O’Malley’s 1907 Bengal District Gazetteer for Darjeeling. 
In this version, the gazetteer is compiled together with reprints of the 
1857 Darjeeling Guide, a 1921 guide to Darjeeling and its Mountain 
Railway describing in minute detail the sights and sounds experienced 
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along the way from the Siliguri plains to Darjeeling, and a facsimile of 
the very letter that granted the Darjeeling Himalayan Railway 
UNESCO world heritage status.142 The compiled publication 
commences with a lengthy introduction written by Kumud Ranjan 
Biswas, a former MP and member of the then dominant communist 
party (CPM).143 Although the gazetteer is fundamentally a highly 
technocratic document of colonial domination, Biswas’ introduction 
reflects a very different attitude. With the title A Summer Place it 
represents Darjeeling in the by now familiar and romantic light of the 
harmonious hill station while O’Malley’s publication itself is compared 
to “good wine” – the “fruits of his labour of love”. Poetry, beauty and 
love are central to Biswas’s description, but the repertoire he refers to 
is strikingly British. Along with the inevitable reference to the Bengali 
poet Rabindranath Tagore, Biswas finds space for an overwhelming 
amount of references to British poets – especially the romantics 
Wordsworth, Keats and Shelley.  
Throughout his introduction it is clear that, for Biswas, it is the 
British gaze and organized interventions that are constitutive of 
Darjeeling as a place. In Biswas’ rendering, their interventions in 
construction, forest protection and tea plantations gave birth to 
Darjeeling: 
Ever since it was built by the British in the early part of the 
nineteenth century the magnificent hill station of Darjeeling has 
                                                
142 The full publication is available electronically through the West Bengal State 
Central Library’s online depository: 
http://dspace.wbpublibnet.gov.in:8080/jspui/handle/10689/2958 (accessed 
November 2012). 
143 Biswas was elected in 1977, 1982 and 1987. The Communist Party of India 
(Marxists) headed the government of West Bengal for 34 consecutive years 
between 1977 and 2011. 
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attracted travelers from all over the world. (…) To make it more 
homely they planted oaks and junipers and many other exotic plants 
and trees. Forest were reserved and felling of trees was strictly 
controlled. (…) Charming little cottages came to adorn its terraced 
slopes. Roads and railways were laid to make it more easily 
accessible. (…) In time it became the beloved of all irrespective of 
the differences in rank and riches. (Biswas, 2001, p. xii) 
Here, the historical beginning of Darjeeling is, firstly, connected 
directly to the agency of the British – a perspective that is repeated 
ubiquitously across a variety of both academic and political texts on 
Darjeeling (Bagchi, 2012; Dasgupta, 1999; GJM, 2009; Samanta, 2000; 
Sarkar, 2010; T. B. Subba, 1992). Hence, the very constitution of 
Darjeeling is both placed in the hands and seen through the eyes of the 
British. 
Secondly, Biswas’ description obviously presents a highly 
selective view of the colonial past. In this view, the British superior 
abilities to make Darjeeling a pleasant, organised place comes out 
clearly and is emphasised by his subsequent statement that the present 
mismanagement is gradually turning the place into a “veritable jungle” 
again (O'Malley, [2001] 1907, p. xv). In the emphasis on the care taken 
by British forest reservation and control, the massive scale of British 
tree felling across the colonial hill stations – i.e. the very reason for the 
need of such measures – is obscured (see Kennedy, 1996). Similarly, 
the exclusiveness of the British hill station in terms of class and race is 
forgotten when the Darjeeling is described as “the beloved of all 
irrespective of the differences in rank and riches” (see Kenny, 1995). 
Indeed, the bourgeois perspective of the colonial masters is strikingly 
repeated in Biswas’ contemporary recommendation for people to visit 
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Darjeeling reminding everyone that “life is not all work, there should 
also be some time to play” (Biswas, 2001, p. xiv). 
Finally, in line with the analysis above, Biswas draws a clear line 
between beautiful hills of Darjeeling and those further east. Moving, 
for once, away from the British romantics he refers to the beautiful 
scenery of Tagore’s Shesher Kabita. Although the novel is set in 
Shillong – the capital of Assam at the time – Biswas quickly seeks to 
divorce the beauty of Tagore’s novel from the unruly north east. 
Referring to Tagore’s love for and occasional visits to Darjeeling, 
Biswas states “when a Bengali reads Rabindranaths’ Shesher Kabita 
there is hardly any doubt that it is not the Shillong hills (…) but the 
hills of Darjeeling that is in the background of his mind” (O'Malley, 
[2001] 1907, p. xi). Hence, once again, the harmonious nature of the 
Darjeeling hill-scape is placed in opposition to the wilder neighbouring 
hills. 
With the emphasis on Darjeeling as a romantic, peaceful and 
harmonious place, the hill station perspective obviously avoids any 
mention of the Gorkhaland movement in the late 80’s. A main 
reference point for Biswas’ description is in fact Satyajit Ray’s 1962 
movie Kanchanjangha. This movie plays out various stories of love 
and relationships with the scenic setting of Darjeeling as a 
background . In Biswas’ words, the film is “a tribute to Darjeeling and 
the sublime beauty of the hills” (O'Malley, [2001] 1907, p. ix). The 
historical somersault made by the references is however both striking 
and widespread. Ray’s Kanchanjangha is, like the recent movie Barfi! 
– acclaimed as the Brand ambassador for Darjeeling –  set well before 
the violent eruption of the Gorkhaland movement in the Darjeeling 
hills (A. Banerjee, 2012). Both movies use the historic, heritage sites of 
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Darjeeling as the backdrop for a love story. In Barfi! we encounter the 
Darjeeling Himalayan Railway Station at Ghoom, the old Planters Club 
etc. and, in the words of the director Anurag Basu, “this periodic film 
set in the 70s has been able to successfully capture the true spirit of 
Darjeeling” (A. Banerjee, 2012). Hence, to retain the harmonic image 
of Darjeeling, a complicated historical loop is constructed in which the 
“true spirit” of the present brand Darjeeling is to be found before the 
Gorkhaland demand was raised. 
Other branded constructions of Darjeeling bring about similar 
effects. Today, roughly 10 million kg. of tea is produced in Darjeeling 
each year. However, estimates state that about 40 million kg. of tea 
labelled Darjeeling is consumed every year. While the blame for the 
sale of ‘fake’ Darjeeling is variously placed upon the Darjeeling tea 
producers themselves and on others, the numbers alone indicate the 
brand equity of the Darjeeling label. Over the last decades various 
initiatives have been taken to protect this power in the global market. 
“Darjeeling” has been internationally certified as a Geographical 
Indications (GI) product under the WTO ‘Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights’ (TRIPS) Agreement, and national 
legislation has been enacted to protect the Darjeeling brand (see e.g. 
Das, 2006). In the process, a logo and a range of certification 
procedures have been advised (see illustration below). While these 
initiatives are, on the one hand, obviously directed at furthering the 
interests of the producers of a specific product by branding it to 
Darjeeling as an ‘authentic’ place, they, on the other hand also 
contribute to the assignment of meaning to Darjeeling as a place. While 
the tea is branded Darjeeling, Darjeeling is also branded in terms of tea. 
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Illustration 10: The Darjeeling Tea Logo 
 
As a brand, Darjeeling naturally seeks to bring out the unique 
characters of the product, characters that can help distinguish it in the 
global market for tea and hence allow it to bring home a higher price. 
Here, the specific characteristics of the Darjeeling hills are 
foregrounded. As the magazine Tea & Coffee states, “it is just 
something about the hills of Darjeeling that makes tea… Darjeeling” 
(Levy, 2007). To bring out this special “something”, this intangible 
value that is employed to provide the Darjeeling tea producers with 
another very tangible value – a better price for their goods – 
descriptions largely fall back on the complex of beauty, tradition and 
romance attached to the hill station across colonial and post-colonial 
state discourse. “There is no doubt that the quality of the tea produced 
here is affected by the magic of its fairy tale surroundings” (Levy, 
2007) It is, ostensibly, the combination of the beauty in the “magical, 
mystical” hills of Darjeeling, on the one hand, and the traditional, 
“orthodox” methods of tea production handed down from the British 
founders of the tea plantations that enable the production of Darjeeling 
tea only here (Levy, 2007). 
Conclusion 
In summary, the branding of Darjeeling tea as a geographical 
indications product globally rearticulates and reinforces the historical 
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ascription of meaning to Darjeeling as a hill station.  Although less 
widely known, the same could be said of the UNESCO world heritage 
certification of the Darjeeling Himalayan Railway. These certifications 
stage Darjeeling as a place in front of the external gaze of the global 
middle-class consumer-tourist. They represent Darjeeling through the 
organized, picturesque scenery of its colonial history, rather than the 
‘unruliness’ of its recent history. Here neither the independence 
movement confrontations between colonialist and nationalist, nor the 
Gorkhaland movement confrontations between state marginalization 
and local mobilization are registered. When strikes and violence erupts, 
as in the 80s and repeatedly since then, it is typically seen as 
intermittent. Across newspaper reports, various versions of the phrase 
“return to peace” is often used. In sharp contrast to the ‘durable 
disorder’ of the north-eastern hills, ‘unrulyness’ in the Darjeeling hills 
is thus seen as periodic rather than perpetual. In the imagination of the 
hill station, peace and harmony is insistently seen as the natural state of 
affairs. 
Repeating the colonial merger of the governmental gaze and the 
gaze of the tourist-consumer, the place-making dynamics of globalised 
branding and heritage certification largely remove the making of 
Darjeeling as a place from Darjeeling as a locality. If decisions about 
Darjeeling have – in the partition of India, in discussions of the ‘tribal 
question’ and in the on-going reorganisation of the Indian state – been 
taken large from the outside, this outside has moved further away. 
Hence, although present decision-making might be more globally 
dispersed than under the British Empire, a sense of imperial 
government-at-distance remains lodged within the place-making 
dynamics of Darjeeling. As a consequence, Darjeeling largely remains 
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in an ambivalent position in the political landscape of India: 
disconnected from the plains of village India as well as from the 
‘unruly’ hills of the north-east, concomitantly entangled in colonial 
signification across the midnight of 1947 and the violent uprising of the 
Gorkhaland movement. 
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Chapter 8: Darjeeling Disquiet 
 (…) there was a report of new dissatisfaction in the hills, gathering 
insurgency, men and guns. It was the Indian-Nepalese this time, fed 
up with being treated like the minority in a place where they were the 
majority. They wanted their own country, or at least their own state, 
in which to manage their own affairs. Here, where India blurred into 
Bhutan and Sikkim (…) it had always been a messy map. (Desai, 
2006, p. 9) 
Seen across the stretch of a couple of centuries, the situation of the 
‘Nepali’ population in Darjeeling is complicated and rife with 
paradoxes. In the mid-nineteenth century many arrived to work for the 
British tea planters, clearing the forest and establishing tea gardens. 
During the following decades, their manual labour enabled the British 
to eliminate the unorganised jungle shaping the Darjeeling hills in the 
romantic image of the hill station. Fuelled by the desires of commercial 
endeavours and scientific exploration, Darjeeling gradually emerged as 
a place of beauty and leisure, a tourist destination, a reference point for 
globally acclaimed tea, and finally a world heritage site. Albeit 
ostensibly describing Darjeeling as a place, this image is, however, 
largely everywhere but in Darjeeling. Hence, as generations of 
‘Nepalis’ call for a greater say in decisions on their local environment, 
they have to face the images of Darjeeling as a globalised non-place – 
an image crucially enabled by the hard labour of their parents and 
grand-parents. 
In this chapter, I investigate the meeting between the hill station 
image of Darjeeling described in the preceding chapter and the 
Gorkhaland movement. I argue, that the tourist gaze still plays an 
important role in the global production of Darjeeling as a place. Along 
with the old colonial buildings of Darjeeling, the toy train and the tea 
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gardens, the tourist presence and practice in town reinforce the notion 
that this is what Darjeeling is essentially about – that Darjeeling is still 
a peaceful Himalayan hill station. I show how neither Subbash 
Ghisingh’s Gorkhaland of the late 80’s nor Bimal Gurung’s 
contemporary Gorkhaland actually present an alternative ascription of 
meaning to Darjeeling. Hence, the Hill station imagination lives on in 
present tourist initiatives and even today seems to provide a point of 
convergence between the Gorkhaland movement and the state 
government in Calcutta. Despite disagreements and calls for statehood 
and autonomy, what seems to be emerging looks more like an imperial 
arrangement of government at distance symbolically assembled around 
a contemporary refashioning of the hill station. 
In the following, I commence with a brief history of the 
Gorkhaland movement, combined with a few reflections on my own 
futile search for representations Gorkhaland as a place. I then turn to 
the 80’s Gorkhaland movement. I analyse how central documents 
published by the West Bengal government maintain an image of the 
harmonious hill station even in the face of violent uprising, and how 
speeches held by Subbash Ghising, seem directed rather at unsettling 
Darjeeling and harnessing anxiety, than at place-making. I then move 
on to the present Gorkhaland movement, analysing political 
publications as well as public spectacles. My argument is that the 
question about what Gorkhaland is, remains largely unanswered, 
overshadowed by a spectacular display directed more towards who 
controls Darjeeling and, also, that today the refashioned image of the 
hill station brings together, once again, the governmental gaze and the 
tourist gaze in a convergence between the Gorkha Janmukti Morcha 
and the new government of West Bengal. 
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Searching for Gorkhaland 
In the late 1980s, Subbas Ghishing’s Gorkhaland movement suddenly 
brought a new representation of the Darjeeling hills into state and 
national media. This stands in a marked contrast to the representation 
of the area in the image of the hills station. Instead of a place of beauty 
and harmony, it surrounds Darjeeling with notions of anxiety, of 
internal colonisation, of being out of place. As presented in chapter 
four, the Darjeeling hills had already laid ground to a variety of 
different territorial proposals. Nonetheless, its position had, throughout 
the processes of territorial reorganisation largely been decided from the 
outside following colonial lines of differentiation. However, this time 
the proposal of a Gorkhaland state was put forward more forcefully 
than ever. Large areas in the hills were shut down for long periods of 
time, arms were being acquired or made, and clashes between the 
newly founded Gorkhaland National Liberation Front (GNLF) and the 
police left many dead and wounded. The intensity of these events 
destabilised the position of the area as a place in the territorialised 
political landscapes of West Bengal and India more than ever before. 
Periodically disrupted negotiations between the GNLF, the West 
Bengal state government, and the central government finally led to an 
agreement signed July 25, 1988. The demand for a separate state of 
Gorkhaland was not met, but it was agreed to set up an “Autonomous 
Hill Council” – the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council (DGHC). In 
October 1988 a state act was passed officially instituting the DGHC 
and elections were held for the 28 elected seats in December 1988. 
GNLF won 26 of the elected seats and the Communist Party of India 
(Marxists) (CPI(M)) the remaining two. Ghisingh was made the 
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chairman and chief executive councillor of the DGHC.144 Over the next 
two decades, this position enabled Ghisingh to concentrate power in 
what one observer has called a “local ethnic autocracy” (Lacina, 2009). 
Ghisingh was re-elected twice, and after delaying the elections 
scheduled for 2004, he was declared administrator of the DGHC 
without elections (Dam, 2005). However, with his role as the 
uncontested king of the hills becoming more and more obvious, 
rumours about him being a “traitor” co-opted by the CPI(M) state 
government flourished. The tide was about to turn against him. 
When I arrived in Darjeeling during the run-up to the state 
elections in April 2011, the Gorkhaland demand was back, but the 
proponents were new: Bimal Gurung and his Gorkha Janmukti Morcha 
(GJM) had taken over. Formerly working under Ghisingh, Gurung 
suddenly gained popularity in 2007 through the curious series of events 
describes in the introduction to this study. Gurung had been running a 
local fan club for Prashant Tamang, a ‘Gorkha’ boy from Darjeeling, 
who was one of the contestants in the televised talent show Indian Idol 
3. As he won the last round in the autumn of 2007, his success spilled 
over on Gurung. Gurung, in turn, began to oppose Ghisingh and 
launched a new Gorkhaland movement. Although not as violent as in 
the 80’s, the new movement continued the heavy-handed politics of 
earlier times. On 21 May 2010, Madan Tamang, president of the All 
India Gorkha League (ABGL) and a vocal opponent of GJM and Bimal 
Gurung, was killed in public in Darjeeling town. In February 2011, two 
GJM supporters were killed by the police in Shibsu, Dooars further 
                                                
144 Another 14 members were to be nominated by the state government that, 
according to Subba, filled 13 of these seats with CPI(M) members - “One post had 
to be left vacant due to the fleeing of Jan Bahadur Rai, the Chaiman of Kalimpong 
Municipality, to Siliguri” (T. B. Subba, 1992, p. 157). 
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adding to the tension in the hills as well as to the demand for 
Gorkhaland.  
In spring 2011, the Gorkhaland demand was back at centre stage 
and newly repainted on shop-fronts and walls in the public spaces of 
the town. The urban space of Darjeeling, presented itself as a virtual 
canvas for slogans and symbols. While one would occasionally meet 
election posters from other parties, the GJM was massively represented 
on walls, shop fronts and vehicles. The green-white-yellow colours of 
the GJM flag provided a ubiquitous background to most of the 
“Gorkhaland” inscriptions around town visually fusing the GJM party 
and the Gorkhaland agenda. The colours of the GJM flag were also 
repeated ubiquitously on light-posts, benches, hand-rails and wall 
decorations throughout the centre of the town. Through numerous signs 
on wall and shop fronts, this specific colour scheme and the word 
“Gorkhaland” merged – clearly signalling that Gorkhaland was now 
spelled GJM. There was, obviously, an anxious concern about situating 
GJM and the Gorkhaland agenda for everyone to see – as something 
tangible – within the public space of the town of Darjeeling (see 
illustrations below). 
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Illustration 11: The GJM colour scheme on the bandstand at Darjeeling's main 
pedestrian square Chowrasta 
 
Illustration 12: One of the many colour coordinated signs in central Darjeeling 
 
Before going to Darjeeling, I had begun reading Christopher 
Townsend Middleton’s excellent dissertation (2010) on the ethnic 
politics of the area. On arrival, I expected to meet the vibrant ethnic 
politics that he describes with reference to the mid-2000s. Things had, 
however, apparently changed quickly since then. As it turned out, 
‘ethnic’ activities were largely in a state of forced “hibernation” as the 
town was preparing for the state elections. In these, and in the current 
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party politics, the common Gorkhaland front could not afford to be 
broken down into individual ethnic claims. Instead, I thought that I 
would be witness to a micro-politics of place-making aimed at bringing 
forth Gorkhaland as a tangible and important place in the political 
landscape. However, across my encounters with informants, my 
reading of documents and attendance at public gatherings the what of 
Gorkhaland remained strikingly elusive. What instead appeared was a 
strong focus on who was in control of a Darjeeling that, with the 
continuous presence of tourists in town, continued to resemble the 
image of the colonial hills station. 
My initial question for investigation – what sort of place 
Gorkhaland is made out to be? – has thus largely remained 
unanswered. Various stabs at including additional textual material after 
returning from Darjeeling didn’t seem to help. But if the contours of 
Gorkhaland as a place-to-be does not characterise neither the discourse 
nor the practices of the various movements for Gorkhaland, what does 
then motivate these movements? What are they about, and how do they 
relate to the widespread and commodified ‘hill station’ image of 
Darjeeling presented earlier? And finally, why is Gorkhaland still so 
ubiquitously on display – in GJM colours – across Darjeeling? What I 
find can be described two parallel movements. One describes a 
trajectory from an ‘anxiety of belonging’ (amplified under Ghisingh’s 
leadership) to an ‘anxiety of control’ evolving with the urban, public 
space of Darjeeling town. The other describes a development from the 
tacit tactics of state evasion presented in chapter four, towards 
spectacular strategies of state engagement. Across these two 
trajectories, a politics emerges which seem to be less about producing 
Gorkhaland as a place, and more about posing specific actors as locally 
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sovereign partners with which the state can negotiate political and 
territorial demands. 
Harnessing Anxieties in a Darjeeling Disquiet? 
In this section, I analyse the meeting of the first Gorkhaland agitation 
with the hill station imagination of Darjeeling. I show how Subbash 
Ghising utilises the anxieties of being out of place among the ‘Nepali’ 
population and how he concomitantly seems to unsettle, rather than 
substantiate an answer to the question of what Gorkhaland is. And I 
illustrate how, on the other side of the conflict, the West Bengal 
government replays colonial representations of Darjeeling. Taken 
together, this meeting poses Darjeeling as an essentially harmonious 
place suddenly struck by unlikely unruliness. 
During the first Gorkhaland conflict, a lengthy ‘information war’ 
took place between the GNLF and the ruling CPI(M). In his widely 
read reflections on the Gorkhaland conflict, Tanka Subba describes 
how this war was conducted through the publication and circulation of 
various documents and speeches across the Darjeeling hills: 
The Gorkhas or Nepalis have propagated a history of Darjeeling and 
its peoples while the state government, which is controlled absolutely 
by the Bengalis, has presented another history of the region and the 
peoples. Thousands of audio cassettes carrying Subhas Ghisingh’s 
version of Darjeeling’s history were circulated. Probably even 
greater number of the copies of the “Information Document” in two 
volumes were circulated by the West Bengal Government and the 
party functionaries of the CPI (M). An information war, rather 
disinformation war, or at best propaganda war, overshadowed many 
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political activities in West Bengal in 1986 and 1987. (T. B. Subba, 
1992, p. 27)145 
As Subba points out, territorial history and the connected issue of 
belonging is an important line of conflict running through these 
documents. Thus, while “the GNLF and its predecessors (…) 
ascertained that Darjeeling was never part of Bengal (…) the West 
Bengal Government equally emphasized that it was never a part of 
Nepal” (T. B. Subba, 1992, p. 29). I would argue, however, that the 
‘information war’ documents display some other interesting 
characteristics. As I see it, the discursive and rhetorical strategies 
employed during the conflict display a very asymmetric positioning in 
relation to Darjeeling. While Ghisingh seeks to unsettle the area, the 
West Bengal government seek to fixate it as a place within a specific 
colonial imagination.  
Many of Ghisingh’s speeches, interviews and orchestrated 
practices seem directed more towards unsettling the Darjeeling area 
than connecting it to a fixed meaning as a place. The widely circulated 
speech that Subba mentions, actually says preciously little about what 
kind of place Gorkhaland is. Ghisingh instead combines a confusing 
historical sketch of the area – vaguely alluding to some kings in the 
twelfth century and the late eighteenth century Gorkha conquest – with 
a complex and convoluted analysis of the legal situation of the 
‘Gorkhas’ in India. As Middleton suggests, the main objective seems to 
be a nourishing of anxiety, harnessing its energy for a movement led by 
                                                
145 The audio cassettes contained a speech held by Subhas Ghisingh in June 1985 in 
Kurseong, later published by the DGHC transcribed under the heading “The 
Historical Speech” (M. P. Lama, 1996, p. 22). The two “information documents” 
were published by the CPI(M) dominated government under the common heading 
“Gorkhaland Agitation” (Government of West Bengal, 1986, 1987) along with at 
least one propaganda pamphlet brought out directly by the state committee of the 
CPI(M) (Ranadive, 1986). 
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Ghisingh (see Middleton, 2010, pp. 150-155). Stray mentions of the 
recent expulsion of Nepalis from Assam, of being “orphaned”, “not 
bonafide citizens of India” and “hired tenants” dot the speech along 
with familiar notions of the brave Gorkhas. The collective practice of 
burning the Indo-Nepal Treaty and the Sugauli Treaty orchestrated by 
the GNLF seems similarly to indicate not only a harnessing of the 
anxious belonging of the ‘Nepalis’ in Darjeeling, but also an attempted 
unsettlement or de-territorialisation of the Darjeeling space. 
What emerges from Ghisingh’s speech, is an unclear but insistent 
emphasis on the area’s unsettled position within the political landscape 
of the borderland. Mixing historical and legal complications, Ghisingh 
indicates that the area was left dangling between Nepal and India when 
the British left the subcontinent. Did the British propose the area to the 
Gorkhas only to have the All India Gorkha League reject the proposal? 
Was it given to Nepal as a “buffer province”? Should there have been a 
“plebiscite”? Was the Sugauli treaty nullified when the British left the 
subcontinent? And does the Indo-Nepal treaty stand “rejected and 
nullified” as Nepal is declared a “Zone of Peace”? (M. P. Lama, 1996, 
pp. 25-26). The speech alludes to all these options suggesting that “the 
proper settlement of Darjeeling and Teesta has not come so far, not the 
settlement of our fate” (M. P. Lama, 1996, p. 26). To this situation, the 
only solution is Gorkhaland – but what this means remains opaque. It 
seems, as Middleton suggests in reference to the 2008 Gorkhaland 
agitation, that “’Gorkhaland’ has become the telos, the ultimate 
realization of affect’s embodied potentiality. A future. A promise 
land.” (Middleton, 2010, p. 156). As such, Gorkhaland is not 
represented as a place, not even a place-to-be, but more like a fata 
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morgana simmering in the horizon – fuelling desires but essentially 
ungraspable. 
In constrast to this, the first ‘information document’ published by 
the Government of West Bengal foregrounds a ‘historical outline’ of 
the Darjeeling hills. As Subba points out, this document emphasises 
that “there is no historical evidence of [the Darjeeling hills] ever being 
part of Nepal” (Government of West Bengal, 1986, p. 4). However, in 
terms of representing Darjeeling as a place, the document does much 
more. It provides a representation of Darjeeling that seamlessly 
incorporates the gaze of the colonial archives into the contemporary 
history and politics of the area. After a brief mention that the area was 
part of the Sikkim and Bhutan kingdoms earlier, the historical account 
only really enters the area with the British in 1835. Here, the gaze of 
the colonial and the post-colonial state blends. The grant of lease in 
1835, the following annexation of further areas from Sikkim, and the 
later capture of the Dooars areas from Bhutan are all described as 
situations in which areas were “included in India” – not brought under 
British colonial domination (Government of West Bengal, 1986, p. 4). 
With this historical starting-point, the Gorkha conquest of the area can 
be dismissed as something taking place “long before the district of 
Darjeeling took shape” – utterly irrelevant to the history of the district. 
Along the colonial archives, the area is then described as 
“practically uninhabited” when the British arrives in 1835 
(Government of West Bengal, 1986, p. 5). A somewhat misleading 
reading of colonial census figures proves this point in the document. 
Here, the figure of 100 inhabitants, as it was judged by Archibal 
Campbell upon arrival to Darjeeling and only related to the small 
settlement on the Darjeeling hill, is directly compared to later figures 
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covering much larger areas: the 10,000 inhabitants Campbell guessed 
lived in Darjeeling and the surrounding hills in 1850 and the 94,712 
inhabitants registered in in the first Census of the whole district in 
1872. This assertion of ‘emptiness’ before the British arrived on the 
scene has some resemblances to notions of terra nullius (empty land) in 
other colonial contexts (Cerwonka, 2004; Massey, 2005). While for the 
British it might have served as legitimation for taking over the land, in 
this ‘information document’ it furthermore supports a notion that the 
area was only a real place after the British arrived – after all, what can 
we make of an uninhabited space “almost entirely under forest”? 
Additionally, if the land was empty – both of people and 
meaning-as-a-place – in 1835 then everyone living there today must, 
logically, be a migrant. Only a small number of Bhutias and Lepchas 
lived there before. As the document further points out, “both the 
Nepalis and the Bengalis came to the territory as immigrants following 
the development of the tea industry and the expansion of the 
administration” (Government of West Bengal, 1986, p. 4). 
Subsequently, the Nepalis are described as “a pushing, thriving race” – 
quoting directly from Hunter’s 1907 gazetteer without qualification or 
comment (Government of West Bengal, 1986, pp. 5-6). The document, 
in other words, uncritically reproduces a colonial discourse not only on 
migration history but also on race. 
Finally, on the very first page, the information document brings 
out a representation of the area that resonates uncannily well with the 
image of the colonial hill station described earlier. Before going into a 
range of ‘socio-economic’ figures, the document foregrounds that: 
The peaceful Himalayan region of West Bengal, with a Nepalese 
majority, is largely known for its tea gardens and scenic beauty and 
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is a major tourist attraction in the country. Tea, Tourism and Timber, 
the three Ts form the backbone of the hill economy. (Government of 
West Bengal, 1986, p. 1) 
As in a hill station tourist brochure, the Darjeeling area – at the time 
regularly shut down by bandhs (close-down strikes) and hit by violent 
clashes – is characterised as inherently peaceful, beautiful and 
attractive. The violence taking place in Darjeeling must, therefore, be 
temporary and external to Darjeeling as a place. It must be fuelled 
simply by the “anti-nationalist” and “secessionist” agitation of the 
GNLF. And it is probably – as especially CPI (M) senior politician 
Ranadive’s separate pamphlet emphasises – incited by the “invisible 
hand” of “foreign influence” (Government of West Bengal, 1986, pp. 
v, 30; Ranadive, 1986). 
The beauty and tranquillity of the hill station landscape is then 
utilised as the aesthetic backdrop to describe a ‘normal’ situation of 
“communal harmony” among a diverse range of tea garden workers: 
The lush green tea estates are a microcosm of the Indian entity where the 
Nepalis, tribals from Bihar, Bengalis, Lepchas, Bhutias, Mech and other hill 
and non-hill tribes work side by side, and come to know each other, and 
strengthen their bonds as working people irrespective of their linguistic, 
ethnic, religious and other differences. The struggles fought by the trade 
unions in the tea gardens over many decades have brought about a working 
class consciousness and solidarity which transcends other loyalties and bonds. 
(Government of West Bengal, 1986, p. 28) 
Strikingly, for an avowed communist document, this “working class 
consciousness and solidarity” knows no ‘other’ in the “lush green tea 
estates”. Hence, the widespread ethnic split between Bengali owners 
and managers, on the one hand, and Nepali manual labourers, on the 
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other, is nowhere to be found in the text.146 The beauty of the 
Darjeeling hill and tea garden are, rather, invoked to propagate that, 
“until the recent happenings” everyone “lived peacefully and 
amicably” and that “the atmosphere of in the hills of Darjeeling was in 
keeping with the excellent tradition of communal harmony in the rest of 
the state” (Government of West Bengal, 1986, pp. 6, my emphasis). 
This representation of Darjeeling as a peaceful place, with all its 
‘imperial debris’, all its reminiscences from the image of the colonial 
hill station, was also widely circulated in news reports even around the 
peak of the conflict.147 While the violence in the hills is of course the 
main focus of report – the news – the beauty and tranquillity ostensibly 
characterising ‘normal life’ in the hills is repeatedly brought in as a 
backdrop in introductions and headings. The article Darjeeling 
Disquiet begins with the statement: 
To the list of India’s troublespots, one more name has now been 
added – Darjeeling. This idyllic hill station first developed by the 
British after they obtained it from Sikkim on an annual rent of Rs. 
6000 ‘way back in 1835, has been in the grip of an agitation 
involving a section of its Nepali population” (Economic Times, 
1986). 
Another article published in The Sunday Observer a few months later 
commences with the following paragraph: 
                                                
146 Michael Hutt e.g. states that: “In the main industries of Darjeeling district (tea, 
timber, and tourism), Nepalis constitute the vast majority of the workforce, but are 
almost wholly absent from the ownership or management of any concern. Such 
positions are invariably occupied by plainspeople.” (1997, p. 119). Swatahsiddha 
Sarkar presents a similar view in a recent article stating that: “there is no denying 
the fact that in the spheres of tea plantation and white collar job sector the 
plainsmen, mostly the Bengalis, have enjoyed an advantageous position ever since 
the history of the hills station” (2010, p. 112). 
147 There is a large compilation of news reports from the period in the DGHC 
publication (M. P. Lama, 1996). 
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The Nepalese in their inimitable manner, have given themselves an 
absolute gem of a word – “Kunni”, which means; “I don’t know, and 
I couldn’t be bothered to find out.” This writer will wager his finest 
silk kurta that were one to descend (due to the GNLF roadblocks) on 
any one of the tea bushes in Darjeeling’s 45-plus tea estates, and ask 
the astute Nepalese there what all the fuss and fury was about, pat 
would come a succinct “Kunni”. So, how an extremely breathtaking 
and tranquil mountainscape has turner truculent is surely a complex, 
contradictory story. (The Sunday Observer, 1986) 
Referring explicitly to the tranquillity of the land, and implicitly to the 
peaceful character of the Nepalis – the “simple ‘sathi’” (friend) as the 
latter article calls them – these and other articles dramatize the current 
situation on the backdrop of a different, ‘normal’ past. A past that 
resonates uncannily with colonial representations of the idyllic hill 
station and simple mountain folk.  
Gorkhaland as a Pragmatic Solution for the Hill Station 
In this section, I analyse the political publications of the contemporary 
Gorkhaland movement. I show how these texts present Gorkhaland 
more in terms of a pragmatic solution to a political problem than in 
terms directed at producing a new meaning for the area. And I show 
how, in the lack of any new meaning, the tried and tested image of the 
Darjeeling hill station imposes itself even on the pages of the 
Gorkhaland movements own publications. 
When the Gorkhaland movement was renewed under Bimal 
Gurungs leadership in 2007 the repertoire of political mobilisation, 
public practises and discourse repeated many elements from the 80s. 
Strikes were held shutting down traffic in the hills for periods at a time, 
‘black-flag’ rallies assembled, and copies of legal agreements burnt in 
the streets. The 1986 GNLF pamphlet Why Gorkhaland? A Case for 
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the Formation of a Separate State was replaced with the similar-
sounding GJM pamphlet Why Gorkhaland?. Still, some shift of focus 
had taken place. Many activities and speeches directed anger and 
resentment towards Ghisingh and the DGHC rather than the national 
establishment in general. The legal agreements burnt were no longer, as 
under Ghisingh, the Indo-Nepal Friendship Treaty, but the 1988 
agreement between Ghisingh, the union and the state government 
instituting the by now despised hill council. ‘Gandhian’ hunger strikes 
supplemented the repertoire of movement practices and arguments 
brought forward were substantially more nationalist in their references 
than under Ghisingh. Nonetheless, across changes and continuities in 
political strategy, the representations of Gorkhaland as a distinct, 
‘anthropological’ place continue to be elusive – giving way to generic 
administrative representations – easily legible by the state – and a co-
optation of the (commodified) ‘hill station’ imagination of the area. 
Although the ‘anxiety of belonging’ for the Gorkhas still 
provides the main background for the movement, Gurung and the 
GJM’s political discourse does not (need to) amplify this affect as 
much. In line with the academic and other reflective literature 
published since the 80s, the GJM seems to take the ‘identity crisis’ of 
the Gorkhas in India more as an established fact than something that 
needs to be brought about (see e.g. Sinha & Subba, 2003; T. B. Subba 
et al., 2009). In the hands of the GJM, Ghisingh’s harnessing and 
amplification of a precarious situation has been concentrated, rather, 
onto a few more concrete enemies. On top of this list stands Ghisingh 
himself and his idea of a sixth schedule arrangement for the Darjeeling 
hills. The encouraged flourishing of discreet ethnic identities in the 
mid-2000s have again given way to an emphasis on a common Gorkha 
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identity. As described by Middleton, the main Nepali festival Dasain 
(or Durga Puja) is now brought back into the public space of Darjeeling 
(Middleton, 2010, pp. 314-316). Similarly, in 2008 Gurung sought to 
impose a typical Nepali dress-code for all Gorkhas in Darjeeling over 
the tourist season (The Hindu, 2008; The Telegraph, 2008). Although 
this apparently didn’t last long, it represented a new politics of concrete 
‘Gorkha’ symbols played out in urban, public space – fashioning the 
Gorkha community in front of the tourists’ gaze. 
GJM’s pamphlet Why Gorkhaland? is widely available in 
Darjeeling and on the internet. It presents a shorter, revised version of 
the document The Case for Gorkhaland which the GJM submitted to 
the Union Home Secretary during the first round of ‘tripartite talks’148. 
On the first page, it presents the Gorkhaland movement as a “justified, 
peaceful, democratic, constitutional and Gandhian Movement for a 
separate state within the Indian Union” (GJM, 2009, p. 1). From this 
assertion onwards, the pamphlet and the longer document, as well as 
multiple interviews and speeches seek to place Gorkhaland well within 
the Indian nation both administratively and rhetorically. Apart from 
explicitly stating the movement’s loyalty to the Indian nation, the 
documents bring out numerous references to the pantheon of Indian 
national heroes, they inscribe the history of the Gorkhas into the anti-
colonial struggle, and phrase their oppression at the hands of the West 
Bengal state in the nationally despised terms of colonialism. 
The ‘internal colonialism’ of the West Bengal state is repeatedly 
emphasised across the documents, turning the well-known accusations 
of anti-nationalism away from the Gorkhaland movement. Why 
                                                
148 Following GJM takeover in Darjeeling, these talks were initiated in September 
2008. The three parties were the Union Government (led by the home ministry), the 
West Bengal State and the GJM. 
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Gorkhaland? e.g. states that as India became independent and 
Darjeeling and Dooars part of West Bengal “the area once again 
became a colony ruled by the new masters.” (GJM, 2009, pp. 3-4). As 
the longer document supplements: “The inclusion of Darjeeling and the 
Dooars in present day Bengal stemmed more from the desire for 
revenue prompted by colonial traditions rather than nationalist 
feelings.” (GJM, 2008, p. 12 my emphasis). Nonetheless: 
the West Bengal Government to paper over its historic oppression of 
the people of Darjeeling district and Dooars and its neo-colonial 
policies in the region (…) dubbed the movement as “anti-national” 
(GJM, 2008). 
In contrast to this, The Case for Gorkhaland establishes that “the 
Development of the Gorkha sub-nationalism coincided with the 
development of Indian nationalism.” Hence, the: “patriotic Indian 
Gorkhas have always wanted to have a home within India (GJM, 2008, 
p. 10) and “a separate state for the Indian Gorkhas will help the 
community find its own feet and march in tune with the forward 
movement of the great country of India” (GJM, 2008, p. 11). 
Across the GJM documents, Gorkhaland is curiously described 
as an “area” – a generic space – rather than a place. When Gorkhaland 
is presented, the documents repeatedly refer back to existing 
administrative delineations, the number of mouzas (the smallest 
administrative unit) and the area in square kilometres. The Why 
Gorkhaland? pamphlet e.g. states that: 
The total area of the proposed State of Gorkhaland comprising the 
present Darjeeling District and the contiguous area of Dooars in 
North Jalpaiguri district is approximately 6459 square kilometres. 
The Total population of the proposed State of Gorkhaland is 
approximately 30 lakhs as per 2001 census. (…) the district of 
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Darjeeling lies between 26°31’ and 27°13’ North latitude and 
between 87°89’ and 88°53’ East longitude. (GJM, 2009, p. 16) 
The Case for Gorkhaland presents a similar formulation, supplemented 
by an appendix listing all the existing police stations and mouzas 
intended to be included in Gorkhaland (GJM, 2008, pp. 3, 15-16). 
Here, the establishment of a certain, authentic meaning as a place that 
one might expect to find in a pamphlet propagating local autonomy in 
the contemporary global conjuncture just isn’t there.  
Presented as an administrative space, Gorkhaland is posed 
largely as a pragmatic political solution to a problem of national 
recognition rather than a problem of local belonging and autonomy. 
The Case for Gorkhaland argues that ”Gorkhaland is the dream of over 
a crore [10 million] of Indian Gorkhas living all over India, not merely 
that of the 25 odd lakh Gorkhas in Darjeeling and Dooars in West 
Bengal” (GJM, 2008). Hence, the issue relates not only to Darjeeling as 
a place, but to all Indian Gorkhas that are “only asserting their right to 
self-esteem in a country that they helped to build.” Seen in this light, 
Gorkhaland could, in principle, be situated anywhere in India. The 
claim of the Darjeeling hills and parts of the Siliguri and Dooars plains 
as a separate state is simply a matter of historical conjecture. As the 
document states, “the battleground for the demand has perforce been 
located in present day West Bengal for historical and geographical 
reasons.” (GJM, 2008, p. 10). It is, in other words, not the specific 
character of the Darjeeling area as a place that motivates the 
Gorkhaland movement, as it is presented here, but broader questions of 
national recognition that might – due to somewhat arbitrary historical 
reasons – be solved through territorial intervention in this area. 
Darjeeling Disquiet 
 218 
As support for the idea that Gorkhaland can provide a solution to 
a question of recognition The Case for Gorkhaland presents a curious 
reading of two academic texts: Thongchai Winichakul’s Siam Mapped 
(1994) and Ian Barrow’s Making History, Drawing Territory (2003). 
While both of these texts provide a critical, deconstructive reading of 
the effects of mapping and bordering territory, the GJM reading turns 
them into constructive propositions. As the document notes: 
Both these scholars viewed a community of people as a fluid, 
amorphous group lacking a concrete identity until they were 
characterised within politically defined spaces with boundaries that 
could be reflected on the map. (GJM, 2008, p. 11)149 
Consequently, the document uses these texts to legitimate the answer 
that “the delineation of geographical boundaries (…) gives a 
community – or a nation – an identity as a political entity” (GJM, 2008, 
p. 10). Hence, in relation to Gorkhaland: 
“The new state will not be premised on economic solutions to the 
problems of a particular region. The new state, instead, is a political 
entity that will create, with no ambiguity whatsoever, a political 
identity for a people who were landholders in a territory that later 
became current day India.” (GJM, 2008, pp. 11, emphasis added) 
Although the latter quote mentions a more grounded form of 
belonging (being landholders) the main thrust of the argument 
presented by GJM poses Gorkhaland simply as an academically 
supported ‘politico-administrative’ solution to a more general problem 
of identity and recognition. 
With regards to Darjeeling, the GJM documents, on the other 
hand, largely recycle the existing ‘hill station’ image – even 
                                                
149 In line with this, the Why Gorkhaland? pamphlet provides a map of the 
“proposed state of Gorkhaland” (GJM, 2009, p. 17). 
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incorporating elements from the 1986 presentation by the West Bengal 
government. The Case for Gorkhaland e.g. describes how a broad 
range of ethnic communities worked harmoniously together in the tea 
gardens of Darjeeling giving them a shared “ethno-class 
consciousness” (GJM, 2008, p. 4). Similarly, the more widely 
circulated pamphlet describes Darjeeling as follows: 
Darjeeling is popular[ly] known as “Queen of Hills”, a tourist 
paradise. Darjeeling produces world famous tea known as the 
“Champagne of Tea”, which fetches sizeable foreign exchange for 
the country. (…) Darjeeling is also famous for its “Toy Train” which 
has been accorded the status of International Heritage by UNESCO. 
(GJM, 2009, p. 16) 
Here, the document uncritically taps into a readily available repertoire 
of phrases to describe Darjeeling – phrases that bring up associations in 
line with the hill station image of the area with its global connections. 
In parallel, the front cover of the pamphlet displays images of a snow-
clad Kanchenjunga, brave Gurkha soldiers, lush green tea gardens 
undergoing peaceful plucking, and the heritage Toy Train. (see 
illustration below). 
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Illustration 13: Why Gorkhaland? 
This representation of the Darjeeling area in the well-rehearsed 
‘tourist-brochure’ language of beauty, harmony and heritage is, further, 
combined with a range of more forward-looking potential identities for 
the area largely presented in a similar language of commodification. 
Under the envisioned Gorkhaland administration, Darjeeling is 
presented as a potential “Agra-Export Zone”, as well as an “organic 
state” and “biodiversity hotspot” suited for “agro-tourism” and “hydel-
power” projects (GJM, 2008, pp. 14-15). Across these representations, 
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it is the economic potential and the ability to ‘sell’ the area that is in 
focus, rather than its connection to the ‘Gorkhas’. 
In summary, the recent GJM discourse seem to be less about 
representing Gorkhaland as an authentic homeland for the Gorkhas 
than one might expect. Instead of posing the area as one that holds a 
certain meaning for the Gorkha population, the documents present the 
proposal of a separate state as a pragmatic, political solution to a 
nation-wide question of recognition and belonging. Hence, rather than 
focusing on ‘rooting’ Gorkha identity in the area, the documents seems 
more invested in producing the GJM as the only legitimate actor to 
engage in a process of political bargaining over the area. To do so, the 
documents largely speak in a language easily amenable to state 
legibility: Just as the old DGHC agreement, they describe the area in 
terms of existing administrative units more readily available for 
bargaining than e.g. essential claims in terms of homeland. As the 1986 
‘information document’ before them, the documents describe the 
Darjeeling area through the image of the harmonious tea garden – a 
perspective obviously familiar to the state. And, in a future-oriented 
exposition, The Case for Gorkhaland sells the area in the – similarly 
well-rehearsed – language of economic development. In other words, 
state legibility and political bargaining seem to be valued over more 
‘anthropological’ or ‘indigenous’ forms of place-making.  
Gorkhaland as Spectacle 
Jai Gorkha, jai Gorkhaland, jai Gorkha Janmukti Morcha!  
As described in the introduction to this chapter, the visual image of 
GJM and the Gorkhaland agenda was imposingly present in the urban 
public space of Darjeeling in April 2011. In this section, I argue that 
this presence is connected to the discursive project of posing GJM as 
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the only legitimate partner for external political bargaining manifested 
through a control of public space. Intuitively, the ubiquity of the GJM 
spectacle can hardly be interpreted as stemming solely from 
spontaneous public support. I suggest that we regard it as a spectacle 
directed towards the production of compliance – much like the 
spectacles of the Asad cult that Lisa Wedeen has analysed.150 Thus, as 
the mitigating of the ‘Indian Nepali’ community’s ‘anxious belonging’ 
have shifted from tacit tactics of state evasion to spectacular strategies 
of state recognition, urban Darjeeling provides an important site for a 
spectacular display of control and orchestrating compliance – just as in 
colonial times (Kenny, 1995). 
Already under Ghising’s Gorkhaland movement and later rule, 
urban public space has held an obvious, important role for staging 
control over the area (Sarkar, 2010, p. 115). Still today, control of the 
Darjeeling streets seems to work as a consciously manipulated gauge of 
the often impenetrable weave of politics in the area. During the time of 
the state elections in April 2011, the way the Gorkhaland was fused 
with the GJM across public space was, as mentioned, striking. Most 
visual representations would, in one way or another, bring together the 
green-yellow-white colours of the GJM flag with the Gorkhaland 
inscription (see illustrations below). In line with this the whole setup 
                                                
150 In her book on Syria, Lisa Wedeen describes the ‘Asad cult’ as “a strategy of 
domination based on compliance rather than legitimacy” – a compliance brought 
about largely through the visual orchestration of symbols and visceral orchestration 
of public rituals in a grand ‘spectacle’ (Wedeen, 1999, p. 6). Wedeen argues that 
spectacles are effective: 1) because they discipline participants in a way that “both 
symbolizes and prepares for political obedience”; 2) because they “dramatize (…) 
power by providing occasions to enforce obedience, thereby creating a politics of 
pretence in which all participate by few actually believe”; and finally because they 
“ground political thinking in the images and symbols the regime puts forth, framing 
the way people see themselves as citizens, much as advertising offers people a 
frame in which they imagine themselves as consumers” (Wedeen, 1999, p. 19). 
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was much more geared towards stating who was in control of the area, 
rather than what kind of a place Gorkhaland was (supposed to be). 
 
 
Illustration 14: One of the many Gorkhaland signs 
 
In spite of GJM’s visual presence, anxiety of control still hung in 
the air of Darjeeling town in April-May 2011. Counter-intuitively, 
Subash Ghisingh was again at the centre of attention. Since GJM had 
barred him from entering the hills in February 2008, Ghisingh had 
stayed in the plains of Siliguri. However, on 8 April 2011 he returned 
in preparation for the elections.151 In Darjeeling, his presence was 
closely and nervously surveyed by the media and residents. Numerous 
newspaper articles and a lot of general gossip in town was strikingly 
focused on the physical presence and position of Ghisingh in 
Darjeeling town. Politics and urban space seemed curiously aligned. 
The day before the election results were announced, Bimal Gurung 
                                                
151 The votes for the elections were cast in different phases throughout the state 
creating a temporal gap between the actual voting pratice in the Darjeeling hills 
(part of one of the early phases of the election process) and the publication of the 
results on 13 May, 2011. 
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used a newspaper interview to emphasise that Ghisingh “should realise 
that the hills are not with him and he should leave” – that his “visa to 
the hill” would expire after the elections (Chhetri, 2011b). The threat of 
repercussions was only slightly veiled. As Gurung had stated in an 
earlier interview: “the common people would not allow him to stay 
even a single day in the hills. The security would definitely be relaxed 
after the electoral process is completed. Then we would see.” (Gurung 
interviews in Bagchi, 2012, p. 362). 
On 13 May 2011 the election results were announced. GJM 
candidates had won all three hill constituencies of Darjeeling, 
Kalimpong and Kurseong with large margins. Five days later, Rabin 
Rai, a young GJM cadre who had been injured during a clash with the 
GNLF after the elections results, died in a hospital in Siliguri. By then, 
Ghisingh had left the Darjeeling hills leading the newspapers to carry 
the breaking news: “Ghisingh leaves the hills at night” (Chhetri, 
2011a). For some, there seemed to be a sigh of relief. Nonetheless, 
during the elections rallies the following days, a sense of urgency about 
dispelling Ghisingh’s ghost from the hills continued to characterise the 
public spectacle. 
In the GJM victory rally on 13 May, when the elections results 
were made public, GJM cadres poured into Darjeeling from the 
surrounding areas on foot and in a variety of vehicles (see illustration 
below). The slogans they chanted were, however, not about electoral 
victory and Gorkhaland. The most popular seemed to be “Subbash 
Ghisingh is rotten!” and “Subbash Ghisingh should be thrown into the 
dam!”. The old master had to go. Pouring into town, the cadres passed 
in front of the Old Supermarket building where most of the ‘ethnic’ 
organisations have their offices. While these must have been busy 
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during the “all time high” of ethnic politics in the mid-2000s 
(Middleton, 2010, p. 310) activities were now in a lull. As one 
representative told me, they were currently in “hibernation”. Wanting 
to display an undivided Gorkhaland, the political parties had “their 
hands on their heads”.152 The ‘ethnic’ organisations largely followed 
suit as the GJM chanted slogans against the sixth schedule and hence a 
‘tribal’ status for Darjeeling. 
 
 
Illustration 15: GJM cadres coming into Darjeeling 
 
On 19 May, the GJM held a “black rally” to mourn the loss of 
Rabin Rai. This replaced an electoral victory rally that had been 
planned. Here, even though Ghisingh had left the hills, the speeches 
again centred on his person and a rejection of the sixth schedule. 
Roshan Giri, GJM vice-president, stated that: 
                                                
152 Middleton further states that many of the ‘ethnic’ representatives and activist 
that were informants during his fieldwork a few years earlier were nowhere to be 
found (Christoffer Townsend Middleton, personal communication, Darjeeling May 
2011). 
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The GNLF has always been creating violence here, (…) [Subbash 
Ghisingh] has killed more than 1200 people, he has burned down the 
houses of many people, many became orphans and still today GNLF 
is doing politics of violence and intimidation here. (…) Now if 
Subbash Ghisingh tries to come to the hills the people should not 
tolerate him. Now Subbash Ghisingh is living as a culprit of the 
Gorkha jati. (…) he escaped from Darjeeling over-night since he lost 
the election and the people rejected the sixth schedule.153 
Although the GJM had just come out with a massive electoral victory 
and managed to physically dispel their old opponent from the hills, 
Ghishing’s ghost was – it seemed – still around. While one might have 
expected speeches describing the noble cause of Gorkhaland for which 
Rai had, tragically, lost his life, an anxious focus on dispelling 
Ghisingh’s ghost and manifesting control of the hills once again 
overshadowed other concerns.  
Conclusion: Converging Gazes 
On March 1, 2012 the new Chief Minister of West Bengal, Mamata 
Bannerjee, visited the Darjeeling hills. The following day The Calcutta 
Telegraph reported: 
At 9th Mile, before Teesta Bazar, Mamata asked the driver to stop. 
Stepping out of the vehicle, she started taking pictures on her iPad. 
“Why don’t you build cottages here? This is such a beautiful place. 
Many people can come and stay here,” Mamata told the tourism 
secretary. “I have taken some pictures. I will send them to you. 
Please see what can be done here,” she said before taking her seat in 
the front beside the driver. (Ganguly, 2012) 
                                                
153 Roshan Giri’s speech presented at Chowk Bazaar, Darjeeling 19 May 2011. 
Recorded by the author, transcribed and translated from the original Nepali with 
help from Narayan Adhikari. 
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This spontaneous event was, the Telegraph suggested, part of 
Mamata’s “master plan to convert the hills into Switzerland”. Eight 
months later, the Telegraph reported that the small village Mamata had 
photographed had become an “eco-tourist spot” with “home stays”, 
“tourist tents” a “trekking trail” and a park (Chhetri, 2012). Between 
their respective electoral successes in the 2011 state elections and these 
instances in 2012, the GJM and Bannerjee had signed an agreement 
paving the way for a revised administrative setup for local government 
– the Gorkhaland Territorial Administration (GTA). At the signing of 
the GTA agreement in the summer of 2011, Bannerjee, similarly stated 
her goal of turning Darjeeling hills into “Switzerland”. Since then, this 
image has repeatedly been brought up both by her and the GJM.  
Across disagreements, the new rulers in both Calcutta and 
Darjeeling thus seem to be converging on an image of a future 
Darjeeling. As analysed above, already the 2009 Why Gorkhaland? 
pamphlet and other GJM documents relied on a hill station image of 
Darjeeling – converging towards the mixed governmental and tourist 
gaze that the West Bengal government is applying. This converging 
gaze once again replays a representation of Darjeeling in the image of 
the hill station. Recently, a tourism development project “destination 
Darjeeling” was recently set in motion to further mould Darjeeling in 
the “Switzerland” image of a modern agro-tourism hill station. As part 
of the project, the government plans to renovate the Planter’s Club, the 
Gymkhana Club and the old church of Darjeeling – all three physical 
manifestations of Darjeeling’s hill station history (India Today Online, 
2011). 
Hence, as the GJM spectacles and discourse of slightly veiled 
threats is setting Bimal Gurung up as the local sovereign of the 
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Darjeeling hills, a representational agreement seems to be emerging 
between him and Calcutta. The once again repeated imagination of 
Darjeeling through the governmental gaze of the British colonisers, 
thus supports a governmental arrangement that itself seems close to an 
imperial government at a distance. In the GTA elections, the GJM won 
all forty-five constituencies. In twenty-eight of these they were 
unopposed. In a range of other constituencies they were officially 
opposed by Mamata’s Trinamool Congress (TMC) but she had already 
announced that her candidates were to withdraw – albeit too late for the 
official deadline (Dutta, 2012). Hence, the GJM face actual 
competition in only one constituency. Here the independent candidate 
Sanchabir Subba contested, despite Bimal Gurung’s public request that 
he stepped down (B. Roy, 2012). Subba lost the election. Furthermore, 
a range of potential court cases against GJM cadres, including the one 
related the killing of Madam Tamang, has so far gone nowhere. Hence, 
if we regard sovereignty as, ultimately, the power to decide over life 
and death then the GJM does seem to act – and be allowed to act – as a 
local sovereign.  
Mamata’s gesture presented above, on the other hand, seems to 
replay that of an emperor governing at a distance. Just like when the 
British first arrived to Darjeeling, Mamata also found a “forested spur” 
that could be domesticated into the contemporary tourist version of a 
hill station. While it remains to be seen what the GTA/GJM 
administration will mean for the people of Darjeeling, the arrangement 
of local autonomy that has been instituted seems to differ substantially 
from what might have been aspired for. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
Processes of globalization have disturbed  the familiar metaphors 
and practices of vertical encompassment (still taken for granted by 
the participants in debates on globalization, including journalists 
and academics), and the new landscape that is emerging can be 
understood only through a rethinking of space and scale (Ferguson 
& Gupta, 2002, p. 990) 
The world as we know it from the school atlas is changing. Over the 
last couple of decades, we have been searching for terms to grasp this 
change. Globalisation, neoliberalism, and empire have been some of 
the suggestions. However, what has been important to me, in the 
present study, has not been a discussion of what overall terms we 
should apply to grasp contemporary changes. Rather, my interest has 
been attached to the ways in which these changes are actually taking 
place, how the changing world involves shifting conditions for 
government and for local autonomy. I have engaged this investigation 
from the Himalayan hills, not to exoticise this location, but due to the 
perspective on government that this locality allows. As argued in the 
text above, these hills are inherently challenging to govern and they 
have historically been regarded as a place of un-governability. On the 
other hand, they have also functioned as a place of refuge from the 
centralised governmental gaze. Investigating the conditions of 
government and autonomy from these hills thus allows us to bring into 
sharp relief the spatiality of government. And it is, I argue, exactly the 
spatiality of government that we need to rethink in light of 
contemporary changes. 
Pursuing this interest, I have engaged in a complex and broad-
sweeping analysis. Arguing that we need to regard contemporary 
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changes in light of the governmental histories that they relate to, I have 
presented three governmental assemblages: imperial landscapes, 
national territories and glocal place-making. I have analysed how each 
of these emerged in relation the extension of government across the 
Himalayan hills at different points in time. Nonetheless, I have done so 
primarily to provide a deeper understanding of the contemporary 
conditions. In the study, I thus show how elements of both imperial 
landscapes and national territories are present in contemporary 
government; I argue that these elements stand in various positions of 
tension with each other; and I illustrate how a range of these tensions 
are actualised in place-making in the Himalayan hills. Hence, while 
claims to local autonomy are obviously framed by categories of 
difference originating in imperial histories and national territories, the 
politics surrounding these claims in turn tell us a whole lot about the 
contemporary life empire and nation.  
As my study illustrates, the imperial landscapes of the British and 
Gorkhas have operated through an ecological differentiation between 
hills and plains, and through anthropological differentiations of castes 
and races. The national territories of Nepal and India have, in turn, 
sought to ‘rule out and roll over’ these differences in the production of 
national unity. I argue, however, that the production of national 
territories has ‘rolled over’ more than it has ‘ruled out’ the imperial 
landscapes and their lines of difference. In Panchayat Nepal, this 
rolling over involved teaching a new national language of difference – 
one in which notions of developmental difference would eliminate 
imperial hierarchies of caste. But, as I illustrate in the study, imperial 
differences survived below the surface. National schooling ended up 
extending imperial differences across the hills more efficiently than 
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ever, while the practice of schooling concomitantly supported a 
developmental differentiation between educated and un-educated, 
awareness and backwardness.  
Hence, imperial landscapes and national territories are not so 
interesting by themselves as they are interesting in light of the tensions 
that exist between them. We routinely regard empire as operating 
through gradually fading extensions of power from centres towards 
peripheries, through spatial differentiation and through organised ranks 
of inequality (Ludden, 2011). National rule is, on the other hand, 
typically imagined in terms of spatial homogeneity, even extensions of 
sovereignty and at least some level of equality. National territories, in 
other words, encourages us to disregard the spatiality of government, 
while imperial landscapes brings this spatiality in focus. My study, 
however, blurs the boundaries between these two assemblages in real 
life. In my analysis of the position of Darjeeling within the territorial 
reorganisation and national imagination of India, I show how colonial 
lines of ecological and racial distinctions directly inform national 
territorialisation. Hence, while Indian nationalism often emphasises its 
background in a ‘post-colonial condition’, it is important to remember 
that this conditions wasn’t nearly as uniform as national discourse 
tends to portray. And it is important to note that the spatial inequalities 
of the imperial landscape were often brought into the national territory 
across midnight in 1947.154  
The contemporary production of place, I have argued, exposes a 
range of the tensions that exist between imperial landscapes and 
                                                
154 See (Ludden, 2012) for a thought-provoking analysis of the contemporary life of 
imperial borders and its consequences. See also (S. Roy, 2007) for a detailed 
analysis of Nehruvian India including many lines that run back across the midnight 
of 1947. 
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national territories. As movements for local autonomy seek to pose 
their localities as places to be invested with formal governmental 
authority, they bring out, refashion and re-combine categories of 
difference from both imperial landscapes and national territories. 
Concomitantly, the politics of autonomy also actualises globalised 
notions of indigeneity, tourism, heritage and branding. The 
governmental assemblage around glocal place-making, thus, brings out 
elements that we associate with all three of the grand terms for 
contemporary change mentioned above: globalisation, neoliberalism, 
and empire. It brings out the contemporary global connectivity in 
multiple ways and on both sides of traditional distinctions between e.g. 
state dominance and grass-root resistance. As my study of the 
Limbuwan movement illustrates, the production of place and claims to 
local autonomy operate through connections of imperial differences to 
global notions of indigeneity and the circulation of local as well as 
international academic texts. Affluent diaspora, furthermore, play a role 
in this both through the production of academic studies based in foreign 
universities, and through the wider circulation of academic knowledge 
of indigenous history and culture across social media. The production 
of Limbuwan as a ‘local’ place is thus ‘global’ in multiple senses. 
The same goes for Darjeeling and Gorkhaland. Here, connections 
between state interest and globalised capitalist endeavours that one 
could describe in terms of neoliberalism support a colonial image of 
Darjeeling. Hence, in the governmental assemblage around glocal 
place-making, the movement for a Gorkhaland state is faced not only 
with national territorial government, but also with globalised images of 
Darjeeling that are circulated in relation to industries of heritage, 
tourism and tea. As I have shown, these images replay colonial 
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aesthetics that might end up as a gathering point for new forms of 
imperial government at a distance. The convergence between the West 
Bengal government and the GJM around the existing harmonious 
image of the hill station, point towards what might be seen as a 
contemporary marker of normality (as opposed to violence and 
unruliness). Here, the end of conflict is marked in the commercialised 
image of tourists pouring into the hills. International tourism thus 
comes to encapsulate the notion of the area’s “return to peace” and its 
division from areas characterised by more perpetual unruliness in the 
national and global imagination. 
Taking a concerted look at the contemporary conditions for 
autonomy across Limbuwan and Gorkhaland, the picture that emerges 
is ambivalent. Across these movements my study suggest that the 
contemporary changes in governmental assemblages might bring 
decisions both closer to and further from the people inhabiting these 
areas. For the Limbuwan movement, connections to globalised notions 
of indigeneity bring substantial leverage into claims for a federal state. 
The shifting governmental situation thus brings opportunities that have 
not been present across long periods of autocratic and unequal rule. 
However, as my study also indicates, the academic politics through 
which the battle for Limbuwan is currently fought also contains a 
potentially exclusive dimension. As engagement in this sort of politics 
relies on an ‘ethnic fluency’ operating through a specific language of 
difference and belonging, the academic politics of Limbuwan in part 
replays developmental difference of awareness and un-educated 
backwardness. As a range of the novel ‘indigenous people’s 
organisations’ double as NGOs implementing foreign supported 
development programs, the tried and tested developmental language of 
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awareness easily imposes itself in the vocabulary of their operations. 
The consequences of this might be a repeated distinction between 
developed centres and backward peripheries – whether in geographical 
or other sense. 
Finally, despite a multitude of connections that challenge our 
scalar imagination of the world, my study illustrates how the 
Limbuwan and Gorkhaland movements for autonomy are still 
thoroughly territorialised by the national scale. Throughout my 
investigations of the movements, I kept asking myself: Why are there 
not more secessionists? The contiguous areas of Limbuwan and 
Gorkhaland, after all, share histories of migration, settlement and 
centralised exploitation; they share normative landscape of belonging; 
and they share contemporary ambitions. Nonetheless, the movements I 
analysed largely turn their backs to each other, while turning their 
fronts towards the national centres. As the longer history of the area 
reminds us, this movement into rather than away from the 
governmental gaze of the nation-state is something that has gradually 
emerged. It obviously involves a paradox as local autonomy is sought 
through centralised legibility. This paradox, I think, illustrates part of 
the reason for the resilience of national territorialisation even in the 
contemporary period of global changes: that even a supposedly 
‘fragile’ national state like Nepal has managed to direct the energies of 
local aspirations towards its territorial centre – turning the back to the 
potential soul-mates across the border. 
Studying Contemporary Government and Politics 
If the scales that we habitually rely on for analysis of government and 
politics are shifting what sort of analytical language can we then 
invoke? As pointed out above, my study clearly shows a range of 
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political and governmental dynamics that cut across, rearrange, and 
render obsolete a school atlas approach to the study of contemporary 
government and politics. However, I also suggest new conceptual 
possibilities. First of all, I have invoked the notions of landscape with 
its associations of textures and elevation. In the course of this study, the 
rugged landscape of the hills has acted as a constant reminder that 
government, no matter how globalised, is extended across geography – 
and that geography differs. It has, similarly, reminded us that 
government fundamentally operates through a combination of vision 
and materiality. Landscape, thus, brings out the spatial variety of 
government and governmental conditions that a reliance of territory 
obscures. Together with notions of borderland, landscape reminds us of 
the differences within as well as the similarities across national 
territories. As such, the notion of landscape provides a different 
potential starting-point for analysis than territory – one that brings into 
sharper view the spatiality of government. 
Secondly, I have employed the notion of assemblages to grasp 
the historical shifts in government that I analyse. I follow Deleuze and 
Guattari in seeing the assemblage as a combination of discourses and 
practices that organise space in certain ways (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1987, pp. 503-505). Within this overall characteristic, the notion of the 
assemblage indicates a coming together of a broad range of different 
elements. As in the British hill station, an assemblage can combine a 
broad range of interests, agendas and sensibilities: scientific, 
commercial, administrative, aesthetic, recreational etc. The imperial 
landscapes, national territories and glocal place-making that I have 
analysed in this study also combine knowledge and vision in various 
ways. Invoking the notions of the assemblage as an approach to 
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contemporary government is useful because it sidesteps habitual 
notions of scale. Although assemblages organise space and thus 
produce scale, they are not conceptually tied to certain scales. As I 
have employed the term, it has thus been related to the scales of 
empire, nation, and place in their continued scalar fixation and shifting 
moments of territorialisation and de-territorialisation. Hence, the 
assemblage opens up useful perspectives on a world undergoing scalar 
rearrangements. 
Thirdly, my study has relied on an analytic that focuses on 
difference. In this perspective, government operates through and 
creates a variety of languages of differences as a way to make an 
unwieldy and complex reality governable. In my study, I have pointed 
out how ecological, territorial and anthropological languages of 
difference operate through different categories and in different 
combinations across the three assemblages. This is not meant to 
indicate that these are the only possible languages of difference, nor 
that the assemblages present their only possibilities for combination. 
As my study shows, shifts in governmental assemblages emerge 
through a continuous play of differences. Over time, some differences 
are emphasised and others obscured. And, as I show, differences 
produced or emphasised in order to govern often attain a social life in 
which they are later mobilised and refashioned to challenge and 
rearrange government. Hence, the languages of difference and 
assemblages that I bring out in the present study essentially come out 
of my analytical engagement with the Himalayan hills. However, these 
notions of differences and assemblages potentially have a broader 
resonance because they obviously tap into globalised orders – such as 
the national order of things and global notions of indigenous belonging. 
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Finally, my study has first and foremost dealt with ‘government’. 
But what does it tell us conceptually about government? Obviously, my 
approach to government relies substantially on conceptual 
developments surrounding the Foucaultian notion of ‘governmentality’. 
However, this notion often overlooks or even obscures the spatiality of 
government in its focus on the government of populations.155 As the 
long historical lines of my study has illustrated, government is always 
also a government of landscape. This is important because it is a 
feature of governmental practice that the national territorial 
assemblages obscures. Through governmental discourses and practices 
this assemblages present the school atlas imagination of space as 
external to government, although, I argue, it is in fact an essentially 
building block in the production of governability and government. 
Hence, in this study, I have stubbornly insisted to use the simple term 
government across various assemblages to indicate that there is no 
other, essentially different government out there. This recognition 
becomes even more acute as the national scale might no longer be the 
natural scale to think through. 
Paths ahead 
The present study opens up various interesting paths for further 
investigation in the intersection between globalised dynamics of local 
political aspirations. One pressing problematic to engage is the 
contemporary political play around notions of ‘ruly’ and ‘un-ruly’ 
places. My study tentatively point out that there might be a new 
‘normal’ emerging for such areas associated with branding, tourism 
                                                
155 As Stuart Elden has recently pointed out in relation to ‘territory’: while 
Foucault’s approach to history is “extremely helpful” his treatment of territory “is, 
at best, misleading” – the problem being that “Territory emerges later than 
Foucault thinks it disappears.” (Elden, 2013, pp. 2,8) 
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and the global competition among nation-states. In the Darjeeling hills, 
the image of tourist coming in to enjoy the views, the agri-tourist 
accommodation and the heritage sites seems to become the very 
illustration of a ‘return to peace’. As the recent opening of a ‘guerrilla 
trek’ where tourists can follow the trails of the Maoist insurgency in 
Nepal illustrates, the same tendency goes for other ‘unruly’ areas on 
the subcontinent.156 But what are we to make of such ‘returns to 
peace’? How do these commercialised dynamics contain the 
‘unrulyness’ and how do they relate to the aspirations behind it?  
As I argue for Darjeeling, a ‘return to peace’ might involve new 
arrangements for governing at distance that neither bring decisions 
closer to the local inhabitants, nor resonate very well with the 
democratic image that most states eagerly project in the contemporary 
world of international competition. Reflections in this direction lead to 
another pressing problematic around the local democratic consequences 
of the contemporary global shifts. It has been outside the scope of the 
present study to engage this problematic. However, my motivation 
throughout has been connected to the aspirations for a larger say in 
local matters that I believe, ultimately, fuels the complex and 
contradictory politics of local autonomy. Such aspirations are 
obviously intimately related to notions of democracy. Hence, as the 
conditions for a politics based on these aspirations are shifting, so 
should our approach to them in terms of democracy. As I suggest, new 
concerns might be arising along with the novel opportunities. 
                                                
156 The trek was opened by the former guerrilla leader, Maoist party supremo, and 
former prime minister Prachanda in October 2012. See 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-19815779 (accessed January 2013) 
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